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Antique skepticism Pyrrho. Antique skepticism

Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation

FGBOU VPO "Khakassian State University them. N.F. Katanov"

Institute of economics and management

Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies

Skepticism as a direction of ancient philosophy

(control work on the discipline "Philosophy")

Completed: student gr. 201-B

Checked by: Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies,

k. philos. D., A. P. Nikitin

Abakan, 2014

Plan

Introduction

1. Overview of the periods of development of skepticism

2. Pyrrho and his school

Conclusion

List of used literature

Introduction

In the history of ancient philosophy, the following stages are distinguished: 1) the formation ancient Greek philosophy(VI-V centuries BC; philosophers - Thales, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Socrates, etc.); 2) classical Greek philosophy (V - IV centuries BC) - the teachings of Democritus, Plato, Aristotle; 3) Hellenistic-Roman philosophy (from the end of the 4th century BC to the 6th century AD) - the concepts of Epicureanism, Stoicism, skepticism.

Relevance Topics control work is that at the end of the 4th c. BC. signs of a crisis in Greek slave-owning democracy are intensifying. This crisis led to the loss of political independence by Athens and other Greek policies.

The economic and political decline of Greece, the decline of the role of the policy are reflected in Greek philosophy. The efforts aimed at understanding the objective world, which manifested themselves among the Greek philosophers, are gradually being replaced by the desire to bring philosophical and scientific questions only to what is sufficient to justify the correct, i.e. able to provide happiness, personal behavior. There is widespread disappointment in all types and forms of social and political life. Philosophy turns from a theoretical system into a state of mind and expresses the self-awareness of a person who has lost himself in the world. Over time, interest in philosophical thinking generally falls sharply. There comes a period of mysticism, fusion of religion and philosophy.

Metaphysics as philosophy predominantly gives way to ethics, the main question of the philosophy of this period is not what things are in themselves, but how they relate to us. Philosophy is increasingly striving to become a doctrine that develops rules and norms. human life. In this, all three main philosophical directions of the era of early Hellenism are similar - Stoicism, Epicureanism and skepticism.

The loss of oneself and self-doubt gave rise to such a direction of Hellenistic philosophy as skepticism.

Skepticism(from Greek. skeptics- examining, investigating) - philosophical direction, putting forward doubt as a principle of thinking, especially doubt about the reliability of truth. moderate skepticism limited to the knowledge of facts, showing restraint in relation to all hypotheses and theories. In the ordinary sense, skepticism is a psychological state of uncertainty, doubt about something, forcing one to refrain from making categorical judgments.

Antique skepticism as a reaction to the metaphysical dogmatism of previous philosophical schools is presented, first of all, Pyrrho, then the secondary and new academies ( Arcesilaus, Carneades) and so on. late skepticism (Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus and etc.).

Ancient skepticism went through many changes and phases in its development. At first, it had a practical character, that is, it acted not only as the most true, but also as the most useful and profitable life position and then turned into a theoretical doctrine; initially he questioned the possibility of any knowledge, then criticized the knowledge, but only received by the previous philosophy. Three periods can be distinguished in ancient skepticism:

1) The older Pyrrhonism, developed by Pyrrho himself (c. 360-270 BC) and his student Timon of Flius, dates back to the 3rd century. BC e. At that time, skepticism was of a purely practical nature: its core was ethics, and dialectics was only its outer shell; from many points of view, it was a doctrine analogous to the original Stoicism and Epicureanism.

2) Academicism. Strictly speaking, during the period when a number of Pyrrho's students were interrupted, a skeptical trend dominated the Academy; it was in the 3rd and 2nd centuries. BC e. "in the Middle Academy", the most prominent representatives of which were Arcesilaus (315-240) and Carneades (214-129 BC).

3) Younger Pyrrhonism found its supporters when skepticism left the walls of the Academy. Studying the works of representatives of the Academy of a later period, one can see that they systematized the skeptical argument. The original ethical position receded into the background, epistemological criticism came to the fore. The main representatives of this period were Aenesidemus and Agrippa. Skepticism found many adherents in this last period among the physicians of the "empirical" school, among whom was Sextus Empiricus.

Losev A.F., the earliest stage of skepticism, headed by Pyrrho, calls intuitive-relativistic. Later skepticism developed within the Platonic Academy. For the first time, we find a skeptical teaching in the head of the Middle Academy, Arcesilaus. This direction Losev A.F. calls intuitive and probabilistic. It was further developed by the head of the New Academy Carneades. This period is called reflective and probabilistic. This academic skepticism gradually weakened and turned into eclecticism, which is known from Philo of Larissa and Antiochus of Ascalon (II-I centuries BC), who headed the so-called Fourth and Fifth Academies. A more firm and consistent position of skepticism is taken by a distant follower and renewer of Pyrrhonism, a skeptic of the 1st century. BC. Aenesidemus, whose skepticism is called systematic, or reflective-relativistic.

followed him logical-relativistic skepticism of Agrippa and Menodotus (1st century AD) and already the final completion of ancient skepticism, or absolute skepticism, which borders on nihilism, although far from being reduced to it, is considered the skepticism of Sextus Empiricus and Saturninus (II-III centuries AD).

2. Pyrrho and his school

Pyrrho from Elis (c. 360 BC - 280 BC) - ancient Greek philosopher from Elis. The founder of ancient skepticism, Pyrrho, considered the philosopher who strives for happiness.

Founder of the ancient skeptical school. He was of the opinion that nothing in reality is either beautiful or ugly, neither just nor unjust, because in itself everything is the same (adiaphoron - indifferent), and therefore it is no more one than the other. Everything that is not the same, different, is (arbitrary) human institutions and customs. Things are inaccessible to our knowledge; this is the basis of the method of refraining from judgment. As a practical-moral ideal method, “equanimity”, “serenity” (ataraxia) is derived from here.

The doctrine of Pyrrho is called Pyrrhonism. This name is synonymous with skepticism. Skeptics doubted everything, refuted the dogmas of other schools, but they themselves did not assert anything. Skeptics denied the truth of any knowledge and rejected any evidence.

Skeptics come to the conclusion that feelings in themselves do not carry truth. Feelings cannot judge themselves, and therefore they cannot determine whether they are true or false. That is, we can say that this or that object is red or green, sweet or bitter, but we do not know what it really is. He is only for us. According to Piron, any of our assertions about any subject can be countered with equal right, with equal force, by an assertion that contradicts it.

From the impossibility of making any statements about any objects, Pyrrho concludes that the only way of relating to things proper to a philosopher can consist only in in abstinence from whatever judgments about them. If we refrain from all judgment of things, we will achieve equanimity (ataraxia) , which is the highest degree of happiness available to the philosopher.

Examples are given from his personal life as an illustration of the serene peace necessary for correct skepticism. Pyrrho, being with his disciples on a ship during a storm, set them as an example a pig, which at that time calmly ate its food, when all the passengers were unusually worried and feared a catastrophe. That's the same imperturbable, in his opinion, befits a true sage ...

Equally important, and perhaps even more important, was ethical area of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Although Pyrrho himself did not write anything, enough material has come down to us both about his skepticism in general and about the ethical section of his philosophy. There are a number of terms that are important here. light hand Pyrrho's ideas were widely spread throughout subsequent philosophy.

Such is the term "epoche," meaning "refraining" from all judgment. Since we do not know anything, then, according to Pyrrho, we must refrain from any judgments. For all of us, said Pyrrho, everything is "indifferent", "adiaphoron", is another most popular term, and not only among skeptics. As a result of abstaining from all judgment, we must act only as everyone usually does, according to the mores and orders in our country.

Therefore, Pyrrho used here two more terms, which can only amaze anyone who first studies ancient philosophy and feels a desire to delve into the essence of ancient skepticism. These are the terms "ataraxia", "equanimity", and "apatheia", "insensitivity", "dispassion". This last term is illiterately translated by some as "the absence of suffering." This is exactly what should be the inner state of a sage who has renounced a reasonable explanation of reality and a reasonable attitude towards it.

3. Skepticism of the Platonic Academy

Usually Plato's successors (academicians) are divided into Old, Middle and New Academy. (Some also accept, in addition, the 4th and even the 5th academy).

Stoic and Epicurean dogmatism is opposed first by the New Academy, which is a continuation of the Platonic Academy. The most important figures were Arcesilaus and Carneades.

The foundation of the Middle Academy is attributed to Arcesilaus, the New Academy represents the views of Carneades. Both, however, are related to skepticism, and the skeptics themselves found it difficult to distinguish between their point of view and the academic one. Skeptics already considered both of these philosophers skeptics, but they still made some distinction between academics and pure skeptics.

During the period of domination of the Middle and New Academy, pure Pyrrhonism already falls silent, and falls silent for a long time, for almost a century and a half. But in the 1st century BC, when academic skepticism is already becoming obsolete, entering into connection with the dogmatic systems criticized by itself, and above all with the system of Stoicism, Pyrrhonism reappears on the scene, but now not in such a naked and naive form as it was initially, in the person of Aenesidemus and other skeptics, he acts as a fairly developed system, the completion of which will be in the II-III centuries. AD Sextus Empiric.

Arcesilaus(315-240 BC) - ancient Greek philosopher, head of the second (Middle) Academy. He represented a different type of personality than the respected Pyrrho and the sarcastic Timon; he was a type of skeptic - a man of the world, and because of this, grace should have been the dominant feature of his thinking. Arcesilaus was a man who knew how to arrange his life, was a lover of beauty, art and poetry, was known for his independent and chivalrous character.

He gave the school a skeptical direction, preaching "abstention from judgment" (epoche); only the probable, he believed, is within the reach, and it is enough for life.

Having received a thorough education and having listened to the conversations of the peripatetic Theophrastus and the academician Crantor, he developed, under the influence of the philosophy of Pyrrho, a special skeptical worldview that refuted the teachings of the Stoics and consisted in the fact that (in the world) there is no indisputable criterion for determining the truth and that any position can be disputed by those or by other arguments which also seem probable; therefore, the achievement of the absolutely true is inaccessible to human consciousness, and, consequently, it is necessary to confine ourselves to the probable alone, which, according to the teachings of Arcesilaus, is quite sufficient for our practical activity.

Under Arcesilaus came new phase in school development. He used the ironic method of Socrates and Plato in a new skeptical spirit, for a massive and uncompromising attack on the Stoics. Of the two, one: either the Stoic sage must agree that he owns only opinions, or, if given, only the sage knows the truth, he must be an "acaleptic", i.e. dissenting, and therefore skeptical. If the Stoic recommended "stopping judgment" only in cases of lack of evidence, Arcesilaus generalizes: "nothing is absolutely obvious."

The term "epoche" was most likely discovered by Arcesilaus, and not by Pyrrho, precisely in the heat of the anti-Stoic controversy. Pyrrho, however, has already spoken of "adoxia", i.e. about non-participation in judgment. It is clear that the Stoics should have reacted vividly to the attempt of Arcesilaus to radically shake the concept of "consent", without which the solution of existential problems is impossible, and action is also impossible. To this Arcesilaus answered with the argument of eulogon, or prudence. - It is not true that as a result of refraining from judgment, moral action becomes impossible. In fact, the Stoics, when explaining generally accepted actions, spoke of a "duty" that has its own basis.

And the skeptics say that the performance of duty is quite appropriate without absolute certainty of the truth. Moreover, he who is able to act intelligently is happy, and happiness is a special case of wisdom (phronesis). So it turns out that Stoicism from within itself is led to the recognition of the absurdity of claims to moral superiority.

Arcesilaus is credited with "esoteric dogmatism" alongside "exoteric skepticism", i.e. he was a skeptic for the public, but a dogmatist for students and confidants, within the walls of the Academy. However, our sources allow us only to speculate.

Thus, for Arcesilaus, who does not recognize any reasonable evidence, the criterion of truth is only practical reasonableness, which either indicates the success of the enterprise, or does not indicate it. In other words, instead of Pyrrhonian pure and unconditional relativity, Arcesilaus (and this remains his Platonic trait) nevertheless recommends understanding sensual fluidity and choosing from it what creates success for a person. It is this life-to-practice success, which never possesses complete reliability, that is the criterion of truth for it. Therefore, we would call the skepticism of Arcesilaus practical-probabilistic, utilitarian-probabilistic, or directly, intuitively given probability.

Something of the Platonic doctrine of reason remains here, of course. However, here it is strongly relativized, namely, to the degree of practical probability. It - pragmatic-probabilistic skepticism.

Carneades(born 214 BC, Cyrene, North Africa - mind 129 BC, Athens) - Greek philosopher, founder of the new, or third Academy.

Arriving in 156 BC. e. to Rome and living there, he practiced philosophy, developed extreme skepticism and denied knowledge and the possibility of definitive proof. As the first theorist of the concept of probability, he distinguishes three degrees of it:

1. representations are probable only for the one who adheres to them;

2. representations are probable and not contested by those concerned;

3. The views are absolutely undeniable.

The strongest requirement of Carneades in relation to the probability he puts forward is that from a simple statement of the singularity of a representation, we must proceed to an analysis of all other moments that are involved in one way or another in the singular representation we are studying. In other words, the highest criterion of truth lies in such a probability, which is established and studied in connection with all other objects adjacent to it, which can either reveal its truth, or violate this truth, or even completely exclude it.

At the same time, Carneades perfectly understands that in his doctrine of the three criteria of truth, he, in fact, has in mind only one single criterion, namely probability, but not that direct and non-critical, not that too intuitive, which Arcesilaus spoke of, but scientifically designed as a specifically given structure.

The most important thing in academic skepticism is precisely the doctrine of probability in different senses of the word: either in the sense of the word that everything that exists and is expressed can be disputed, or in the sense of the word that evidence is not at all a necessity for thought, because much in life, although it does not allow proof, it is nevertheless clear enough.

Carneades expressed his philosophical views orally, so the content of his views was preserved in the works of other thinkers - Cicero, Eusebius. Also popularizing the skepticism of Carneades was the literary activity of his students - Clytomach, Charmides, whose numerous works have not been preserved, but there are numerous references to them.

4. Sextus Empiricus: Skepticism as a way of life

The indicated three main steps, or types, of ancient skepticism exhaust what was done by skeptics before Sextus Empiricus. These were the types 1) intuitive-relativistic (Pyrrho and Timon), 2) intuitive-probabilistic (Arkesilaus), and 3) reflective-probabilistic (Carneades).

A common feature of these types is the presentation of their skeptical teaching instead of one or another dogmatic teaching, but also presented in the form of a strictly proven dogma. All that was lacking was a position of skepticism that would deny and also consider unprovable its own critique of dogmatism. To say that something does not exist is also to express some kind of judgment that claims to be true.

And only Sextus Empiricus took this last step, namely, to consider as unprovable, unconvincing and skeptical also all his own arguments against dogmatism. If you like, this kind of skepticism can already be called complete nihilism. But it will be enough for us if we simply call this entire system of proofs in Sextus Empiricus absolute skepticism.

It has a lot of logic and wit. But, strictly speaking, it does not go beyond the original Pyrrhonian skepticism, which is called direct or intuitive relativism. The same must be said about Sextus Empiricus, since he himself interprets all his proofs skeptically and nihilistically, so that both at the beginning of its existence and at the end of its existence, Greek skepticism remained absolute nihilism in the sense of the system of reason, despite all the efforts of academicians to save proof of skepticism by his doctrine of probability.

The name of Sextus Empiricus, a talented systematizer of ancient skepticism, after almost one and a half thousand years of oblivion, becomes known in the 70s of the 16th century, when his treatises “Pyrrhonic Fundamentals” and “Against the Scholars” were published one after another. The publication of these works turned out to be so modern and consonant with the thoughts and ideas common in that era that interest in Sextus Empiricus, and through him in all ancient skepticism (Pyrrhonism), went beyond simple historical and philosophical curiosity. Moreover, the discovery of Sextus Empiricus, as the researchers of his work J. Annas and J. Barnes point out, "shaped the course of philosophy for the next three hundred years."

Sextus presented the most general and detailed presentation of his teaching in the treatise "Pyrrho's Fundamentals", at the very beginning of which he shows the difference between his ideas and other philosophical schools. This difference refers, firstly, to the fact that all dogmatists are sure that they have found the truth by accepting something unobvious on faith, and only skeptics continue to look for it, and secondly, to the fact that dogmatists usually have their own school (the doctrine , worldview), while skeptics do not have it, and to characterize his views, Sextus usually uses the word ᾀγωγή, denoting “path”, “way of life, thinking”, but not a rigid system of doctrines and “attachment to many dogmas related to each other. friend and with phenomena. However, following your principle, be as careful as possible in your statements. Sextus adds that the skeptic can still have a doctrine, if we understand by it "a way of life in which reasonings are consistent with phenomena, since these reasonings seem to indicate how to live rightly."

In accordance with this, Sextus Empiricus sets out his understanding of skepticism, which is nothing more than “a skeptical faculty that opposes phenomena and noumena in any way possible; hence, due to the equivalence of opposite things and speeches, we come first to refraining from judgment, and then to equanimity.

Comparing this "definition" of skepticism with the description of the path that a dogmatist takes when becoming a skeptic, one can outline the logic of skepticism in the following five-term formula: conflict - indecision - equivalence - refraining from judgment - serenity. To achieve the ultimate goal - ataraxia - Sextus Empiricus, following the early skeptics, develops a detailed logical argument, deploying the first terms of this formula. Sextus does not speak of skepticism, but of skeptical ability, calling skepticism "the ability not according to the subtle sense of the word, but simply in relation to its 'being able'".

This way of using the term "ability" shows that skeptical ability refers to natural human characteristics, so being a skeptic is just as natural for a person as feeling, thinking, experiencing, working. The skeptical ability, therefore, exists in every normal person, and it can also serve as a means to achieve a certain goal - ataraxia and help to live in this world non-dogmatically, relying only on phenomena. .

A phenomenon is the basis not of knowledge, but of behavior, a way of life, just like all skepticism is not a theoretical doctrine, but an ability, a state of a person. This allows the skeptic to really, without contradicting the principles of his teaching, to live in this world not inactively. In this context, Sextus Empiricus somewhat concretizes his understanding of the phenomenon as what he relies on in his life, and presents the following four-term scheme.

First, the skeptic follows the natural human tendency to feel and think, using these faculties to achieve happiness. Secondly, he obeys the requirements of bodily affections: if he is hungry - he eats, thirsty - he drinks. Thirdly, the skeptic follows the traditions, laws and regulations accepted in the country where he lives, calling piety good, and impiety evil, saying that gods exist, etc. And fourthly, he can also learn crafts master any profession.

Skepticism - the third main philosophical direction of the Hellenistic era - existed from the end of the 4th century. BC. according to the III century. AD The largest representatives of this direction are Pyrrho (365-275 BC), Carneades (about 214-129 BC), Sextus Empiricus (second half of the 2nd century AD).

Based on the provisions of Heraclitus on the variability, fluidity of the world, the lack of clear certainty in it, skeptics come to the conclusion that it is impossible to achieve objective knowledge about the world, and, consequently, the impossibility of rationally substantiating the norms of human behavior. The only correct course of action under these conditions is to abstain from judgment as a means of achieving ataraxia (equanimity in relation to everything external). But since it is practically impossible to live in a state of absolute silence and inaction, a wise person should live in accordance with laws, customs, or prudence, realizing that such behavior is not based on any firm conviction.

Skepticism, which, although it remained true to its original position, underwent significant changes in the course of development: the demanding, moralizing skepticism of Pyrrho found its application after many centuries in positivist empiricism.

The main provisions of ancient skepticism:

4. Follow the "world of phenomena."

1. The world is fluid, it has no meaning and no clear definition.

The ancient skeptic is by no means a nihilist; he lives as he wants, avoiding in principle the need to evaluate anything. The skeptic is in constant philosophical search, but he is convinced that true knowledge is, in principle, unattainable. Being appears in all the diversity of its fluidity (remember Heraclitus): it seems that there is something definite, but it immediately disappears. In this regard, the skeptic points to time itself, it is, but it is not there, it is impossible to “grab” it. There is no fixed meaning at all.

2. Every affirmation is also a negation, every "yes" is also a "no".

The ancient skeptic rejected the intelligibility of life. To maintain inner peace, a person needs to know a lot from philosophy, but not in order to affirm something or, conversely, affirm (every affirmation is a negation, and, conversely, every negation is an affirmation).

3. The true philosophy of skepticism is silence.

It is better for the wise skeptic to be silent. His silence is the philosophical answer to the questions put to him. Refraining from certain judgments, the skeptic remains imperturbable. The silence of the skeptic can be considered a wise way out of the situation, but one cannot even see the emptiness of thought in it.

4. Follow the "world of phenomena."

Everything is fluid, so live the way you want, take life as it is. He who knows a lot cannot adhere to strictly unambiguous opinions. A skeptic can neither be a judge nor a lawyer. The skeptic Carneades, who was sent to Rome to petition for the abolition of the tax, spoke before the public one day for the tax, and another day against the tax.

Antique skepticism in its own way brought to the limit philosophical attempts to cope with the difficulties of life without its logical and ideological understanding. Silence is both a kind of end to the philosophical search and an indication that new efforts are needed.

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Schools in Greek philosophy, a skeptical, or Pyrrhonic school, akin to Stoicism in its moral tendency, arises. It is the most extreme development of individualism. The Stoics, however, recognized only individual beings, and in their ethics there is a cynic vein - the complete liberation of the wise from everything external; but at the same time, from their point of view, a person must live in accordance with the law of the whole, and be an organic member of this divine whole. The Epicureans more closely limited man to only his own sensations, pleasures and pains, but still recognized that people can be bound by certain moral tasks and be determined in their behavior by true knowledge of the nature of things.

Both the Stoics and the Epicureans recognized a positive criterion of truth, justifying true objective knowledge. Skeptics rejected any possibility of any kind of objective knowledge.

If the Epicureans and Stoics based ethics on knowledge, then Pyrrho tried to base the system of behavior on the consciousness of the absolute impossibility of knowledge. We know nothing, said Pyrrho, neither about things nor about purposes; wherefore, complete indifference and indifference to all external things is the most correct conduct, the result of true wisdom. Some scholars see traces of the influence of Eastern philosophy in this position. But it is remarkable that all three schools - the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Skeptics - proceeding from the most diverse principles and aspirations, converge in the negative ideal of an imperturbable ataraxia(indifference, coolness).

The Stoics had an undoubted connection with the Cynics, Epicurus with the Cyrenaics, Pyrrho, originally from Elis, apparently was influenced early Elido-Eretrian school. Pyrrho was born in 365. He was very poor and earned his livelihood from his youth by painting. In 332, Pyrrho had to participate in the campaign of Alexander the Great to the East. While in India, they say, he was amazed by the local ascetic fakirs, who stood naked for whole days under the scorching rays of the sun, being a model of imperturbable, insensible peace and dispassion. The teachers of Pyrrho are called the Megaricians (Stilpon), and some - the atomist Anaxarchus. After the death of Alexander, Pyrrho returned to his fatherland and founded a school here. He died at the age of 90 (275), respected by all, leaving behind no philosophical works. His philosophy became known through his student Timon of Phlius who later lived in Athens.

Like the Stoics and Epicureans, Pyrrho seeks happiness first and foremost. Whoever wants to be happy must understand three things for himself: firstly, what is the nature of things, secondly, how we should relate to them, and thirdly, what advantage such an attitude will bring us.

All things are indifferent to us, immense, indistinguishable, so that we cannot judge them either true or false. Neither sensation - αἴσθησις, nor δόξα - opinion or judgment - teach us what things are in themselves. All our ideas - even about good and evil - are completely subjective , are based on habit and custom (νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει). Therefore, neither sensation nor judgment teaches us either truth or falsehood; wherefore, we must not trust them, but we must refrain from all opinion, without leaning in any direction. Whatever is discussed, we will neither affirm nor deny anything; every thing is οὐ μάλλον τοδε ἤ τόδε, even οὐ μάλλον ἔστιν, ἤ οὐκ ἔστιν.

Therefore, nothing can be affirmed - οὐδέν ὁρίζειν (one can never say “this is so”, but only “it seems so”), because every positive statement is opposed to its opposite (ἀντιθεσις, ἀντιλογία καὶ ἰσοσθένειν, each thing is ἰσοσθένεια "no more than this", even - "no more is than not is").

The best therefore is consciousness in its own ignorance (ἀκατὰληφια). Therefore, abstinence from any judgment - epoché (ἐποχή) - is the most worthy of a philosopher's behavior in relation to things. And behind such behavior, as his shadow, is the steadfastness and equanimity of the spirit - ἀταραξία. For he who has renounced all knowledge of things cannot attribute any value or value to anything; he chooses nothing, avoids nothing, prefers nothing, since nothing is good or evil in itself. The wise man lives in perfect calmness and dispassion, indifferent to good and evil, without worries and fuss, striving for apathy as the highest goal of his life. People are unhappy through no fault of their own: they are tormented by being deprived of what for some reason they consider their good, or afraid of losing this good.

But, since it is practically impossible to live in absolute inaction, the wise will act in accordance with laws and customs, following probability (τοῖς φαινομένοις ἀκολουθεῖν), fully aware that such behavior is not based on any firm conviction. So, we must live in accordance with common sense - live like everyone else.

As already mentioned, the philosophy of Pyrrho is partly associated with the Megarian school. But still, even from the meager information that has survived to us, one can see that skepticism arose not from dialectics, but rather from fatigue with dialectics, from disgust for it. Timon attacked the dialecticians most viciously, and even disagreed with later dialecticians because they based their skepticism on dialectical arguments.

Pyrrho's skepticism had a decidedly practical rather than a dialectical interest. In him, the weary thought thought to find a solid bulwark, the final calm from the questions and doubts of the mind and heart. Better than Stoic and Epicurean physics, this preaching of absolute ignorance was supposed to substantiate philosophical indifference, give rise to human soul insight into the vanity of the world - complete indifference and peace of mind. Both the Stoics and the Epicureans, as well as the Skeptics, thought by constant reflection to achieve this desired state. Later writers report how Pyrrho admired the fakirs and how he once, during a stormy voyage, set up a piglet as an example to frightened travelers, who immediately calmly ate the food poured out to him.

Pyrrho keeps calm during a sea storm. Painting of the 1st quarter of the 16th century

On another occasion, Pyrrho was walking along a path with his teacher Anaxarchus, who fell into a swamp and fell so deep that he could not get out. Pyrrho imperturbably continued on his way. Many blamed him for such an act, but Anaxarchus, getting out of the swamp, praised him for his equanimity. But such an αταραξία is practically impossible. The same Diogenes Laertius reports that once Pyrrho climbed a tree, frightened of a dog. And when they laughed at him, he said that if, due to weakness, we sometimes cannot resist instincts, then we should try at least to harmonize our mind with reality.

Skeptics were criticized by some for being contrary to common sense. On the contrary, common sense has been the basic principle of everyday life of old and new skeptics, for whom there is nothing but appearances and probabilities .

Introduction

1. Review of the periods of development of skepticism

2. Pyrrho and his school

4. Sextus Empiric: Skepticism as a way of life

Conclusion

List of used literature

The following stages are distinguished in the history of ancient philosophy: 1) the formation of ancient Greek philosophy (VI-V centuries BC; philosophers - Thales, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Socrates, etc.); 2) classical Greek philosophy (V - IV centuries BC) - the teachings of Democritus, Plato, Aristotle; 3) Hellenistic-Roman philosophy (from the end of the 4th century BC to the 6th century AD) - the concepts of Epicureanism, Stoicism, skepticism.

Relevance The subject of the test is that at the end of the 4th c. BC. signs of a crisis in Greek slave-owning democracy are intensifying. This crisis led to the loss of political independence by Athens and other Greek policies.

The economic and political decline of Greece, the decline of the role of the policy are reflected in Greek philosophy. The efforts directed at the knowledge of the objective world, which manifested itself among the Greek philosophers, are gradually replaced by the desire to reduce philosophical and scientific questions only to what is sufficient to substantiate the correct, i.e. able to provide happiness, personal behavior. There is widespread disappointment in all types and forms of social and political life. Philosophy turns from a theoretical system into a state of mind and expresses the self-awareness of a person who has lost himself in the world. Over time, interest in philosophical thinking generally falls sharply. There comes a period of mysticism, fusion of religion and philosophy.

Metaphysics as philosophy predominantly gives way to ethics, the main question of the philosophy of this period is not what things are in themselves, but how they relate to us. Philosophy is increasingly striving to become a doctrine that develops the rules and norms of human life. In this, all three main philosophical directions of the era of early Hellenism are similar - Stoicism, Epicureanism and skepticism.

The loss of oneself and self-doubt gave rise to such a direction of Hellenistic philosophy as skepticism .

Skepticism(from Greek. skeptics- considering, investigating) - a philosophical direction that puts forward doubt as a principle of thinking, especially doubt about the reliability of truth. moderate skepticism limited to the knowledge of facts, showing restraint in relation to all hypotheses and theories. In the ordinary sense, skepticism is a psychological state of uncertainty, doubt about something, forcing one to refrain from making categorical judgments.

Antique skepticism as a reaction to the metaphysical dogmatism of previous philosophical schools is presented, first of all, Pyrrho, then the secondary and new academies ( Arcesilaus , Carneades) and so on. late skepticism (Aenesidemus, Sextus Empiricus and etc.) .

Ancient skepticism went through many changes and phases in its development. At first, it had a practical character, that is, it acted not only as the most true, but also as the most useful and advantageous position in life, and then turned into a theoretical doctrine; initially he questioned the possibility of any knowledge, then criticized the knowledge, but only received by the previous philosophy. Three periods can be distinguished in ancient skepticism:

Equally important, and perhaps even more important, was ethical area of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Although Pyrrho himself did not write anything, enough material has come down to us both about his skepticism in general and about the ethical section of his philosophy. A number of terms are important here, which, with the light hand of Pyrrho, have become very widespread in all subsequent philosophy.

Therefore, Pyrrho used here two more terms that can only amaze anyone who is first engaged in ancient philosophy and has a desire to delve into the essence of ancient skepticism. These are the terms "ataraxia", "equanimity", and "apatheia", "insensitivity", "dispassion". This last term is illiterately translated by some as "the absence of suffering." This is exactly what should be the inner state of a sage who has renounced a reasonable explanation of reality and a reasonable attitude towards it.

3. Skepticism of the Platonic Academy

Usually Plato's successors (academicians) are divided into Old, Middle and New Academy. (Some also accept, in addition, the 4th and even the 5th academy).

The philosophy of ancient skepticism existed for quite a long time and was the most influential trend in philosophy for many, many centuries - from the 4th century. BC according to III-IV centuries. after R.Kh. According to tradition, the founder of ancient skepticism is the philosopher Pyrrho, together with his student Timon. In the future, the skepticism of the Pyrrhonian type fades somewhat, and the so-called academic skepticism appears in the Platonic Academy with such representatives as Carneades and Arcesilaus - this is the 2nd century BC. BC Pyrrhonian skepticism (what later became known as Pyrrhonism) is revived by Aenesidemus and Agrippa (the works of these philosophers have not survived to this day). A representative of late ancient skepticism is the philosopher and physician Sextus Empiricus, who lived in the 2nd century BC. after R.Kh. In the III-IV centuries. the school still exists, and elements of skepticism can be found in the physician Galen.

A few words about the life of the founder of ancient skepticism - Pyrrho. He was born in Elis in 360 B.C. and lived for 90 years. Pyrrho belongs to those philosophers who did not write philosophical treatises, like Socrates, showing with his life the philosophy that he developed. We know about him from the book of Diogenes Laertes. The chapter on Pyrrho in it is the main source of information about Pyrrhonism. From it we learn that he refrained from any judgment, i.e. he had doubts about the knowability of the world. And Pyrrho, being a consistent philosopher, strove throughout his life to be a supporter of this doctrine. As Diogenes Laertes points out, Pyrrho did not move away from anything, shunned nothing, did not avoid any danger, whether it be a cart, a pile or a dog, without being exposed to a sense of danger in anything; he was saved by his friends who followed him. This is a rather bold statement, because it contradicts the essence skeptical philosophy. Further, Diogenes reports that at first Pyrrho was engaged in painting, a picture written rather mediocre has been preserved. He lived in seclusion, rarely appearing even at home. The inhabitants of Elis respected him for his intelligence and elected him high priest. This raises some questions. Again, it is not clear how a person, being an extravagant and convinced skeptic, could become a high priest. Moreover, for his sake they decided to free all philosophers from taxes. More than once he left the house without saying anything to anyone, and wandered around with anyone. One day his friend Anaxarchus fell into a swamp, Pyrrho passed by without shaking his hand. Everyone scolded him, but Anaxarchus praised him. He lived with his sister, a midwife, carried chickens and piglets to the market to sell.

The famous incident is mentioned by Diogenes Laertes: when Pyrrho was sailing on a ship and, together with his companions, got into a storm, everyone began to panic, only Pyrrho, pointing to the ship’s pig, which serenely slurped from its trough, said that this is how the true philosopher.

Little is known about Pyrrho's disciple Timon: only that he was a poet and expounded his teaching in the form of verses, syl. In the future, skeptical ideas began to develop in the Platonic Academy. The disciples of Plato developed the teachings of Plato in their own way. Carneades and Arcesilaus, considering themselves true Platonists, began to develop the theme of criticism of sensationalism and came to the conclusion that truth is unknowable. Nothing has come down to us from Carneades and Arcesilaus either. The supporter of academic skepticism is the ancient Roman orator and philosopher Cicero. He has a number of works where he sets out his point of view on academic skeptics. We can also get acquainted with academic skepticism in the work of Blessed. Augustine "Against the Academicians", where he criticizes their teaching.

In the future, Pyrrhonism is revived by Aenesidemus and Agrippa, and then already by Sextus Empiricus, the systematizer and, perhaps, the most talented deceiver of Pyrrhonism. Sextus Empiricus wrote 2 works - "Three Books of Pyrrho's Provisions" and "Against the Scholars".

Ancient skepticism, like all Hellenistic philosophy, posed primarily ethical questions, considering the main solution to the problem of how to live in this world, how to achieve happy life. It is usually believed that skepticism is primarily a doubt about the cognizability of truth, and they reduce skepticism only to the theory of knowledge. However, with regard to Pyrrhonism, this is not at all the case. Sextus Empiricus divides everything philosophical schools into 2 classes: dogmatic and skeptical. He also divides dogmatists into proper dogmatists and academicians. Dogmatists and academicians believe that they have already decided the question of truth: dogmatists, i.e. the followers of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and others, claim that they have found the truth, while the academicians claim (also dogmatically) that it is impossible to find the truth. Only skeptics seek the truth. Hence, as Sextus Empiricus says, there are three main kinds of philosophy: dogmatic, academic, and skeptical. Diogenes Laertes writes that, in addition to the name "skeptics" - from the word "to look out", they were also called aporetics (from the word "aporia"), zetics (from the word "search") and effectiki (that is, doubters).

As Sextus Empiricus pointed out, the essence of skeptical philosophy boils down to the following: “The skeptical ability is that which opposes in any possible way the phenomenon to the conceivable, hence, due to the equivalence in opposite things and speeches, we come first to refraining from judgment, and then to equanimity.” I note that Sextus speaks of a skeptical ability, and never of a dogmatic one, showing that being a skeptic is natural for a person, while being a dogmatist is unnatural. At first, skeptics try to consider all phenomena and everything conceivable, find out that these phenomena and concepts can be perceived. in a different way, including opposite ones, prove that in this way everyone will contradict each other, so that one judgment will balance the other judgment. Due to the equivalence of judgments in opposite things and speeches, the skeptic decides to abstain from judging anything, and then comes to equanimity - ataraxia, i.e. to what the Stoics were looking for. And each of these stages was carefully developed by skeptics. Refraining from judgment is also called the term "epoch".

So the first task of a Pyrrhonician is to set everything against each other in whatever way possible. Therefore, the skeptic opposes everything: the phenomenon against the phenomenon, the phenomenon against the conceivable, the conceivable against the conceivable. For these purposes, Enesidemus developed ten trails, and Agrippa five more. Often these paths limit the consideration of skepticism, and there are good reasons for this. Here, indeed, are the foundations of ancient Pyrrhonism. But before considering the paths, let's try to understand whether it is really possible to live following the philosophy of ancient skepticism?

The dispute about this philosophy arose during the lifetime of the skeptics themselves, they were reproached for the fact that their philosophy was not viable, that it had no life guide. Because in order to live, you have to take something for the truth. If you doubt everything, then, as Aristotle said, a person going to Megara will never reach it, because one must be sure at least that Megara exists.

Skepticism was reproached for such sins by Pascal, Arno, Nicole, Hume and other philosophers of modern times. However, Sextus Empiricus writes something completely opposite - that the skeptic accepts his philosophy in order not to remain inactive, because it is dogmatic philosophy that leads a person to inactivity, only skepticism can serve as a guide in life and activity. The skeptic focuses primarily on phenomena, refuses to know the essence of things, because he is not sure of this, he is looking for it. What is certain for him is a phenomenon. As Pyrrho said: that honey seems sweet to me, I am sure of this, but I refrain from judging that it is sweet by nature.

The dogmatist, on the other hand, affirms some propositions about the essence of things, and they may be erroneous, which shows the difference between dogmatic schools. And what happens if a person begins to act in accordance with an erroneous philosophy? This will lead to sad consequences. If we rely in our philosophy only on phenomena, only on what we undoubtedly know, then all our activity will have a solid foundation.

This position of Sextus Empiricus has other roots. In the 1st century after R.Kh. in Greece there were three medical schools: methodical, dogmatic and empirical. The doctor Sextus belonged to the school of empiricists, hence his name "Empiricist". The doctor Galen belonged to the same school. These doctors argued that one should not search for the origins of diseases, one should not determine what is more in a person: earth or fire, one should not bring all four elements into harmony, but one should look at the symptoms and rid the patient of these symptoms. In the treatment of patients, this method gave good results, but empiricists wanted to treat not only the body, but also the soul. The main diseases of the soul are dogmatism and academicism, because they prevent a person from achieving happiness, and dogmatism must be cured. A person must be cured of what he is mistaken in, and he is mistaken in that it is possible to know the essence of things. It is necessary to show him that this is erroneous, to show that the truth is sought by trusting the phenomenon. In the chapter "Why Does a Skeptic Make Weak Arguments?" Sextus Empiricus writes about this. Indeed, when we read his works, we often see weak arguments, sometimes even funny ones. Sextus Empiricus himself knows this and says that skeptics deliberately do this - they say, one can be convinced with a weak argument, for the other one needs to build a solid philosophical system. The main thing is the goal, the achievement of happiness. However, for the sake of fairness, it must be said that skeptics have very few weak arguments.

So let's look at the skeptical arguments put forward by Sextus Empiricus. First, about the paths of Enisidem. There are ten of them, they mainly cover the sensual side of knowledge, and the five paths of Agrippa - the rational.

The first trope is based on the diversity of living beings and reads as follows. Philosophers argue that the criterion of truth is a person, i.e. he is the measure of all things (Protagoras) and he alone can know the truth. The skeptic rightly asks, why, in fact, a person? After all, man knows the world through the sense organs. But the diversity of the animal world shows that animals also have sense organs and are different from humans. Why do we believe that the human senses give a truer picture of the world than the senses of animals? How can those with a narrow ear and those with a wide ear, those with hairy ears and those with smooth ears, hear equally? And we have no right to consider ourselves a criterion of truth. Therefore, we must refrain from judging, because we do not know whose sense organs can be trusted.

The second trope: the philosopher makes an assumption (narrowing the question): let's say that a person is a criterion of truth. But there are many people, and they are different. There are Scythians, Greeks, Indians. They tolerate cold and heat in different ways, food for some is healthy, for others it is harmful. People are diverse, and therefore it is impossible to say which person is the criterion of truth.

The third trope further narrows the field of study. The skeptic suggests that we have found a person who is the criterion of truth. But he has many sense organs that can give a picture of the world around him in different ways: honey tastes sweet, but unpleasant in appearance, rainwater is good for the eyes, and the respiratory tract becomes rough from it, etc. - this also implies abstinence judgments about the environment.

The fourth trope is about circumstances. Suppose there is a sense organ that we can trust the most, but there are always some circumstances: there are tears in the eyes that more or less affect the idea of a visible object, or an uneven state of mind: for a lover, a woman seems beautiful, for another - nothing special. Wine seems sour if you eat dates before it, and if you eat nuts or peas, then sweet, etc. This also results in refraining from judgment.

The fifth trope is about dependence on position, distances and places. For example, a tower seems small from a distance, but large up close. The same lamp flame is dim in the sun and bright in the dark. Coral is soft in the sea and hard in the air. The facts again force us to refrain from judging what the subject is in essence.

The sixth trope depends on impurities, writes Sextus. We never perceive any phenomenon in itself, but only in conjunction with something. It is always air or water or some other medium. One and the same sound is different in rare air or in dense air, aromas intoxicate in a bath more than in ordinary air, etc. Same conclusion as before.

The seventh trope concerns the size and structure of the underlying objects. The same object may look different depending on whether it is large or small, whether it is broken into its component parts or is whole. For example, filings of silver themselves appear black, but together as a whole they appear white; wine, consumed in moderation, strengthens us, and with excess, it relaxes the body, etc.

The eighth trope is about attitude towards something. It echoes the sixth. The skeptic claims that since everything exists in relation to something, we will refrain from saying what it is in isolation in its nature.

The ninth trope concerns the constantly or rarely encountered. The sun should strike us, of course, more, writes Sextus Empiricus, but since we see it constantly, and the comet is rare, we are amazed at the comet in such a way that we consider it a divine sign, and we are not surprised at all by the sun. What is less common surprises us, even if the event itself is very ordinary.

The tenth trope is connected with the question of morality and depends on beliefs and dogmatic provisions. different peoples, their customs. Sextus gives examples where he shows that different peoples have their own ideas about good and evil. Some Ethiopians tattoo small children, but we don't. The Persians consider it proper to wear long multicolored clothes, but we do not, and so on.

The first trope is about heterogeneity. It shows that there is a huge variety philosophical systems, people cannot agree and find the truth, it follows that if there is still no agreement, then it is necessary to refrain from judgment for the time being.

The second trope is about moving away to infinity. Based on it, the skeptic argues: in order to prove something, one must be based on a statement that must also be proved, it must be proved on the basis of some other statement, which in turn must also be proved, and so on. - we go to infinity, i.e. we don't know where to start justifying, and so we refrain from judging.

The third trope is called “relative to what,” in which the underlying thing seems to be this or that in relation to the one who judges or contemplates the subject. He who judges an object is at the same time the subject and the object of knowledge. When we judge something, we intervene in the process of cognition, therefore we cannot judge the object in itself, since it does not exist by itself, but exists only for us.

The fourth trope is about supposition. If a philosopher wants to avoid going to infinity, then he dogmatically assumes that some proposition is true in itself. But the skeptic does not agree to such a concession, believing that this is precisely a concession, the position is accepted without proof and therefore cannot claim the truth.

The fifth trope is on mutual provability, which says that in order to avoid infinity in a proof, philosophers often fall into the errors of mutual provability. One proposition is justified with the help of another, which in turn is justified with the help of the first.

All these tropes are used by skeptics when considering any philosophical question.

Skeptics argued with their contemporaries, the main opponents for them were the Stoics. In the books of Sextus Empiricus, there are objections to ethics, rhetoricians, geometers, astrologers (arguments from this book will be found in the works of the Church Fathers). Take, for example, the issue of causality. In particular, Sextus Empiricus considers the question, does a cause exist or not? First he proves that there is a cause, for it is difficult to suppose that there is any effect without its cause, then everything would be in complete disorder. But even with no less persuasiveness, he proves that there is no reason. For before we think of any effect, we must know that there is a cause that produces this effect, and in order to know that this is a cause, we must know that it is the cause of an effect, i.e. we can neither think the cause nor the effect separately, i.e. they are relative to each other. Therefore, in order to think the cause, one must first know the action, and in order to know the action, one must first know the cause. It follows from this mutual evidence that we cannot know either the cause or the effect.

A few words about how ancient skepticism interacted with nascent Christianity. Can we say that skepticism hindered or helped the spread of Christianity? Most historians of philosophy believe that ancient skepticism prepared the way for the seed of Christianity to fall on fertile ground through the preaching of the apostles. Skeptical views in the first years after A.D. were so common among ancient thinkers that any statement could be perceived as quite reliable and worthy. And skepticism prepared the ancient world to say: "I believe, because it is absurd." Therefore, we can say that skepticism played a preparatory role for the spread of Christianity in Europe.

Skepticism was developed in the writings of Lactantius, who considered skepticism a good introduction to Christianity. After all, skepticism shows the futility and weakness of our mind, it proves that the mind cannot know the truth on its own, this requires revelation. On the other hand, bliss. Augustine shows another way of dealing with skepticism Christian - the way to overcome it. In his writings, he proves that skepticism is not true philosophy. According to Augustine, skepticism destroys faith in truth, and since God is truth, skepticism leads to atheism. Therefore, every Christian must wage an uncompromising struggle against skepticism.

Ancient skepticism was one of the most influential currents in philosophy for many, many centuries - from the 4th century. BC according to III-IV centuries. after R.Kh. According to tradition, the founder of ancient skepticism is Pyrrho, who was born in Elis in 360.

BC and lived for 90 years. Pyrrho refers to those philosophers who did not write philosophical treatises - like Socrates, showing the essence of his philosophy with his life. Everything that is known about him, for the most part, is set forth in the book of Diogenes Laertes. From it we learn that Pyrrho refrained from any judgments, i.e. he had doubts about the knowability of the essence of things. And, being a consistent philosopher, he strove to follow this teaching throughout his life. As Diogenes Laertes points out, “in accordance with this, he led his life, not deviating from anything, avoiding nothing, being exposed to any danger, whether it be a cart, a horse or a dog, but not yielding to sensations in anything, they saved him from dangers. friends who followed him” (D.L. IX, 62). This is a rather strange statement, because, as we shall see, it contradicts the essence of skeptical philosophy. Initially, Pyrrho was engaged in painting, a picture written by him rather mediocre has been preserved. He lived in seclusion, rarely appearing even at home. The inhabitants of Elis respected him for his intelligence and elected him high priest. This fact again causes some reflection in us - it is not clear how a person, being so extravagant in behavior, could become a high priest. Moreover, for his sake they decided to free all philosophers from taxes. Further, Diogenes Laertes writes that more than once he left home without saying anything to anyone, and wandered around with anyone. One day his friend Anaxarchus fell into a swamp, Pyrrho passed by without shaking his hand. Everyone scolded him, but Anaxarchus praised him. He lived with his sister, a midwife, carried chickens and piglets to the market to sell.

Little is known about Pyrrho's disciple Timon: only that he was a poet and expounded his teaching in the form of verses, syl. Later, skeptical ideas began to develop in the Platonic Academy in the 2nd century BC. BC The disciples of Plato developed the teachings of the founder of the Academy in their own way. The scholars Carneades and Arcesilaus, considering themselves true Platonists, began to develop the theme of criticism of sensationalism and came to the conclusion that truth is unknowable. The works of Carneades and Arcesilaus have not survived. The supporter of academic skepticism is the ancient Roman orator and philosopher Cicero. Many of his works have come down to us, where he sets out his understanding of academic skepticism. We can also get acquainted with academic skepticism in the work of Blessed. Augustine "Against the Academicians", where he criticizes their teaching.

Subsequently, Pyrrhonism revived in the 1st century. BC at Aenesidemus and Agrippa, and then already in the II century. after R.Kh. Sextus Empiricus, systematizer and perhaps the most talented representative of Pyrrhonism. Sextus Empiricus wrote two works - "Three Books of the Pyrrhonic Propositions" and "Against the Scholars". In the III-IV centuries. elements of skepticism can be found in the famous physician Galen.

Sextus Empiricus divides all philosophical schools into two groups: dogmatic and skeptical. He also divides dogmatists into proper dogmatists and academicians. Dogmatists and academicians believe that they have already decided the question of truth: dogmatists, i.e. the followers of Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics, and others, claim that they have found the truth, while the academicians claim (also dogmatically) that it is impossible to find the truth. Only skeptics seek the truth. Therefore, says Sextus Empiricus, there are three main kinds of philosophy: dogmatic, academic, and skeptical. Diogenes Laertes writes that, in addition to the name “skeptics” (from sk)eptomai, “to examine, investigate”), they were also called aporetics (from the word “aporia”), zetetics (from zht)ew, “search”) and effectists ( from _ep)ecw, "refrain from judgment") (D.L. IX, 70).

Sextus Empiricus finds the beginning of skeptical philosophy in the ability of a person to doubt. A person doubts because he has a skeptical ability: “The skeptical ability is that which opposes the phenomenon to the conceivable in whatever way possible; hence, due to the equivalence in opposite things and speeches, we come first to refraining from judgment (_epoc)h), and then to equanimity (_atarax0ia) ”(Sext Empiric. Three books of Pyrrho provisions, 8). “Abstention from judgment,” continues Sextus, “is such a state of mind in which we deny nothing and affirm nothing” (Ibid., 10). Let us note that Sextus speaks of skeptical ability, and never of dogmatic ability, showing that it is natural for a person to be a skeptic, to doubt, while being a dogmatist is unnatural.

Thus, the method of skepticism consists in the fact that the skeptic tries to consider all phenomena and everything conceivable, finds out that these phenomena and concepts can be perceived in different ways, including the opposite, proves that in this way a contradiction arises, so that one judgment would be tantamount to something else. Due to the equivalence of judgments about opposite things and speeches, the skeptic decides to refrain from judging anything, and then comes to equanimity - ataraxia, i.e. to what the Stoics were looking for. Each of these steps has been elaborately worked out by the skeptics. Refraining from judgment is often referred to by the ancient term "epoch".

So the first task of a Pyrrhonician is to set everything against each other in whatever way possible. Therefore, the skeptic opposes everything: the phenomenon - the phenomenon, the phenomenon - the conceivable, the conceivable - the conceivable. For these purposes, Aenesidemus developed ten ways of argumentation, the so-called. tropes, and Agrippa added five more. Often these paths limit the consideration of skepticism, and there are good reasons for this. Indeed, they contain the foundations of ancient Pyrrhonism. However, as we have seen, this kind of reasoning plays an auxiliary role in achieving a more important goal - ataraxia.

The dispute about this philosophy arose during the lifetime of the skeptics themselves, they were reproached for the fact that skepticism is not viable: in order to live and act, it is necessary to be firmly convinced of something. If you doubt everything, then nothing can be done. As mentioned earlier, even Aristotle noticed this internal contradiction of skepticism: “And this is especially obvious from the fact that in reality no one holds such views: neither other people, nor those who express this position. Indeed, why does such a person go to Megara and not stay at home, imagining that he is going there? (Met. 4, 4). However, Sextus Empiricus writes something completely opposite - that the skeptic accepts his philosophy in order not to remain completely inactive (Sext, 23). The skeptic focuses only on phenomena and refuses to know the essence of things. What is certain for him is a phenomenon. As Timon said, “I do not affirm that honey is sweet, but that it seems so, I admit” (D.L. IX, 105). Therefore, the skeptic acts based on phenomena and does not think about what is behind them, what is their meaning, etc. The dogmatist, on the other hand, asserts some propositions about the essence of these phenomena, and they may be erroneous, which shows the difference between dogmatic schools. And what happens if a person begins to act in accordance with an erroneous philosophy? This will lead to sad consequences. If, however, one leans in one's philosophy only on phenomena, on that which is undoubted, then activity will have a solid foundation.

This position of Sextus Empiricus has other roots. At this time in Greece there were three medical schools: methodical, dogmatic and empirical. The doctor Sextus belonged to the school of empiricists, as his name suggests. The famous physician Galen would later belong to the same school. The empiricists argued that it was not necessary to search for the origins of diseases, it was not necessary to determine what is more in a person: earth or fire, water or bile, as dogmatic doctors suggested, but one should be guided by experience, look at the symptoms of the disease and rid the patient of them. In the treatment of patients, this method gave good results, but empiricists wanted to treat not only the body, but also the soul. The main disease of the soul is dogmatism, because it prevents a person from achieving happiness, and therefore dogmatism must be cured. A person must be cured of what he is mistaken in - that it is possible to know the essence of things.

Consider the skeptical arguments advanced by the Pyrrhonics. First, about the paths of Enisidem. There are ten of them, they mainly cover the sensual side of knowledge. A list of these tropes is given by Diogenes Laertes and Sextus Empiricus. Their order of presentation is somewhat different, we will follow Sextus Empiricus.

The first trope is based on the diversity of living beings and their cognitive abilities. Philosophers usually argue that the criterion of truth is a person, i.e. he is the measure of all things (Protagoras) and only he can know the truth. The skeptic rightly asks, why, in fact, a person? After all, a person learns the world around him through the senses. But the diversity of the animal world shows that animals also have sense organs, and they are different from humans. Why do we believe that the human senses give a truer picture of the world than the senses of animals? For example, “how can it be said that when touched, [animals] get the same impression and tortoise-like, and those with naked meat, and equipped with needles, and feathered, and scaly? And how can those with a very narrow hearing organ, and those with a very wide one, and those with hairy ears, and those with smooth ears, receive the same perception of hearing? (Sext, 49-50). Therefore, a person has no right to consider himself a criterion for knowing the truth. “If, depending on the difference between living beings, there are various ideas, about which it is impossible to judge, then it is necessary to refrain from judging about external objects” (61).

The second trope: the philosopher makes an assumption: suppose, nevertheless, that man is the criterion of truth, “that people are more trustworthy than stupid animals” (79). But there are many people, and they are different. There are Scythians, Greeks, Indians. They tolerate cold and heat in different ways, food is healthy for some, harmful for others, etc. People are diverse, and therefore it is impossible to say which person correctly perceives external objects.

The third trope: even if we assume that it is possible to find a person who is the criterion of truth, then this will not help to know the essence of a thing. After all, each person has many sense organs that can give a picture of the world around them in different ways. “Honey seems to some to be sweet in taste, but unpleasant in appearance. Therefore, it is impossible to say whether it is really sweet or unpleasant” (92). A person has only five sense organs, and it is possible that there are some qualities of objects that are not perceived by any of these organs, just as a blind person from birth knows nothing about colors, and a deaf person knows nothing about sounds.

Fourth trope: the same object can be perceived differently in different circumstances, in different situations, "depending on age, on movement or rest, on hatred or love, on malnutrition or satiety, on intoxication or sobriety" (100) . For example, for a woman in love, a woman seems beautiful, for another - ordinary. “Wine seems sour to those who have eaten dates or figs before, and sweet to those who have eaten nuts or peas before.” This also results in refraining from judgment.

The fifth trope speaks of dependence on position, distances and places. For example, a tower from a distance seems small, but close up it looks big. The same lamp flame is dim in the sun and bright in the dark. Coral is soft in the sea and hard in the air. One can only say what an object seems to be in connection with this or that position, or distance, or place, what it is by nature - it is impossible to know.

The sixth trope "depends on impurities," writes Sextus (124). No object or phenomenon is perceived by itself, in isolation, but always in conjunction with something. For example, "the same sound seems different when combined with rare air, and different when combined with thick air" (125). Aromas are more intoxicating in a bath than in ordinary air, and so on. Therefore, due to impurities, the senses do not perceive the exact essence of external objects. The conclusion is the same - refraining from judgment.

The seventh trope "concerns the relations of size and structure of the underlying objects" (120). The same object may look different depending on whether it is large or small, whether it is broken into its component parts or is whole. For example, “grains of sand, separated from each other, seem hard, but collected in a heap they produce a soft sensation”, “silver filings themselves seem black, but when added to the whole they appear white”; “wine consumed in moderation strengthens us, and drunk in excess relaxes the body”, etc.

The eighth trope "speaks of an attitude towards something" (135). The skeptic argues that "since everything exists in relation to something, we will refrain from saying what it is in isolation and in its nature." For example, anyone who makes any judgment about something says it in relation to himself, to his feelings, to his way of thinking, etc. And in general, everything exists "in relation to a given impurity, a given method, a given composition, a certain value and a certain position."

The ninth trope concerns the constantly or rarely encountered. “The sun, of course, should amaze us much more than a comet,” writes Sextus Empiricus, “but since we see the sun all the time, and the comet is rare, we are amazed by the comet so that we consider it even a divine sign, but we are not amazed at all » (141). What occurs less often strikes us more than what occurs frequently, even if it is in its essence a very ordinary event.

The tenth trope is connected with the issue of morality and depends on the behavior, customs, laws, beliefs and dogmatic positions of different peoples, theirs. Sextus gives examples where he shows that different peoples have their own ideas about good and evil, about decent and indecent, about various religious beliefs, laws and customs. For example, “Some of the Ethiopians tattoo small children, we don't; and the Persians consider it decent to wear long, multi-coloured and toe-length clothes, but for us it is indecent, ”etc.

As can be seen from the above, the paths of Aenesidemus mark self-contradiction sensory knowledge and are thus a response to sensationalistic epistemology. But rationalism, according to the skeptics, cannot lead us to the truth, and the tropes of Agrippa speak of this.

The first trope is about heterogeneity. It testifies that there is a huge variety of philosophical systems, people cannot agree and find the truth, it follows that if there is still no agreement on anything, then it is necessary to refrain from judgment for the time being.

The second trope is about moving away to infinity. Based on it, the skeptic argues: everything that we cite to prove the truth of a proposition must also be proved if we consider it to be true, and it, in turn, must also be proved, and so on. Thus, an endless chain of evidence is built up, we do not know where to start the justification, and therefore we refrain from judging.

The third trope is called “relative to what”, in which the underlying thing seems to us this or that in relation to the one who judges the object or contemplates it, and to the contemplated or cognized object itself. In the cognition of an object, the subject of cognition always participates, there is no subject without an object and vice versa. When we judge something, we intervene in what we judge, and therefore we cannot judge the object in itself, since it does not exist in itself, but exists only for us.

The fourth trope is about assumption. If a philosopher wants to avoid going to infinity, then he dogmatically assumes that some proposition is true in itself. But the skeptic does not agree to such a concession, believing that this is precisely a concession, the position is accepted without proof and therefore cannot claim the truth.

The fifth trope is about mutual provability: in order to avoid infinity in a proof, philosophers often fall into the fallacy of mutual provability. One proposition is justified with the help of another, which in turn is justified with the help of the first.

Skeptics apply all these paths when considering any philosophical question, to which all the other pages of the books of Sextus Empiricus are devoted. Sextus proves that it is necessary to refrain from judging questions about the criterion of good and evil, the knowledge of truth, the existence of God or gods, the existence of causes and effects, about what time and place are, definition and proof, etc. For example, the problem of causality: does a cause exist or does it not exist? First, Sextus Empiricus proves that there is a cause, for it is difficult to suppose that there is any effect without its cause, then everything would be in complete disorder. But with no less persuasiveness, he proves that there is no reason. For before we can think of any action, we must know that there is a cause that produces this action; and in order to know that there is a cause, we must know that there is some effect of which it is the cause, i.e. we cannot think of cause or effect separately, they are correlated with each other. Therefore, in order to think the cause, one must first know the action, and in order to know the action, one must first know the cause. It follows from this mutual evidence that we cannot know either the cause or the effect. Further, for every cause there must be a cause for that cause, and so on ad infinitum. Another argument: the cause either coexists with the action, or precedes it. But if the cause exists before the effect, then it is not the cause of this effect, because the cause is directly related to the effect; the cause cannot be simultaneous with the action, because the action occurs after the cause. Thus, since it can be proved both that there is a cause and that there is no cause, it is necessary to refrain from judging on this point.

A few words about how ancient skepticism interacted with nascent Christianity. Can we say that skepticism hindered or helped the spread of Christianity? Some historians of philosophy believe that ancient skepticism prepared the way for the seed of Christianity to fall on fertile ground through the preaching of the apostles. Skeptical views in the first years after A.D. were so common among ancient thinkers that any statement could be perceived as quite possible. Skepticism prepared the ancient world to say: "I believe, because it is absurd." Therefore, it can be said that skepticism played a preparatory role for the spread of Christianity in Europe, destroying the ancient trust only in reason.

The attitude of Christian theologians to skepticism was different. On the one hand, the early Christian writer Lactantius considered skepticism a good introduction to Christianity, because skepticism shows the weakness of our mind, it proves that the mind cannot know the truth on its own, this requires revelation. On the other hand, bliss. Augustine proves that skepticism is not true philosophy, it destroys the belief in the existence of truth, and since God is truth, skepticism leads to atheism. Therefore, according to the blessed Augustine, an irreconcilable struggle against skepticism is necessary. The Eastern Fathers of the Church, on the other hand, treated skepticism rather coolly. St. Gregory the Theologian and Patriarch Photius show their familiarity with the ideas of ancient skeptics, but do not comment on their views. Such a divergence in attitudes towards skepticism on the part of Western and Eastern theologians is due, perhaps, to the fact that Western Christians got acquainted with skepticism in Latin, through Cicero, a former academician, i.e. a dogmatist who denied the cognizability of truth; Eastern Christians read in Greek the works of the Pyrrhonics Aenesidemus (even a summary of the work of Aenesidemus made by St. Photius has been preserved) and Sextus Empiricus, who did not express such a negative attitude towards the possibility of knowing the truth.

12.09.2020

Psychology of self-development

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