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DUNS SKOT John (Ioannes Duns Scotus) (c. 1266, Duns, Scotland - November 8, 1308, Cologne) - Franciscan theologian, philosopher, the largest representative of the medieval conceptualism ; "the thinnest doctor" (doctor subtilis). He taught at Oxford, Paris, Cologne. Major works - comments on the "Sentences" Peter Lombard : the Oxford commentary, known as Ordinatio (in other editions - Commentaria Oxoniensia, Opus Oxoniense), and the Parisian - Reportata Parisiensia.
Remaining faithful to the tradition of Augustinianism, Duns Scotus at the same time reforms it. He was the first of the Franciscan theologians to renounce the doctrine Augustine about the need for special divine insight to achieve true knowledge, allowing, after Aristotle , firstly, that the human mind has the ability to acquire reliable knowledge about things that exist, and secondly, that all knowledge is ultimately based on the data of sensory perception. Although the ultimate goal of knowledge is the comprehension of divine being, however, a direct contemplation of the infinite being of God is not available to a person in his current state. He knows about the divine being only what he can infer, starting from the contemplation of created things.
But it is not things as such, not the essences of finite things that are the own object of the human intellect: if the ability of intellect were initially limited to the realm of material things, the knowledge of God would become impossible. In sensually perceived things, the mind distinguishes, along with the characteristics that are characteristic only of finite things, which are fixed in Aristotelian categories, transcendentals - aspects of a reality that transcends the world of material things, since they can take place outside of it. This is, first of all, being, as well as the attributes of being, either coinciding in scope with the concept of being: one, true, good, or “disjunctive attributes” such as “infinite or finite”, “necessary or accidental”, “to be a cause or causally conditioned” and etc., dividing the sphere of being as a whole into two subregions.
It is being, according to Duns Scotus, that is the own object of the human intellect, since it is unambiguous, i.e. in the same sense it is applicable both to the Creator and to creatures, and therefore, although man abstracts it from the consideration of material things, it also leads to the knowledge of God, i.e. to the realization of the desire inherent in human nature. Being as such is the subject of philosophy, infinite being is theology, and the finite being of material things is physics.
Like Thomas Aquinas , Duns Scott in his proofs he relies on the Aristotelian doctrine of causes. The proofs of the existence of God for both begin with the statement of the fact that there is something random in the world that may or may not exist. Since the existence of random things is not necessary, it is derivative, i.e. due to the First Cause, which has the necessary existence, Thomas concludes. Duns Scotus considers his argument insufficient: it is impossible, starting from the accidental, to come to conclusions that have the status of necessary truths. In order for the above reasoning to acquire evidentiary force, one should begin with the necessary premises. This can be done, because in any random fact there is something non-random, an essential characteristic that cannot be absent from what is random, namely, that it is possible. The assertion of the possibility of actually existing finite things is necessary. The actual existence of that which has only a possible existence necessarily presupposes the existence of a more perfect (necessary) existence, since a possible existence becomes actual if it is conditioned by that to which existence is inherent in its very nature. God, while possessing the necessary being, is at the same time the source of all possibilities. Since the possibilities of all finite things and events coexist in God, he is infinite.
Really exist, according to Duns Scotus, only individuals; forms and essences (“whatnesses” of things) also exist, but not really, but as objects of the Divine intellect. These entities are "nature" which in themselves are neither general nor particular, but precede the existence of both the general and the particular. If the nature of the horse, argues Duns Scotus, were single, there would be only one horse, if it were universal, there would be no separate horses, since the individual cannot be derived from the general, and vice versa, from the individual - the general. The existence of individual things is possible due to the addition to the essence-nature of a special individualizing feature - "thisness".
Matter cannot serve as the beginning of individualization and differentiation of concrete things from each other, since it itself is indefinite and indistinguishable. The individual is characterized by a unity more perfect than the unity of the species (general nature), because it excludes division into parts. The transition from the unity of species to the unity of the individual presupposes the addition of some inner perfection. "Thisness", being added to the view, as it were, compresses it; species (general nature) loses its divisibility due to “thisness”. In conjunction with "thisness", the general nature ceases to be common to all individuals and turns into a characteristic of this particular individual. The addition of "thisness" means a change in the mode of existence of the species: it receives a real existence.
Interpreting the act of creation as a transition from the reduced existence of universals as objects of divine thinking to the real existence of individuals, Duns Scotus for the first time, in line with the Platonic-Aristotelian philosophical tradition, gives the individual the status of a fundamental ontological unit. An individual, according to the teachings of Duns Scotus, has a higher existential perfection than the perfection of a specific or generic essence. The affirmation of the value of the individual led to the affirmation of the value of the human person, which corresponded to the spirit of the Christian doctrine. This was precisely the main meaning of the doctrine of "thisness".
To solve one of the most important and most difficult problems of scholastic theology and philosophy: how does the presence of non-identical attributes of God - goodness, omnipotence, foresight, etc. - is compatible with the statement about the absolute simplicity and unity of God, i.e. with the absence of any plurality in it, Duns Scotus introduces the concept of formal difference. Objects are formally different if they correspond to different (non-identical) concepts, but at the same time they are not only mental objects, i.e. if their difference is due to the thing itself. In contrast to really different objects that exist separately from each other in the form of different things, the formal difference of objects does not imply their real existence: they are different without being different things (actually existing substances). Therefore, the formal distinction of the Divine attributes does not contradict the real unity of the Divine substance. The concept of formal difference is used by Duns Scotus when considering also the problem of the difference between Persons in the Trinity and for distinguishing will and reason as abilities of the soul.
The theory of knowledge of Duns Scotus is characterized by a sharp opposition between intuitive and abstract knowledge. The object of intuitive knowledge is the individual, perceived as existing, the object of the abstract is “whatness”, or the essence of a thing. Only intuitive knowledge makes it possible to directly come into contact with something that exists, i.e. with being. The human intellect, although naturally endowed with the capacity for intuitive cognition, in its present state is limited primarily to the realm of abstract cognition. Grasping the common nature inherent in individuals of the same species, the intellect abstracts it from individuals, turning it into a universal ( general concept). Directly, without resorting to the help of intelligible species, the intellect can contact what really exists only in one case: by knowing the acts performed by itself. Knowledge about these acts, expressed in statements like “I doubt this and that”, “I think about this”, is absolutely reliable. The participation of the intellect (along with the sense organs) in the cognition of things in the external world ensures the achievement of reliable knowledge already at the stage of sensory perception.
Having contrasted, following Avicenna (Ibn Sina), the necessary existence of God with the random existence of finite things, Duns Scotus had to explain how these types of being are interconnected. He could not agree with Avicenna that the world of finite things emanate from the necessary being with necessity: God, according to Christian doctrine, creates the world freely; in the act of creation he is not compelled by any necessity. In his conception of creation, Duns Scotus proceeds from the same premise as other scholastics: God, before giving existence to things, has perfect knowledge of their essence. But if the ideas of things are rooted in the divine essence itself, as his predecessors believed, then, Duns Scotus points out, the divine intellect in the act of knowing would be determined by the pre-existing essences of things. In reality, the divine intellect is primary in relation to the essences of things, since, knowing them, it simultaneously produces them. Therefore, the necessity inherent in the essences of things - each essence is characterized by a certain set of signs, and these signs must necessarily be present in it - is not an external necessity with which divine knowledge must conform; necessity is not a property of entities in themselves, but is communicated to them in the act of cognition and testifies to the perfection of the divine mind.
God creates not only the essence of things, but also really existing things. The existence of things is accidental, not necessarily inherent in them, since the only reason for their existence is the will (desire) of God: “It acts randomly in relation to any object, so that it can desire the opposite of it. This is true not only when the will is considered ... simply as the will that precedes its act, but also when it is considered in the act of volition itself” (Op. Oxon., I, d. 39, q. unica, n. 22). This explains the radical contingency of created things. In the act of creation, God assigned to each thing its nature: fire - the ability to heat, air - to be lighter than earth, etc. But since the divine will cannot be bound by any particular object, it is quite possible for fire to be cold, etc., and for the whole universe to be governed by other laws. The free will of God, however, is not pure arbitrariness. The perfection of the divine will is that it can only act in accordance with the divine intellect. Therefore, as Duns Scotus states, "God desires in the highest degree of intelligence." He desires essences as they should be, and chooses compatible essences among those that must come into existence in the act of creation. God is incapable of willing the meaningless. He is an infinitely wise architect who knows his own creation in every detail. The existence and non-existence of random things depends entirely on the free will of God, but when God wills and creates, He always creates wisely and purposefully. The assertion of the superiority of the will over the intellect is a hallmark of the ethics of Duns Scotus. He does not deny the fact that a person must know the object, desire it, but why, he asks, is this object chosen as the object of knowledge? Because we want to know it. The will governs the intellect, directing it to the knowledge of this or that object. Duns Scotus does not agree with Thomas Aquinas that the will necessarily aspires to the Highest Good, and if the human intellect were able to discern the Good in itself, our will would immediately cling to it and thereby achieve the most perfect freedom. Will, Duns Scotus argues, is the only ability that is not determined by anything - neither by its object, nor by the natural inclinations of a person. For Duns Scotus, the main assumption from which his predecessors proceeded when formulating their ethical doctrines is unacceptable, namely, that the basis of all moral virtues is the natural desire of every thing to achieve the degree of perfection that it can achieve, having its own form. Love for God and for one's neighbor, in such doctrines, turns out to be the result of a more fundamental desire of man to achieve his own perfection. Based on input Anselm of Canterbury the distinction between a person's natural inclination to act for his own benefit and the desire for justice, Duns Scotus interprets free will as freedom from necessity, forcing a person to seek, first of all, his own good; freedom is expressed in the ability to love goodness for the sake of goodness itself, in the ability to selflessly love God and other people.
Compositions:
1. Opera omnia, ed. L. Vives, 26 vol. P., 1891–95;
2. Opera omnia, ed. C.Balic etc. Vatican, 1950;
3. God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal Questions, ed. and transl. F. Alluntis and A. Wolter, 1975.
Literature:
1. Gilson A. Jean Duns Scot: Introduction à ses positions fondamentales. P., 1952;
2. Messner R. Schauendes und begriffliches Erkennen nach Duns Scotus. Freiburg im B., 1942;
3. Bettoni E. L "ascesa a Dio in Duns Scotus. Mil., 1943;
4. Grajewski M. The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus. Wash., 1944;
5. Wolter A. The Transcendentals and Their Function ih the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus. N.Y., 1946;
6. Vier P.C. Evidence and its Function according to John Duns Scotus. N.Y., 1951;
7. Owens J. Common Nature: A Point of Comparison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics. - "Mediaeval Studies", 19 (1957);
8. Hoeres W. Der Wille als reine Vollkommenheit nach Duns Scotus. Munch., 1962;
9. Stadter E. Psychologie und Metaphysik der menschlichen Freiheit. Die ideengeschichtliche Entwicklung zwischen Bonaventura und Duns Scotus. Munch., 1971.
The last and most original representative of the golden age of medieval scholasticism and in some respects a harbinger of a different worldview. Got a nickname doctor subtilis("Doctor thin").
He taught theology at Oxford and Paris. According to his philosophical views, he was a pure indeterminist and recognized the primacy of the will over the mind both in man and in God; attached great importance to individuality, individual freedom, which sharply differed from the Dominican Thomas Aquinas, an advocate of authority to the detriment of private will. Considered a follower of the ideas of William de La Mare.
Information about the life of D. Scott is half legendary.
Born, most likely in the city of Duns (in southern Scotland), according to other assumptions - in Northumberland or Ireland; indication of the year of birth. fluctuate between 1260 and 1274.
It is known for sure that he taught theology at Oxford, and then in Paris. Here he defended his doctoral dissertation, in which he defended (against the Dominicans-Thomists) the original purity of St. Virgo (Immaculata Conceptio). According to legend, a miracle happened in this dispute in favor of D. Scott: a marble statue of the Virgin nodded her head approvingly. It is historically reliable that the Parisian faculty recognized the arguments of D. Scott so convincing that at the same time it decided to require from now on from all those seeking an academic degree, an oath confession of faith in the Immaculate Conception (five and a half centuries before the proclamation of this dogma by Pope Pius IX). Summoned to Cologne on ecclesiastical matters, D. Scott died there of apoplexy, believed to be in 1308.
According to legend, D. Scott seemed extremely stupid in his early youth, and only after one mysterious vision did he begin to reveal his rich spiritual powers. In addition to theology and philosophy, he acquired extensive knowledge in linguistics, mathematics, optics and astrology.
As far as the general limits of the scholastic worldview allowed, D. Scott was an empiricist and individualist, firm in religious and practical principles and a skeptic of purely speculative truths (in which one can see one of the first manifestations of the British national character). He did not possess, and did not consider it possible to possess, a coherent and comprehensive system of theological and philosophical knowledge, in which particular truths would be derived a priori from the general principles of reason. From the point of view of D. Scott, everything real is known only empirically, through its action, tormented by the cognizer. External things act on us in sensory perception, and our knowledge of the reality of its content depends on the object, and not on the subject. But on the other hand, it cannot depend entirely on the object, because in this case, the simple perception of the object or its presence in our consciousness would already constitute perfect knowledge, while in fact we see that the perfection of knowledge is achieved only by the efforts of the mind, turned on the subject. Our mind is not a bearer of ready-made ideas or a passive tabula rasa; it is the potency of conceivable forms (species intelligibiles), by means of which it transforms individual data of sense perception into general knowledge.
That which is thus known or conceived by the mind in things, supersensible data, has no real existence apart from individual things; but it is also not only our subjective thought, but expresses the formal properties or differences inherent in objects. Since differences in themselves, without a discriminating mind, are unthinkable, the objective existence of these formal properties in things, independent of our mind, is possible only insofar as they are initially distinguished by another mind, namely the divine mind. How, in actual (actual) cognition, the formal properties of things (not exhausted by single phenomena) coincide with the corresponding formal ideas of our mind, and where is the guarantee of such a coincidence - to this question about the essence of cognition and the criterion of truth in D. Scott, as in others scholastics, no answer.
Sharper than other scholastics, distinguishing faith from knowledge, D. Scott resolutely denied the subordinate relationship of sciences to theology. Theology, according to D. Scott, is not a speculative or theoretical science; it is not an invention to avoid ignorance; with its vast volume, it could contain much more knowledge than it now contains; but its task is not this, but that, by means of frequent repetition of the same practical truths, to induce listeners to fulfill the prescribed. Theology is the healing of the spirit (medicina mentis): it is based on faith, which has as its direct object not the nature of the Divine, but the will of God. Faith as an abiding state, as well as the very acts of faith and, finally, the “seeing” that follows faith, are states and acts not speculative, but practical. Theoretical knowledge of the Deity we have only to the extent necessary for our spiritual well-being; at the same time, the Divinity is known to us empirically through the testing of His actions, partly in the physical world, partly in historical revelation. We cannot understand God, but only perceive in His actions. Accordingly, D. Scott rejected the a priori ontological proof of the existence of God, allowing only the cosmological and teleological.
Considering the world and the life of the world in their positive and negative properties, the mind cognizes the Divine as the perfect root cause, expediently acting, but we can have only a vague knowledge of God's own individual reality. The internal definitions of the deity (trinity, etc.), reported in the Christian dogma, cannot be deduced or proved by reason; they also do not have the character of self-evident truths, but are accepted only by virtue of the authority of the one who communicates them. However, these data of revelation, being communicated to man from above, then become the subject of rational thinking, extracting from them a systematic knowledge of divine things. On this basis, D. Scott indulges in speculations about the objects of faith, initially inaccessible to reason.
Although God in himself is an absolutely simple being (simpliciter simplex), inexpressible in any concept, and therefore His attributes or perfections cannot have a special reality in Him, however, they differ formally. The first such difference is reason and will. The rationality of God is evident from His perfect causality, that is, from the universal order or connection of the universe; His will is proved by the accident of single phenomena. For if these phenomena in their reality are not only consequences of a general rational order, but have their own causality independent of it, which, however, is subordinate to God as the first cause, then. consequently, the first cause itself, in addition to its rational action, has another, arbitrary, or exists as will. But as an absolute being, or perfect in itself, God cannot have reason and will only in relation to another, created being. In Himself there are two eternal internal processiones: rational and volitional - knowledge and love; the first is the divine Word or the Son, the second is the Holy Spirit, and the one principle of both is God the Father. All things are in the mind of God as ideas, that is, from the side of their knowability, or as objects of knowledge; but such being is not real or perfect, because according to D. Scott ideality is less than reality. In order to produce real reality, the ideas of the mind (divine) must be accompanied by the free will of God, which is the final cause of all being, which does not allow further research.
D. Scott's philosophical metaphysics is characterized by his views on matter and his understanding of individual being (principium individuationis). D. Scott understands universality negatively - not as the fullness of all definitions, but, on the contrary, as their absence: the most general being for him is the most indefinite, empty; as such he recognizes matter in itself (materia prima). He does not share either Plato's view, according to which matter is non-existent (to mh on), nor Aristotle's view, according to which it is only potential being (to dunmei on): according to D. Scott, matter actually stands out from nothing and is a real limit creations. Everything that exists (except God) is composed of matter and form. The existence of matter or its reality is independent of the form, which determines only the quality of material existence. The various subdivisions of matter, distinguished by D. Scott, express only the various degrees of certainty that matter receives from its combination with form; she herself is everywhere and always the same. Thus, the concept of matter in D. Scott coincides with the concept of universal substance, a single real substratum of all things. It is not surprising, therefore, that, contrary to all scholastic authorities, D. Scott attributed materiality to human souls and angels. The following argument is quite remarkable: the more perfect a form is, the more effective (relevant) it is, and the more relevant it is, the more it penetrates into matter and more firmly unites it with itself. The forms of an angel and a rational soul, however, are the most perfect and most actual, and, consequently, they completely unite matter with themselves, and therefore do not undergo quantitative disintegration, since they have the property of a unifying force.
Brief biography of the philosopher
Definition 1
John Duns Scott ($1266 - $1308) Scottish scholastic, theologian, philosopher, monk of the Franciscan order, the last prominent representative of his era.
His activities are attributed to the period of the so-called High Middle Ages , along with the activities of Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham. His impact on the state and the church was very significant and strong.
Theology lecturer at Oxford and Paris. For the Franciscan order, Duns Scotus was one of the most privileged teachers, just like Thomas Aquinas for the Dominican order.
The whole philosophy of Duns Scotus comes down to the study of being as such. But the human mind can only assume about being that it is possible to abstract from sensory data. He does not have access to the contemplation of being, without specific definitions. He sees a being that belongs to finite things, that is, created things.
Philosophy begins with an abstract understanding of being, which is applied both to the Creator and to creation, on the basis of which it proves the existence of God as an infinite being.
In contrast to finite things that exist by chance, derivatively, due to a certain cause, God, as an infinite being, is endowed with a necessary existence, he is the First cause for finite things.
His famous treatises include:
- The Doctrine of the Unambiguity of Being
- Doctrine of formal distinction
- The Doctrine of Concreteness
His works also include a system of arguments in favor of the existence of God and the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary.
Theology of Duns Scotus
In the traditions of scholasticism of the Middle Ages, he shared reason and faith, only his position was particularly harsh. Duns Scotus was an ardent opponent of the subordinate relationship of science to theology. He considered theology, theology not as a science, as speculative and theoretical, but rather as something that is capable of healing the spirit. With such an impressive body of knowledge, it could become comprehensive.
Theology is based on faith and has as its subject the Will of God, not his nature. God can be known through empirical experience, through the sensations of his actions, a person has theoretical knowledge of him based only on the need for spiritual peace. God is not known to us, but only perceived in actions, in the physical world and in religious revelation. Consequently, Duns Scotus did not adhere to the doctrine of the ontological proof of Divine existence, referring only to the cosmological and ontological.
Along with the study of the world and life, and their negative and positive properties, the mind cognizes God as the absolute and perfect first cause, which acts expediently. We cannot know the individual divine reality, but have only a vague assumption about it. We do not have the definitions of God that are spoken of in Christian teachings; they cannot be proved by reason. It is also impossible to talk about the self-evidence of God, we submit to his authority. But all these characteristics, which are given in revelation, then interact with the mind and become its subject, as a result of which a system of knowledge about divine things is built.
Cosmology of Duns Scotus
Remark 1
Duns Scotus believed that the basis of the world is a single and indefinite substance or matter, and perfection - as a form that completely owns matter. Thus, the universe, according to Duns Scotus, is a slow ascent from the whole to the particular, individual, from the indefinite to the definite, from imperfection to perfection. The merit of Duns Scotus lies in the representation of the universe as an independent whole.
His philosophy is out of bounds medieval scholasticism and goes far ahead. She takes the position of late scholasticism, the forerunner of the philosophy of the Renaissance.
His teachings include:
- Philosophy is not the servant of theology
- Realism in the understanding of substance and spiritual essence
- Reasonable empiricism
In the 13th century, another Franciscan monk stands out - John Duns Scotus, one of the most prominent philosophers of the 13th century. John Duns Scotus, like Roger Bacon, came from Great Britain, from Scotland. Born in 1266 in the county of Roxburgh in Scotland. In 1281 he became a monk of a Franciscan monastery in the south of Scotland, and in 1291 he was ordained a priest. Throughout this time he studied at Paris and Oxford universities, in 1301 he taught as a bachelor at the University of Paris, then he was recalled to Cologne, where he died on November 8, 1308. Nickname - "thin doctor".
He wrote extremely many works in his short life, he is one of the most prolific scholastics. His work “Oxford Labor” stands out, which is a commentary on the works of Peter Lombard. In addition to the Oxford Work, John Duns Scotus has Miscellaneous Questions, On the First Beginning of All Things, and Subtle Questions on Aristotle's Metaphysics. Perhaps the title of this work was the reason for the nickname "thin doctor".
The main opponent of John Duns Scotus, like Roger Bacon, was Thomas Aquinas. Unlike Roger Bacon, John Duns Scotus had many supporters and students, so that along with Thomism in the 14th century, another direction in scholasticism began to develop - scotism. The contradiction between John Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas begins from the very beginning, from the moment of comparing philosophy and religion. John Duns Scotus himself did not consider himself a philosopher; in general, philosophy and religion have not only different methods, according to John Duns Scotus, but also different subjects, this is the mistake of Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, philosophy has the human mind as its tool, and it is corrupted by human sin, which again was not understood by Thomas Aquinas, who believed that the human mind had not changed since the time before the fall. Therefore, one should not reason about God, but believe in Him and see Him through the grace given by Him.
Thomas Aquinas believed that since there are two kinds of knowledge, theological and scientific knowledge, there are two truths. John Duns Scotus says that if there are two truths about the same subject, then it is logical to assume that one of these truths is less perfect and simply not needed. Therefore, either we must discard one of the areas of knowledge, or assume that these areas of knowledge have different subjects.
John Duns Scotus chooses the second option and argues that the subject of theology is God, and the subject of philosophy is being. Only God Himself has knowledge of God, so our knowledge can only be based on what God Himself tells us. Therefore, theology is based on revelation, while philosophy cannot know God.
One might think that John Duns Scotus here belittles human rational abilities, although he himself claims that, on the contrary, he elevates the mind, since God descends to the weak human mind giving him grace, and if God descends to reason, then this is a value in the eyes of God.
What is being according to Scott? This is one of the most difficult categories of his philosophy, although John Duns Scotus did not consider himself a philosopher, and if he heard such a mention of himself, he would certainly be offended. Nevertheless, there are a lot of philosophical thoughts in his works, and, on almost all issues, John Duns Scotus argues as one of the greatest philosophers. Being, according to Scott, is that which exists everywhere. Therefore, we cannot find being, the knowledge of the material world sees only single things, but we know that all things, while existing, have something in common, that is, being. Things, as John Duns Scotus says, are synonymous in this respect with each other.
Being is the same everywhere - both in things and in God, however, in God, being has an infinite character, and due to the infinity of being, reason cannot say anything about God. And the very concept of infinite being is used by man by analogy with our being, considering this concept to be the most perfect of all the concepts of the mind, which could somehow bring a person closer to God. The concept of infinity in John Duns Scotus is an essential concept that gives us knowledge about God. If in Thomas Aquinas the main characteristic of God is the identity in Him of essence and existence, then John Duns Scotus objects, believing that essence is identical to existence in all objects, this is not what separates objects from God. Separates God from our world His infinity. God is infinite, so he is simple. John Duns Scotus proves this by saying that God cannot be a part of another whole, since He is infinite, and on the other hand, He cannot consist of other parts, for if these parts are finite, then the whole will be finite, and God is infinite. And if these parts are infinite, then we recall the previous argument that the infinite cannot be part of the whole. Therefore God, being infinite, is simple.
Other characteristics of God follow from the infinity of God. In particular, we can say about God that in God the violation of formal identity and difference is possible. If we can say about our material world that a thing is identical to itself and different from another, then in infinite being such a difference disappears. Therefore, we can speak of God as a Trinity and a Unit at the same time. Thanks to His infinite essence, we can speak of Him as Wisdom, Being, Love, and at the same time not violate His unity, His simplicity, His identity. Therefore, on the one hand, we can understand that in God wisdom does not coincide with justice, but since His wisdom and His justice are infinite, we can ultimately say that they also enter into divine simplicity and therefore coincide. All attributes known to us in God are both different and identical to each other.
A separate moment of the relationship between God and the world. According to the Platonic tradition, more accepted in the Franciscan order, John Duns Scotus shares the opinion that there are certain ideas in God. However, here, too, John Duns Scotus departs from the position of Augustine and believes that ideas as such do not exist either outside of God or in the mind of God - ideas as certain entities. Ideas cannot exist outside of God, because this would contradict the creation of the world, and in God they cannot exist, because this would violate the principle of God's simplicity. Ideas exist in God only as His thoughts, but not as separate formations.
As the thoughts of God, ideas are not created, but they do not create either. They are nothing but the thoughts of God, and their existence is therefore relative and dependent on the divine will. These ideas operate in relation to the world insofar as God Himself acts, insofar as God thinks. Therefore, ideas as such are no different from the thought of God.
Thomas Aquinas argued, speaking of God, that God cannot do much, since His will cannot contradict his own knowledge. Almost the same thing is said by John Duns Scotus, although researchers often reproach that John Duns Scotus puts the divine will in the first place. John Duns Scotus really says that the will dominates knowledge, but nevertheless he says that God can do everything, but He does not do what Thomas Aquinas enumerates: does not violate identity, the principle of logic, because God does not want this.
As we remember, the will of God, the mind of God, justice, etc. in God they coincide, but this divine voluntarism is not such voluntarism, just the will of God and His mind are one and the same. John Duns Scotus emphasizes one point in this aspect, arguing with Thomas Aquinas, and mainly with the Averroists, that knowledge has no power over God, there is nothing above God.
Speaking of the relationship between God and the world, of course, one cannot bypass the problem of matter. Since our world itself is material, the problem of cognition of matter, the existence of matter as a separate material principle, matter and form, and other problems arise. Thomas Aquinas argued that matter is the opposite of form and is one of the two components that make up the body. The body is made up of matter and form. John Duns Scotus objects and says that it is incorrect and incorrect to speak of matter simply as the opposite of form. If we are talking about matter, then this already means that matter has some existence of its own, therefore matter also has its own essence. Otherwise, it is meaningless to say that a thing consists of matter and form.
Matter exists - and exists as some entity. And if we say that God created matter, then God created matter, having some of His idea, the thought of matter, which once again confirms the possibility of the existence of matter independently without a form.
Such matter without a form can exist, it can even be known by itself, without a form, but, alas, it cannot be known by a person. Man cognizes only forms and therefore matter in cognition is not given to him. Matter, as indicated in the book of Genesis, is created earlier form, therefore, for John Duns Scotus, matter even has some priority over form, because it exists before form, arose earlier. And if it exists earlier, and if matter can exist separately, then the principle of individuation, i.e. that which gives an individual character to things, matter cannot possess.
Here John Duns Scotus faces a huge difficulty. Just like Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, he argues that there can be no knowledge about the individual, knowledge is only about the general. But, on the other hand, denying the existence of ideas, denying that a thing consists of matter and form, John Duns Scotus also loses the support that came from Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, with the help of which one can assert the cognizability of the material world.
Therefore, a difficulty arises: on the one hand, knowledge exists, and on the other hand, knowledge is possible only about the general, but the general does not exist, only the individual exists. Aristotle had the same difficulty, and Aristotle himself hesitated just as much whether to give priority to reason or our feelings. Giving priority to reason, Aristotle inevitably returned to Platonism; giving priority to feelings, Aristotle inevitably had to become a materialist. Both are equally undesirable, which is why there were hesitation.
In John Duns Scotus we see another solution to the principle of individuation and the problem of cognition. If knowledge exists, and knowledge about the individual cannot exist, and yet only the individual exists, then this shows the extranatural, inhuman, supernatural character of our knowledge.
John Duns Scotus also decides the principle of individuality in his own way, calling this principle a certain word invented by him, in Latin it sounds like haecceitas, which in Russian is translated as “thisness”. Every thing is "this". Thisness that comes from God and gives the principle of individuation to things, making each thing what it is, unique. Therefore, according to John Duns Scotus, there is only God and the real world in all its diversity, everything else is just our abstractions, our conjectures and, possibly, our delusions. Therefore, John Duns Scotus in this position, remaining generally an adherent of the Franciscan order and a supporter of Augustinian philosophy, takes a nominalist position.
Speaking of matter, John Duns Scotus, following Aristotle, distinguishes several types of matter. First, there is a certain universal and primary substance that exists without form and underlies everything that exists. This matter is the subject of metaphysics and was given the name "first-first matter" by John Duns Scotus. In addition to the first-first matter, there is also a second-first matter. This is a qualitatively defined matter, of which the objects of the material world consist. This second-first matter is the subject of natural philosophy, i.e. natural sciences. And the third-first matter is the material from which a person makes the things around him, it is the subject of mechanics.
By virtue of His infinity, God is a free being, for nothing can limit or restrain God. Man is another free being. In his actions, a person is guided not by his knowledge, but by his will, for freedom is the essence of man. Man is free, but he obeys the divine will and acts according to the laws established by God. One does not contradict the other, just as Gilson gives an example, explaining the philosophy of John Duns Scotus, when a person jumps into the abyss and during his fall does not repent of his act, but continues his fall with the consciousness of his rightness, it turns out that, on the one hand, a person acts according to the law of universal gravitation, and on the other hand, this fall continues to be free. Thus, laws do not force his will, do not cancel his freedom, and freedom and law operate in parallel. In the same way, man acts freely in a world governed by divine law.
A person in the world to whom God has given moral laws acts just as freely. These moral laws, the principles of morality, a person freely observes or does not observe. And even their observance does not violate his freedom, therefore, a person, being moral, remains free.
A person cannot understand the initial divine thoughts, therefore a person does not know what God proceeded from when he established certain moral postulates. Therefore, good for a person is what God created, created and thought. IN this case God's creation and thoughts are beyond any evaluation. From the fact that God is infinite, a number of other consequences of the philosophy of John Duns Scotus follow. In God, His nature, His will, His freedom, His necessity, His love coincide. All these positions, although different, nevertheless constitute a simple divine essence. Therefore, God, being a Trinity, has in His essence love, and this love is the relationship of God the Father and God the Son begotten by Him.
The birth of the Holy Spirit is an act of will and at the same time a necessity. God cannot help but give birth to the Holy Spirit, because He cannot help but love the Holy Spirit, which is why He creates. Therefore, the first free act of God is always an act of His love. Therefore, in understanding God, John Duns Scotus proceeds not from reason, as Thomas Aquinas did, but from the will of God. And since the first act of God is love, then love is much more important for understanding God for John Duns Scotus, and this is exactly what John Duns Scotus writes, and our Christian philosopher considered, referring to the Apostle Paul.
Therefore, John Duns Scotus did not consider himself a philosopher, since the main goal of man is the salvation and knowledge of God, and the knowledge of God is possible only in an act of love for God, and by no means in the knowledge of God. Therefore, John Duns Scotus in every possible way denied philosophy and opposed himself to the intellectualism of philosophers. Philosophers, according to John Duns Scotus, are always by necessity determinists and intellectualists and therefore cannot know God, especially since the subject of philosophy is different.
Duns Scott
The last philosophical movement in the thirteenth century, which resolved the antagonism between the two main philosophical directions century - Augustinism and Thomism - this is Scotism. The essence of the compromise was based on the fact that small concessions were made to Thomism, but the fundamental basis remained Augustinian. The initiative came from the Franciscans, who, appropriating the results achieved by Thomas, modernized their doctrine in such a way that a “new Franciscan school” appeared. The creator of a new philosophical doctrine was Duns Scot, after whom it was commonly called scotism.
Predecessors. The activities of Duns Scotus were prepared by the old Augustinian school, by some of its members, who, even before Duns, fell under the influence of Thomas. Wilhelm of Warr, the teacher of Duns, outstripped him in his opposition to the traditional Illuminism for this school. The most prominent person who connected the old and new schools, located between Bonaventure and Scotus, was Heinrich of Ghent secular confessor, from 1277 - master of theology at the University of Paris (died in 1293). In the theory of knowledge, he remained faithful to Augustine's idea that the natural forces of man are not enough to know the whole truth. It can only be seen in the eternal light of a special divine illumination. He spoke about the psychological predominance of the will over the mind, since the mind has only a passive power, and the will is active by nature. This purely psychological predominance grew to a metaphysical preponderance of the good over knowledge and expressed itself in the ethical predominance of love over knowledge. With his voluntarism, he revived an essential moment in the philosophy of Augustine, which was relegated to the background by his supporters in the thirteenth century. and this, above all, prepared the new Augustinism of Scotus.
Biography and works. Duns Scotus was born around 1270, died in 1309, was a member of the Franciscan order. He was educated and later taught at Oxford. In 1304 he came to Paris, where he became a doctor of theology, and then during the years 1305-1308. teaches. Having moved to Cologne, he suddenly dies. Duns Scotus was one of the outstanding thinkers of the Middle Ages. The church awarded him the title of "thin doctor". First of all, Scott had a critical mind. His works are permeated with controversy and subtle distinctions, but they did not cover all the philosophical and theological problems of that time, as was the case in the works of Thomas.
His main works: a commentary on the "Sentences" of Peter Lombard, which was called the "Oxford essay", as well as a shorter "Paris essay". At Oxford he wrote commentaries on Aristotelian works on logic, metaphysics and psychology. "Controversial Questions of Superphilosophy", which for a long time was considered his work, is no longer attributed to him.
Views. The views of Duns had much in common with the views of Thomas, not to mention the theological views, which proceeded from one church tradition: both the whole concept of God and creation, as well as the most general ontological concepts, as well as the concepts of epistemology and psychology, such as a posterioriism in the theory of knowledge, the denial of the theory of illumination, the concept of universals, the separation of mental functions.
Despite this, the fundamental philosophical positions and aspirations of Scotus differed from the philosophical aspirations of Thomas as much as Augustine and Aristotle differed from each other. Thomas held mainly views that corresponded to Christian and ancient ideas, while Scotus developed only directly Christian motives. In contrast to the objective philosophical position of the Greeks and Thomas, he occupied, like Augustine, an introversive philosophical position. Thanks to her, he modeled his views not in relation to external objects, but in relation to internal experiences. He came to ideas that formed individualism and voluntarism and were far enough from the universal and intellectual philosophy of Thomas.
1. The predominance of faith over reason. Scott adopted the concept of science from Aristotle and Thomas, but applying it rather scrupulously, he got different results. What belongs to science is what is obtained with the help of reason, but reason cannot discover everything that Thomas attributed to it. Scotus, inasmuch as he retained the principle of Thomas concerning the distinction between faith and reason, moved this boundary, significantly reducing the sphere of reason and, accordingly, expanding the area of faith. According to Thomas, only the sacraments of faith, such as the Holy Trinity, cannot be proved; according to Scotus, the vast majority of theological propositions cannot be proved. Thomas proved what features God has, and Scott considered these proofs insufficient. The fact that God is mind and will, that eternity, infinity, omnipotence, omnipresence, truthfulness, justice, mercy, Providence are characteristic of him - all this must be believed, but it cannot be proved. It is also impossible to prove the immortality of the soul, the creation of the soul by God, to demonstrate the participation of God in the activities of the created. Scot did not doubt these truths, but considered them to be truths of revelation and faith, and not of reason and science.
He included in the realm of science some theological propositions, such as that God exists, that He is one, and even the rather controversial proposition that He created the world out of nothing. However, he abandoned the desire of the scholastics to turn faith into knowledge. But the breakthrough was made, and it was already easy for the next generation of philosophers to separate theology from science. But even for Scotus, theology ceased to be a science that has any merit, since its principles were not deduced with sufficient evidence. Ultimately, he did not seek to diminish the value of theology: supernatural truth, which transcends reason, is unshakable and even has a level of truth that is inaccessible to natural reason. Scot's analysis did not question theological truths, but questioned the faculties of reason, and therefore, though not intended to be skeptical, led to skepticism. Its rather critical than constructive position The cattle was a harbinger new era which began in the 14th century. His work stands on the verge between two types of medieval philosophy - creative and critical, believing in reason and one that doubts it and surrenders to the mercy of faith.
2. The advantage of intuition over abstraction. In principle, Scott accepted Thomas's theory of knowledge and interpreted knowledge without resorting to supernatural enlightenment. But, however, in important points- due to his introverted orientation - his views differed from the views of Thomas. Primary, along with acts of external perception, he considered the acts of the mind, turned to itself and oriented to the inner experience in equal measure. Scott also differed in his views on psychological knowledge.
He had a different understanding of the knowledge of the external world. Thomas, faithful to the universal view of the Greeks, believed that the mind cognizes only species, while Scotus also attributed to the mind the ability to know the individual. He also understood the functions of the mind in a different way: Scotus denied that rational knowledge is exclusively abstract. Abstract knowledge of objects must always be preceded by intuitive knowledge; only with the help of intuition, and not through abstract understanding, can the existence and presence of a thing be confirmed. He did not interpret intuition mystically, but understood it as an act of direct cognition of an existing object.
Intuition gives individual and existential knowledge, but it is of an accidental nature, since existence does not refer to the essence of finite things. Abstract knowledge, on the other hand, abstracting itself from existing things and their individual characteristics, cognizes instead their universal and essential features. This distinction between two kinds of knowledge, introduced by Scotus, became, from that time on, a general feature of scholasticism.
3. The predominance of the individual over the general. Scott could not help but emphasize the singular, intuitive knowledge, being sure that the nature of being is single. He broke with ancient universalism, for which being, and to an even greater extent the essence of being, was common. Scott becomes the herald of metaphysical individualism: for him, singularity was not a secondary, but a primary feature of being. It is possible that the metaphysical-religious nature of Christianity led him to this view (the basis of Christianity is not humanity in general, but the individual soul and its salvation), or perhaps simply common sense.
Scotus did not express this simple position directly enough, but stated it in the traditional Aristotelian-scholastic language. This language pointed to "form" as the essential element of a thing. Scot also argued that the species form cannot be unique, but that in addition to it, each thing has an individual form - this was the scholastic formula of individualism. Individual features are not the content of matter, as Thomas wanted to present it, but are a characteristic of the form. In the language of scholasticism, form is an individual feature.
However, Scott's individualism was still not radical. He argued that only specific entities exist, but did not believe that the universal is just a delusion of the mind. This statement became the basis of the position of the next generation of philosophers. For Scotus, the universal was contained in things, since he adopted the realistic position of Thomas, but he went further. Scott admitted that everything that is hidden in the concept is also contained in the object. He understood any mode of rationality as an essential mode. He considered geometrical quantities, points and lines to be really existing in objects. He multiplied the distinctive features of concepts and attributed them all to things. Scott combined individualism with conceptual realism.
Thus, he came to the recognition of the presence of a plurality of forms in a thing, which Thomas considered impossible, since he was convinced that one thing can have only one essence. Plurality of forms was needed by Scott, mainly in psychology. He considered it necessary to separate spiritual element from biological. If the soul is "a form of an organic body, then there must be a double form, both spiritual and bodily. Their combination was a legacy of antiquity, while Christian philosophers had long fought for their separation, but in the 13th century, after studying Aristotle, it was threatened that they divided, will be identified again.
4. The predominance of will over thought. The theory that cognition is the result of the activity of the abstract mind, Scot limited from two sides. First, he said that intuition takes part in cognition. Secondly, he noted that the will also takes part in it. Thomas argued that the mind controls the will, Scott contradicted this. No one can predetermine the actions of the will, since it is by its nature free, being self-moving. The mind cannot control the will, but the will, on the contrary, is able to control the mind. It controls the mind before it begins to act, first of all, the will introduces a moment of activity and freedom into knowledge. Therefore, a special concept of knowledge appeared. It was once developed by Augustine, now it has been developed by Scott. In order to reduce its paradoxicality, he distinguished between the first and second cognitions, recognizing that the first stage of cognition occurs without the participation of the will, however, he argued that the second stage always occurs with its participation.
The assessment of the forces of the mind has changed. The will, as free, is the most perfect of forces. Knowledge is not the highest goal of life, as the intellectuals wanted, and truth is only one of the blessings. Not knowledge, which is a passive process through and through, but free will likens and brings a person closer to God. Not reason, but will is the essence of the soul. Primacy of will, definitely alien ancient philosophy, was, in fact, a Christian motive, and it clearly manifested itself in Augustine. Under the influence of ancient sources among his followers, he faded into the background, but was revived again by Scott.
Since the will is the most perfect force, it must be controlled by the most perfect being, and God must be understood as will. This view had far-reaching consequences: feature will is freedom, therefore God is free in his decisions. Indeed, Scott denied that God cannot create contradictory and impossible things (for example, that 3 + 2 does not equal 5), does not oppose the first two requirements of the decalogue (ten commandments), and that this is precisely what limits the freedom of God. Ultimately, His freedom is not limited, and the will is, in itself, the original law. There are no rules of good to which it could be applied in order to make one's activity good. "God can establish any rules as sufficient, just as if other rules could be established by him in such a way that they would also be sufficient." These truths are truths only because God established them. What is necessary for us is a matter of free choice for God. The ultimate foundation of being is not necessity, but freedom. Truth and goodness are not objective and immutable in their foundations, for only God can judge this as an arbiter.
No Christian doctrine differed more from the ancient doctrines than this one. Plato's builder of the world built it in accordance with eternal ideas that do not depend on him. God in Plato was dependent on the good and the truth, but here the good and the truth depend on God.
The irrationalism of Scotus was associated with this idea, which really made him separate theology from the field of reason and science. If the mind could independently reach the truth, then the truth, depending on incomprehensible Divine decisions, could be completely different from what it really is, so it often has no choice but to turn to Revelation.
essence of scotism. Except some general provisions, views on the world of Thomas and Scott were fundamentally different. For Thomas, the basis of the world was made up of general truths; for Scotus, the world was a combination of the individual. Thomas understood the world as rational, and Scotus - as partly irrational; with Thomas the world was the result of necessity, with Scot it was the result of freedom. This was fundamentally an Augustinian position, and no one defended it with such stubbornness as Scotus. What was only outlined in Augustine was fully developed in Scotus and proved by dialectical arguments. From Augustine's suggestion, Scot created a subtle scholastic system in which: a) faith prevailed over reason; b) intuition - over abstraction; c) individual - over the general; d) will - above thought. The selection of a large sphere of truths from the competence of the mind and their attribution to faith, the recognition of individual forms, intuitive factors and the participation of the will in cognition, the primacy of the will, the arbitrariness of truths that are the result of the action of the free Divine will - these are the most typical motives of Scotism, very far from ancient ideas and inherent in Christianity at its core.
Opposition. Scott made certain concessions to Thomism, but at the same time he attacked Thomas, and he himself was attacked by the Thomists. The old dispute between Augustinism and Thomism has turned into a dispute between Thomism and Scotism. This dispute caused a steady antagonism, and there appeared, as it were, two scholastics: Thomist and Scotist. Some thinkers wrote in the spirit of Thomas, others in the spirit of Scotus. When in the 14th century a new trend appeared in scholastic philosophy, which was equally hostile to both sides, then they united for joint protection. In the late Middle Ages, they united under the name "ancient way".
Scotist School developed mainly in the Franciscan order. Scott's ideas were brought to the greatest abstraction, to extreme formalism and realism. This school survived until the end of the Middle Ages. In the XV century. it also produced such scholastics as John Magister and Tartaretue, whom their contemporaries considered great philosophers and whose influence extended from Paris to Cracow. Subsequently, in the XVI century. The Scottish school, along with Thomism, was revived in Spain and it developed as early as the 17th century: Wadding founded in 1625 the well-known collegium of scotists. This school did not achieve particularly significant results, but successfully worked in various branches of knowledge, for example, in logic and speculative grammar.
Scott not only created the school, but also prepared a reaction against it: his ideas were related to the creation of a new scholasticism of the 14th century. This modernist path appeared when the most daring of his students implemented quite decisively what he started. The new scholasticism came out against Scotism, but it itself was called into being by it. In a certain sense, it can be said that in Thomism scholasticism reached its peak, and in Scotism modern philosophy began to take shape.
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