Why did Socrates choose death over flight? Did he do the right thing by obeying the unfair decision of the court? Why did Socrates refuse to escape from prison?

First spiritual law success is the Law of Pure Potentiality This law is based on the fact that we, by our very nature, are pure consciousness. Pure consciousness is pure potentiality, it is the field of all possibilities and infinite creativity. Pure

Citizen (Citogen) A member of civil society to the extent of his involvement in the highest authority (otherwise he turns into a simple subject) and as long as he executes its laws (otherwise he turns into a king). There are civil societies without

Law (Loi) A universal and binding statement. Obviously, there are no "laws of nature" understood in this sense. We use this word by analogy, referring to certain observable patterns. On the contrary, the rationality of the universe is silent

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truth in villainy and injustice. And I remain at my punishment... and I don't think it's right" (ibid., 39 b).
Usually, the death sentence was carried out immediately after it was pronounced, but in the case of Socrates, the execution of the sentence was delayed for 30 days due to the following circumstance. Every year, the Athenians sent a sacred vessel with gifts to the island of Delos to the temple of Apollo, fulfilling Theseus' oath given to the god Apollo after the destruction of the Minotaur monster in Crete and the deliverance of Athens from paying tribute (seven young men and seven girls to be devoured by the Minotaur) to the Cretan king Minos. From the day the sacred embassy sailed until its return to Athens, the death penalty was forbidden.
Socrates' friends, taking advantage of this circumstance, visited him in prison, where he was awaiting execution, talked with him and prepared his escape. Escape was easy. We learn about this from the words of an old friend, peer and countryman Socrates Crito, after whom one of Plato's dialogues is named. Crito describes the meeting of Crito with Socrates, their conversation the day before the return of the sacred ship. Crito tries to persuade Socrates to escape from prison. But Socrates rejects the insistent request of a friend and remains true to domestic laws.
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2. Citizen and law
As shown in Crito, the motives for refusing to escape stem from the ethical teachings of Socrates and boil down to the fact that "an unjust deed is evil and shame for the one who does it, and moreover, in all cases" (Plato. Crito, 49 c). Therefore, contrary to public opinion, "one should neither respond to injustice with injustice, nor do harm to anyone, even if one had to suffer from someone" (ibid., 49 pp.). Moreover, it is impossible to do injustice in relation to domestic laws, because only thanks to them the state exists, thanks to them Socrates was born from a legal marriage, received the education prescribed by them and became a citizen of Athens, which endowed him with all sorts of benefits. As a citizen, he pledged to uphold, not undermine, the laws of his fatherland. As against the father and mother, and even more so against the state and its laws, it is unacceptable to inflict violence, even if you experience injustice from them, including such an undeserved punishment as condemnation to death.
Objecting to Crito on behalf of personified laws, Socrates continues: laws allow every citizen to discuss and correct them if they are not good in anything. In addition, the laws provide an opportunity for every citizen, if he does not like them, "to take his property and move out wherever he pleases" (ibid., 51 e). Therefore, the laws, says Socrates, told him: "After all, you had seventy years - enough
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time to leave if you did not like us and ... seemed unfair" (ibid., 52 e). And if you, Socrates, did not leave the Fatherland, then this is one of the proofs that "you liked us too, and our State, because you would not have settled in it more firmly than all the Athenians, if you had not felt strong affection for it "(ibid., 52 b). In addition," if you wanted, you could still demand exile for himself and would then do, with the consent of the state, the same thing that he planned to do now without its consent" (ibid., 52 p.).
Finally, Socrates proceeds from the fact that if he breaks the laws by escaping from prison, then this will be an indirect confirmation of the justice of accusing him of breaking the laws and corrupting youth. "After all, the destroyer of laws can very, very much seem like the destroyer of youth and foolish people" (ibid., 53 p.). Speaking on behalf of the laws, Socrates remarks that he, having taught justice and virtue all his life, should not contradict himself in his actions and escape from prison in fear of death, like a miserable slave. And where can he find a new homeland if he has become a violator of its laws in his homeland? The laws of the Fatherland would tell him: "If you leave now, then you will leave offended not by us, by the Laws, but by people" (ibid., 54 p.).
It seems that the question of the reasons that forced Socrates to refuse to escape from prison has been settled. But this is far from true. The fact is that some fundamentally important judgments of Socrates and the line of behavior chosen by him after the trial and the death sentence were passed on him are strikingly at odds with what he said and what he insisted on at the trial. This circumstance, like the question of Socrates' justification
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obedience (or disobedience) to the law have become, especially in recent decades, the subject of lively discussions among researchers. Indeed, how can one reconcile what the son of Sophroniscus asserts in the Apologia with what he says in Crito? From the "Apology" (29 s-d) we know that even if a law is issued, on the basis of which it will be necessary, under pain of death, to "leave philosophy", then in this case, he, Socrates, will obey "God rather than you ( Athenians - F. K.) "and will not stop philosophizing. In "Crito" (250 a-53 a-c), on the contrary, the idea is expressed of civil obedience, of the obligation of a citizen of the polis to obey domestic laws. Besides, how to reconcile Socrates' call for civil obedience with his (as we already know) refusal to obey the order of the Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leontius of Salamis?
On these and similar questions, which caused much trouble to scientists, various opinions and judgments have been and are being expressed. Let's consider some of them. At the end of the last century, the famous Russian religious philosopher V.S. Solovyov spoke out against the widespread concept that in cases of conflict between "internal truth and law" the issue should always be resolved in favor of the law, referring to Socrates, who refused to escape from prison, as an example of civil obedience to the lawful, albeit unjust, verdict of the Athenian judges. V. S. Solovyov wrote that in his decision Socrates was guided not by the motives of civil obedience, but by considerations of a moral order: “Firstly, he found that to flee that small rest of his life for which he, as a 70-year-old elder,
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could count, it would be shameful cowardice ... Secondly, Socrates found that a citizen must sacrifice his personal good to domestic laws, even unjust ones, for the sake of filial piety "(46, VII, 116).
V. S. Solovyov also focused on the fact that “in the case of Socrates, there was no clash of two duties, but only a clash of personal right with civil duty, and it can be accepted in principle that the right must yield” (ibid.). Further, saying that "no one is obliged to defend his material life: it is only a right, which is always permissible, and sometimes commendable to sacrifice," the author continues: "Another thing is when the civic duty of obedience to laws collides not with a personal right, but with a moral , as in the famous classic example of Antigone, who had to choose between the religious and moral duty to give an honest burial to her brother and the civil duty of obedience to the impious and inhuman, but legally fair (as coming from the legitimate authority of the native city) prohibition to give such a burial. in force the rule: it is proper to obey God more than men, and it clearly turns out that justice - in the sense of legality or formal legal legality of actions, is not a virtue in itself, but may or may not become such, depending on the situation. the heroism of Socrates, who succumbed to the unjust law, and the heroism of Antigone, who violated this law ... Socrates conceded his material right for the sake of the highest idea of ​​\u200b\u200bhuman dignity and patriotic duty, and Antigone argued
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someone else's right and thereby fulfilled her duty ... Suppose, for example, that filial piety, brought to heroism, encourages someone not to resist his father, who intended to kill him. One can argue about the moral dignity of heroism, but it would never occur to anyone to justify or find heroic the same person if he considers himself obliged, out of obedience to his father, to kill his brother or sister. - Exactly the same applies to unjust and inhuman laws, whence it is clear that justice in the sense of obedience to laws as such, according to the motto: fiat justitia, pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world perishes) - in itself is not yet a virtue. "(ibid., 116-117).
Let us assume that Socrates, prompted by filial piety, decided to sacrifice his life for the sake of the triumph of domestic laws and the inviolability of their sentence, even if it was unjust. But even in this case, this contradiction is not removed. For we know that in the Apologia the same Socrates expresses no filial piety or patriotism, and declares that even under the threat of death he will not renounce philosophy. We also know that in this case Socrates, like Antigone, appeals to divine, and not human, institutions, that is, he follows, in the words of V.S. Solovyov, the rule: it is fitting to obey God more than men. It turns out that the same Socrates was guided by two opposite rules or principles, in one case (in court) preferring divine laws, in the other (in prison) - human. All this is very strange, unusual and bewildering.
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Some researchers believe that the contradiction in the judgments and behavior of Socrates is verbal and purely external, since the Platonic dialogues "Apology" and "Critias" pursue different goals and talk about different things. So, G. Young believes that the arguments in "Crito", given by Socrates in favor of refusing to escape, do not express the point of view of Socrates, but aim to convince Crito, who wanted to save Socrates' life and took the necessary measures to escape, of his injustice, Crito, intentions, and from the standpoint of understanding things by Crito himself. “And if Socrates,” writes Young, “wants to convince Crito that it is not dicayon (not fair, - F.K.) for him to flee from Athens, he cannot rely on principles as a means of persuasion: these principles, at least , by themselves will not affect Crito" (103, 6). For Crito, Young continues, repeatedly raises the question of what the "majority" of fellow citizens will say, think, and do (Crito, 44 ​​b-c, 44 d, 45 d - 46 a, 48 b), if he and other friends Socrates will not be saved by the latter. Meanwhile, for Socrates, the discussion of the issue of escape must be conducted regardless of the opinion and intention of the "majority". And although Crito formally agreed with this argument, he nevertheless took the principles of Socrates very superficially. In addition, Crito was beside himself with the realization of the imminent death of the philosopher, his friend, and therefore neglected the Socratic principles, in particular, the following: "most of all, it is not life as such that should be valued, but the good life" (48 b). In a word, Crito, although he was a friend of Socrates, is nevertheless one of many, that is, one of those who share the opinion of the majority and are inclined to act as the majority will do in a similar situation.
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Therefore, in order to reconcile Crito with the thought of his (Socrates') death, Socrates is forced to use arguments different from those that he himself considered decisive. What Socrates says in Crito cannot be taken as expressing his (or Plato's) point of view.
According to Young, the question that Socrates and Crito must decide is whether the decaion is Socrates' escape, not whether Socrates and Crito should do what is truly a decaion, i.e., really just (103 , eleven). When discussing this issue, Crito essentially leaves the dialogue, and Socrates takes his place, who, instead of asking questions to Crito, himself answers the questions of the Athenian (personified) Laws that have taken his place. The entry of the Laws into dialogue and the reversal of roles associated with this are caused, according to Young, mainly by the effect produced by the laws on Crito: higher and indisputable authority than Socrates. The fact that the laws oppose the proposal of Crito is for Crito a stronger reason for refusing this proposal than when Socrates does not agree with him "(ibid., 12). In addition, the circumstance associated with the introduction of Athenian laws into the dialogue is explained, according to the author, by the fact that Socrates himself does not share all the arguments that they put forward.
G. Young analyzes in detail each of the four arguments that clearly put forward laws against the alleged intention of Socrates to escape from Athens, that is, against Crito's proposal for Socrates to escape from prison. Despite the lengthy and somewhat intricate
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the nature of the presentation of the material carried out by the author, the analysis deserves attention.
The first of these arguments boils down to the fact that Socrates wants to destroy laws and the state by his escape, because they cannot exist if the decisions made by the court are not carried out by the will of private individuals, are canceled and become invalid (Crito, 50 a-c). Socrates considers it possible to challenge this argument, citing the fact that "the State treated us unfairly and incorrectly decided the matter" (ibid., 50 s). Crito seizes on this objection, since it is implied that Socrates has the right to act unjustly towards a state that has acted unjustly towards him. Therefore, Socrates' failure to comply with the unjust verdict of the court will not lead to the death of the state and its laws, but only to the annulment of the wrong verdict. However, Crito forgets that he previously agreed with the ethical principle of Socrates that (contrary to the opinion of the majority expressing the traditional ethical norm) one should not act unfairly, even if that is what was done to oneself, and one should not respond an atom to evil (49 b-d). Instead of pointing out this contradiction to Crito, Socrates (who took the place of Crito in the dialogue with the Laws) cites a possible counter-objection of the Laws: The Laws were not agreed with the citizens of the polis (city-state) that they, the citizens, would those judgments which they seem to be just, but only that individuals must comply with any and all judgments issued by the State (50 s).
The second argument says that Socrates is in relation to the State and Laws in the same dependence,
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as a slave in front of the owner and as a child in front of his parents - their relationship is unequal, so Socrates must obey the court decision (50 d - 51 s). The state found it just to sentence Socrates to death. Therefore, Socrates' attempt to save his life by flight would be an unjust act. Further, in the argument under consideration, an analogy is drawn between parents and a child, as well as between a master and a slave, however, in other places of the dialogue, children are referred to as timid and inconsistent fools (see 46 c, 49 b), and slaves as contemptible creatures (see 52 d; see also 53 e). Following this analogy, it can be said that if Socrates, against the will of the State, escapes from prison, he will become like a child or a slave; but since Socrates does not want this, he will not escape, will not violate his obligations to the State that gave birth and raised him. However, the whole point of the argument under analysis is precisely that being an unequal child or a slave is not so bad that Socrates opposed such a state of affairs: he should strive to accept the restrictions that follow from his position. All this, G. Young notes, is a stretch, if not an obvious inconsistency, which makes one wonder whether the second argument is as convincing as it appears at first sight (see 103, 18).
The third argument concerning the agreement made between Socrates and the Laws (50s) is that any of the Athenian citizens, knowing the procedure for making decisions and conducting business in the state, nevertheless does not leave Athens, thereby silently obeying the laws and fulfilling all orders from
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states. In "Crito" we read: "... Whoever remains, knowing how we judge in our courts and conduct other cases in the State, we can already say that he actually agreed to do what we (Laws - F. K .) command; and if he does not obey, then we say that he violates justice three times: by not obeying us, ... having agreed to obey us, ... and does not try to convince us when we do something is not good, and although we offer, and do not rudely order, to carry out our decisions and give him the choice of one of two things - either to convince us or to execute - he does neither one nor the other "(51 e - 52 a; see also 51 b-c). It is noteworthy that the execution of laws is a dikaion, since the obligation (agreement) to comply with the laws assumed by a citizen of the state implies that 1) the citizen has the right to challenge the fairness of the decisions made, the opportunity to convince the state and explain what justice is (see . ibid., 51 s, 52 a); 2) the assumption of obligations by a citizen excludes coercion (ananke) or deceit (apatetheis) from the side of the state (52 e); 3) the conclusion of an agreement ... does not bind the citizen to the state forever, but gives each citizen the right to take his property, to settle outside the fatherland at his own discretion (see 51 d-e).
It is easy to see that under the terms of the agreement, the state or laws do not guarantee and can hardly guarantee that they will only do good to the citizen and treat him only fairly. The only thing they promise is to give the citizen the opportunity to convince them, that is, to listen to the arguments of the citizen, which he wishes.
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state, regarding the alleged fallacy and injustice of the decisions made by them (laws). Strictly speaking, the chances of being able to convince them are illusory. After all, in fact, one will have to convince (persuade) one's fellow citizens, in whose person laws exist and function. The question also arises of the legality of drawing a distinction between the citizens of the state and the Laws, since the latter, wishing to preserve their dignity and protect themselves from violations, say that in case of wrong decisions, the citizen will be offended "not by us, the Laws, but by people" (see 54 b ). A certain contradiction is also observed between the second argument, according to which a citizen who owes his birth and upbringing to the state is something like property or a slave of the state, and the third argument, which significantly restricts the rights of a citizen, if not obliging him to voluntary slavery. (The third argument, according to Young, forcing the citizen into voluntary slavery, we consider insufficiently substantiated, as well as some of his other statements, which we will not dwell on here.) In any case, the Laws themselves admit, as we have already seen, inequality of a citizen before the state (see 50 e).
The fourth argument (“What will the escape of Socrates entail?”), analyzed by G. Young, does not change the essence of the problem under discussion, therefore we do not dwell on it.
In our opinion, the most weighty argument of the Laws in their favor should be considered not so much the right of a citizen repeatedly mentioned by them to seek the annulment of unjust decisions, but rather their reference to
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the right of the citizen, who does not like the order of the state, and who does not wish to be obliged to follow the accepted laws, to leave his fatherland and settle anywhere, without waiting for the state to do him any supposed injustice. In addition, one gets the impression that Plato weaves his own point of view into the dialogue between the Laws and Socrates, in particular the idea of ​​unequal relations between the citizen and the state. Be that as it may, it speaks a lot for the fact that in this dialogue Socrates conditionally stands on the position of Crito and his own opinion in order to convince the same Crito of the impossibility for him, Socrates, to escape from prison. In other words, it is quite possible that the arguments (at least the main ones) put forward by the Laws were not shared by Socrates himself. Thus, the contradiction between the "Apology" and "Crito" is eliminated and the thesis is confirmed, according to which these dialogues pursue different goals: in the "Apology" Socrates puts obedience to God above obedience to people, and in "Crito" he uses the traditional idea of ​​obedience to domestic laws, to reconcile Crito with the fact of his death.
Not only in the Apology, but also in Crito, Socrates adheres to the point of view that life without philosophy and philosophizing is not life. Therefore, the Apology says that he, who prefers to obey the Almighty rather than people, will sooner accept death than give up philosophy. In Crito, however, refusing to flee, Socrates refers to this argument, not because he decided to obey people more than God, but for the simple reason that flight (apart from the fact that it would serve as indirect evidence of his guilt) did not
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promised him the possibility of philosophizing in a foreign land. Here is what the Laws say to Socrates: "... If you go to one of the nearest cities, to Thebes or Megara, - after all, both these cities are governed by good laws, then you will come there, Socrates, an enemy of their state order: all those who are dear to them city, they will look askance at you, considering you the destroyer of laws, and you will strengthen the reputation of your judges as if they correctly decided your case ... Or maybe you intend to avoid comfortable states and decent people? But in that case, is it worth living for you "Or do you want to get close to such people and not be ashamed to talk with them? But what is it to talk about, Socrates? About the same thing as what is discussed here - about the fact that virtue and justice, customs and laws are most dear to people? Really, do you think it would be worthy of Socrates?
Indeed, if the activity of Socrates was considered destructive by his fellow citizens, then there was still no hope that the citizens of foreign states would evaluate it differently. It seems that at this point. Socrates, who took the poison, shared the opinion of the Laws, or rather, was aware of the current situation. However, the decisive (subjective) argument against escaping from prison was, presumably, the philosophical position of the historical Socrates, according to which "... contrary to the opinion of the majority,
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1 According to G. Young, "the only order of the city, which Socrates is ready to openly disobey, is the demand to abandon philosophy. In all other respects, even if the Laws order him to die, he will obey" (103, 29). But in this case, the question is inevitable: why did Socrates defiantly ignore the order of the Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leontius of Salamis? G. Yang does not attempt to answer this question in his work.
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one cannot respond with injustice to injustice" (49 p.).
Such, it would seem, philosophy of non-resistance to evil by violence not only disarms a person in the face of evil, but, unwittingly, even encourages evil. Or, as M. Bertman writes: “Socrates does not try to prevent the injustice committed (by the state) against him by fleeing: therefore, he helps and encourages injustice by this omission. In other words, Socrates faces a dilemma: by escaping, he violates the law of the state, while by not escaping, he becomes involved in injustice ... In addition, we could say that his refusal to escape contradicts his past actions when he refused to take part in the actions of the Thirty Tyrants who executed Leonty of Salamis "( 60, 573). To these accusations, Socrates, in turn, could object something like this: there is a significant difference between encouraging injustice and agreeing to be the victim of injustice; after all, I, Socrates, tried to convince the judges of my innocence, but they did not heed my arguments; I am not involved in the unjust verdict, so the evil associated with this verdict stems from the judges, and not from me. And if I agree to become a victim of a formally legal, but unfair sentence, then this is a consistent conclusion from my ethical and philosophical attitude, according to which "it is impossible to respond to injustice with injustice."
But here, in turn, questions arise: is not such an ethical-philosophical attitude equivalent to a call to obey every legislative act as such, on the grounds that this is a legislative act?
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Couldn't there be cases where civil disobedience is justified and really necessary? M. Bertman writes in this regard: “In our time, the Nuremberg trials recognized this possibility (of civil disobedience. F.K.): those leaders of the Third Reich were condemned, whose activities did not go beyond the law, but whose crimes against humanity were considered from the point of view view of higher justice, and not the code of laws and legal proceedings of the Third Reich" (60, 580).
With a considerable degree of certainty, it can be assumed that Socrates would have answered the questions raised as follows: my refusal to arrest Leonty of Salaminsky is just an example of civil disobedience to the authorities, as well as the consistency of my actions. For I refused to carry out the order of Critias and other tyrants, for the reason that they wanted to inflict injustice on another person by using me as an instrument for the execution of their will. Another thing, if the same Thirty tyrants committed injustice (up to the death sentence) against me. In that case, I would have obeyed their order and not responded to injustice with injustice. (To the possible consideration that Socrates had reason not to carry out the order of the Thirty Tyrants because of its illegality or unconstitutionality, he, Socrates, could answer with a counter-question: what are the orders and laws of the state if they do not express the will of those who have political power?)

2. Citizen and law

As shown in Crito, the motives for refusing to escape stem from the ethical teachings of Socrates and boil down to the fact that "an unjust deed is evil and shame for the one who does it, and moreover, in all cases" (Plato. Crito. 49 b). Therefore, contrary to public opinion, “one should neither respond to injustice with injustice, nor do harm to anyone, even if one had to suffer from someone” (Ibid. 49 a-c). Moreover, it is impossible to commit injustice in relation to domestic laws, because it is only thanks to them that there is

state, thanks to them Socrates was born from a legal marriage, received the education prescribed by them and became a citizen of Athens, which endowed him with all sorts of benefits. As a citizen, he pledged to uphold, not undermine, the laws of his fatherland. As against the father and mother, and even more so against the state and its laws, it is unacceptable to inflict violence, even if you experience injustice from them, including such an undeserved punishment as condemnation to death.

Objecting to Crito on behalf of personified laws, Socrates continues: laws allow every citizen to discuss and correct them if they are not good in anything. In addition, the laws provide an opportunity for every citizen, if he does not like them, “to take his property and move out wherever he pleases” (Ibid. 51 e). Therefore, the laws, says Socrates, told him: “After all, you had seventy years - enough time to leave if you did not like us and ... seemed unjust” (Ibid. 52 e). And if you, Socrates, did not leave the fatherland, then this is one of the proofs that “you liked both us and our state, because you would not have settled in it more firmly than all the Athenians, if you had not felt strong attachment to it” (Ibid. 52 b). In addition, “if you wanted to, you could still demand exile for yourself at the court and then, with the consent of the state, you would do the very thing that you planned to do now without its consent” (Ibid. 52 s).

Finally, Socrates proceeds from the fact that if, by his escape from prison, he violates the laws, this will be an indirect confirmation of the justice of the accusation of violating laws and perverting youth. “After all, the destroyer of laws can very, very much also seem like the destroyer of youth and unintelligent people” (Ibid. 53 p.). Speaking on behalf of the laws, Socrates notes that he, having taught justice and virtue all his life, should not contradict himself in his actions and escape from prison in fear of death, like a miserable slave. And where can he find a new homeland if he has become a violator of its laws in his homeland? The laws of the fatherland would have told him: “If you leave now, then you will leave offended not by us, the laws, but by people” (Ibid. 54 p.).

It seems that the question of the reasons that forced Socrates to refuse to escape from prison has been settled. But this is far from true. The fact is that some fundamentally important judgments of Socrates and the line of behavior chosen by him after the trial and the death sentence were passed on him are strikingly at odds with what he said and what he insisted on at the trial. This circumstance, as well as the question of Socrates' justification for obedience (or disobedience) to the law, have become, especially in recent decades, the subject of lively discussions among researchers. Indeed, how can one reconcile what the son of Sophroniscus asserts in the Apologia with what he says in Crito? From the "Apology" (29 c-d) we know that even if a law is issued, on the basis of which it is necessary, under pain of death, to "leave philosophy", then in this case, he, Socrates, will obey "rather God than you

(Athenians. - F. K.) ”and will not stop philosophizing. In "Crito" (250 a-53 a-b), on the contrary, the idea is expressed of civil obedience, of the obligation of a citizen of the policy to obey domestic laws. Besides, how to reconcile Socrates' call for civil obedience with his (as we already know) refusal to obey the order of the Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leontius of Salamis?

On these and similar questions, which caused much trouble to scientists, various opinions and judgments have been and are being expressed. Let's consider some of them. At the end of the last century, the famous Russian religious philosopher V.S. Solovyov spoke out against the widespread concept that in cases of conflict between “inner truth and law”, the issue should always be decided in favor of the law, referring to Socrates, who refused to escape from prison, as an example of civil obedience to the lawful, albeit unjust, verdict of the Athenian judges. V. S. Solovyov wrote that in his decision Socrates was guided not by motives of civil obedience, but by considerations of a moral order: counting would be shameful cowardice ... Secondly, Socrates found that a citizen should sacrifice his personal good to domestic laws, even unjust ones, for the sake of filial piety ”(V. Solovyov. VII. 116).

V. S. Solovyov also focused on the fact that “in the case of Socrates, there was no clash of two duties, but only a clash of personal right with a civil obligation, and it can be accepted in principle that the right must yield” (Ibid.). Further, saying that “no one is obliged to defend his material life: it is only a right, which is always permissible, and sometimes commendable to sacrifice,” the author continues: “It is another matter when the civic duty of obedience to laws collides not with a personal right, but with a moral , as in the famous classical example of Antigone, who had to choose between the religious and moral duty to give an honest burial to her brother and the civil duty of obedience to the impious and inhuman, but legally fair (as coming from the legitimate authority of the native city) prohibition to give such a burial. Here the rule comes into force: it is proper to obey God more than men, and it clearly turns out that justice - in the sense of legality or the formal legal legality of actions, is not a virtue in itself, but may or may not become such, depending on the position. Therefore, the heroism of Socrates, who conceded to an unjust law, and the heroism of Antigone, who violated this law, are equally approved ... Socrates ceded his material right for the sake of the highest idea of ​​\u200b\u200bhuman dignity and patriotic duty, while Antigone asserted someone else's right and thereby fulfilled her duty ... Suppose, for example, what is filial

piety, brought to heroism, induces someone not to resist his father, who intended to kill him. One can argue about the moral dignity of heroism, but it would never occur to anyone to justify or find heroic the same person if he considers himself obliged, out of obedience to his father, to kill his brother or sister. Exactly the same applies to unjust and inhuman laws, whence it is clear that justice in the sense of obedience to the laws as such, according to the motto: fiat justitia, pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world perishes) - in itself is not yet a virtue. (Ibid. 116-117).

Let us assume that Socrates, prompted by filial piety, decided to sacrifice his life for the sake of the triumph of domestic laws and the inviolability of their sentence, even if it was unjust. But even in this case, this contradiction is not removed. For we know that in the Apologia the same Socrates does not express any filial piety or patriotism, and declares that even under the threat of death he will not renounce philosophy. We also know that in this case Socrates, like Antigone, appeals to divine, and not to human institutions, that is, he follows, in the words of V. S. Solovyov, the rule: it is fitting to obey God more than people. It turns out that the same Socrates was guided by two opposite rules or principles, in one case (in court) preferring divine laws, in the other (in prison) - human. All this is very strange, unusual and bewildering.

Some researchers believe that the contradiction in the judgments and behavior of Socrates is verbal and purely external, since the Platonic dialogues "Apology" and "Crito" pursue different goals and talk about different things. So, G. Young believes that the arguments in "Crito", given by Socrates in favor of refusing to escape, do not express the point of view of Socrates, but aim to convince Crito, who wanted to save Socrates' life and took the necessary measures to escape, of his injustice, Crito, intentions, and from the standpoint of understanding things by Crito himself. “And if Socrates,” writes Young, “wants to convince Crito that it is unfair for him to flee from Athens, he cannot rely on principles as a means of persuasion: these principles, at least, in themselves will not affect Crito” (103 , 6). For Crito, continues Young, has repeatedly raised the question of what the "majority" of fellow citizens will say, think, and do (Crito. 44 b-c, 44 d, 45 d-46 a, 48 b) if he and other friends Socrates will not be saved by the latter. Meanwhile, for Socrates, the discussion of the issue of escape must be brought in regardless of the opinion and intention of the “majority”. And although Crito formally agreed with this argument, he, nevertheless, took the principles of Socrates very superficially. In addition, Crito was beside himself with the realization of the imminent death of the philosopher, his friend, and therefore neglected the Socratic principles, in particular, the following: “Most of all, it is not life as such that should be valued, but the good life” (48 b). In a word, although Crito was a friend of Socrates, he is nevertheless one of

many, that is, one of those who shares the opinion of the majority and is inclined to act as the majority will do in a similar situation. Therefore, in order to reconcile Crito with the thought of his (Socrates') death, Socrates is forced to use arguments different from those that he himself considered decisive. What Socrates says in Crito cannot be taken as an expression of his (or Plato's) point of view.

According to Young, the question Socrates and Crito must decide is whether it is ### (fair. - F.C.) Socrates' escape, not whether Socrates and Crito should do what is truly decaion, i.e., it is indeed fair (Young. P. 11). When discussing this issue, Crito, in essence, leaves the dialogue, and Socrates takes his place, who, instead of asking questions to Crito, himself answers the questions of the Athenian (personified) Laws that have taken his place. The entry of the Laws into dialogue and the reversal of roles associated with it are caused, according to Young, mainly by the effect produced by the Laws on Crito: “... Crito is obviously more afraid of the laws and the city than of Socrates. They are endowed for him with a higher and indisputable authority than Socrates. The fact that the laws oppose Crito's proposal is a more compelling reason for Crito to refuse this proposal than when Socrates does not agree with him ”(Ibid. 12). In addition, the circumstance associated with the introduction of the Athenian Laws into the dialogue is explained, according to the author, by the fact that Socrates himself does not share all the arguments that they put forward.

G. Young analyzes in detail each of the four arguments that the Laws clearly put forward against Socrates' alleged intention to escape from Athens, i.e., against Crito's proposal for Socrates to escape from prison. Despite the lengthy and somewhat intricate nature of the presentation of the material by the author, the analysis deserves attention.

The first of these arguments boils down to the fact that Socrates wants to destroy the laws and the state by his escape, because they cannot exist if the decisions made by the court are not carried out at the will of private individuals, are canceled and become invalid (Criton. 50 a-c). Socrates considers it possible to challenge this argument, referring to the fact that “the state treated us unfairly and decided the matter incorrectly” (Ibid. 50 s). Crito seizes on this objection, since it is implied that Socrates has the right to act unjustly towards a state that has acted unjustly towards him. Therefore, Socrates' failure to comply with the unjust verdict of the court will not lead to the death of the state and its laws, but only to the annulment of the wrong verdict. However, Crito forgets that he previously agreed with the ethical principle of Socrates that (contrary to the opinion of the majority expressing the traditional ethical norm) one should not be treated unfairly, even if that is what was done to oneself, and one should not return evil for evil (49 b-d). Instead of

to point out this contradiction to Crito, Socrates (who took the place of Crito in a dialogue with the Laws) gives a possible counter-objection of the Laws: the Laws were agreed with the citizens of the policy (city-state) not that they, the citizens, would obey and execute only those judicial decisions, which they seem to be just, but only that individuals must comply with any and all judgments issued by the State (50 s).

The second argument suggests that Socrates is in relation to the State and the Laws in the same dependence as a slave to the owner and like a child to his parents - their relationship is unequal, so Socrates must obey the court decision (50 d-51 s). The state found it just to sentence Socrates to death. Therefore, Socrates' attempt to save his life by flight would be an unjust act. Further, in the argument under consideration, an analogy is drawn between parents and a child, as well as between a master and a slave, however, in other places of the dialogue, children are spoken of as timid and inconsistent fools (46 c, 49 b), and slaves are spoken of as despicable creatures ( 52 d, see also 53 e). Following this analogy, it can be shown that if Socrates, against the will of the State, escapes from prison, he will become like a child or a slave; but since Socrates does not want this, he will not escape, will not violate his obligations to the State that gave birth and raised him. However, the whole point of the analyzed argument lies precisely in this.

It seems that being an unequal child or a slave is not so bad that Socrates opposed such a state of affairs: he should strive to accept the restrictions that follow from his position. All this, G. Young notes, is a stretch, if not an obvious inconsistency, which makes one wonder whether the second argument is as convincing as it appears at first sight (Young. P. 18).

The third argument concerning the agreement made between Socrates and the Laws (50s) is that any of the Athenian citizens, knowing the procedure for making decisions and conducting business in the State, nevertheless does not leave Athens, thereby silently obeying the laws and fulfilling all orders from the State. In "Crito" we read: "... Whoever remains, knowing how we judge in our courts and conduct other cases in the State, we can already assert that he has in fact agreed to do what we (Laws. - F. K.) command; and if he does not obey, then we say that he violates justice three times: by not obeying us, ... having agreed to obey us, ... and does not try to convince us when we do something wrong, and, although we suggest, and do not rudely order, to carry out our decisions and give him the choice of one of two things - either to convince us or to execute - he does neither one nor the other ”(51 e-52 a; see also 51 b- With). It is noteworthy that the execution of laws is a dikayon, since the obligation (agreement) to comply with the laws assumed by a citizen of the state implies

that: 1) a citizen has the right to challenge the fairness of the decisions made, the opportunity to convince the state and explain what justice is (Ibid. 51 s, 52 a); 2) the assumption by a citizen of obligations excludes coercion (###) or deceit (###) on the part of the state (52 e); 3) the conclusion of an agreement does not bind the citizen to the state forever, but gives each citizen the right to take his property, to settle outside the fatherland at his own discretion (51 d-e).

It is easy to see that under the terms of the agreement, the state or laws do not guarantee and can hardly guarantee that they will only do good to the citizen and treat him only fairly. The only thing they promise is to give the citizen the opportunity to convince them, that is, to listen to the arguments of the citizen, which he wishes to state, regarding the alleged fallacy and injustice of the decisions made by them (laws). Strictly speaking, the chances of being able to convince them are illusory. After all, in fact, one will have to convince (persuade) one's fellow citizens, in whose person laws exist and function. The question also arises of the legitimacy of making a distinction between the citizens of the state and the laws, since the latter, wanting to preserve their dignity and protect themselves from violations, say that in case of wrong decisions, the citizen will be offended “not by us, by the Laws, but by people” (54 b). A well-known contradiction is also observed between the second argument,

according to which the citizen, who owes his birth and upbringing to the state, is something like the property or slave of the state, and the third argument, which significantly restricts the rights of the citizen, if not obliging him to voluntary slavery. (The third argument, which, according to Young, compels a citizen to voluntary slavery, we consider insufficiently substantiated, as well as some of his other statements, which we will not dwell on here.) In any case, the Laws themselves recognize, as we have already seen , inequality of a citizen before the state (50 e).

The fourth argument (“What will the escape of Socrates entail?”), analyzed by G. Young, does not change the essence of the problem under discussion, so we do not dwell on it.

In our opinion, the most weighty argument of the Laws in their favor should be considered not so much the right of a citizen repeatedly mentioned by them to seek the annulment of unjust decisions, but their reference to the right of a citizen who does not like the state order and who does not want to be obliged to follow the adopted laws, to leave his fatherland and settle anywhere without waiting for the state to do any alleged injustice to him. In addition, one gets the impression that Plato weaves his own point of view into the dialogue between the Laws and Socrates, in particular, the idea of ​​unequal relations between the citizen and the state. Be that as it may, there is much to be said for the fact that this

In the dialogue, Socrates conditionally stands on the position of Crito and his own opinion in order to convince the same Crito of the impossibility for him, Socrates, to escape from prison. In other words, it is quite possible that the arguments (at least the main ones) put forward by the Laws were not shared by Socrates himself. Thus, the contradiction between the "Apology" and "Crito" is eliminated and the thesis is confirmed, according to which these dialogues pursue different goals: in the "Apology" Socrates puts obedience to God above obedience to people, and in "Crito" he uses the traditional idea of ​​obedience to domestic laws, to reconcile Crito with the fact of his death.

Not only in the Apology, but also in Crito, Socrates adheres to the point of view that life without philosophy and philosophizing is not life. Therefore, the Apology says that he, who prefers to obey the Almighty rather than people, will rather accept death than give up philosophy. In Crito, however, refusing to flee, Socrates refers to this argument, not because he decided to obey people more than God, but for the simple reason that flight (besides serving as indirect evidence of his guilt) did not promise him the possibility of philosophizing in a foreign land. Here is what the Laws say to Socrates: “... If

5 According to G. Young, “the only order of the city, which Socrates is ready to openly disobey, is the demand to abandon philosophy. In all other respects, even if the Laws tell him to die, he will obey” (Young. P. 29). But in this case, the question is inevitable: why did Socrates defiantly ignore the order of the Thirty Tyrants to arrest Leontius of Salamis? G. Yang does not attempt to answer this question in his work.

if you go to one of the nearest cities, to Thebes or Megara, - after all, both these cities are governed by good laws, then you will come there, Socrates, as an enemy of their state order: all those who care about their city will look askance at you, considering you the destroyer of laws , and you will strengthen the glory of your judges, as if they correctly decided your case ... Or maybe you intend to avoid well-organized states and decent people? But in that case, is it worth living for you? Or would you like to get close to such people and not be ashamed to talk to them? But what is there to talk about, Socrates? About the same thing as here - about the fact that for people the most precious thing is virtue and justice, customs and laws? Do you think that would be worthy of Socrates? But we ought to think about it” (Crito, 53 b-d).

Indeed, if the activity of Socrates was considered destructive by his fellow citizens, then there was still no hope that the citizens of foreign states would evaluate it differently. It seems that at this point Socrates, who had taken the poison, shared the opinion of the Laws, or rather, was aware of the current situation. However, the decisive (subjective) argument against escaping from prison was, presumably, the philosophical position of the historical Socrates, according to which, “contrary to the opinion of the majority, one cannot repay injustice with injustice” (49 p.).

Such, it would seem, philosophy of non-resistance to evil by violence not only disarms a person in the face of evil, but, unwittingly, even encourages evil. Or, as M. Bergman writes: “Socrates does not try to prevent the injustice committed (by the state) against him by fleeing: therefore, he helps and encourages injustice by this omission. In other words, Socrates is faced with a dilemma: by escaping, he violates the law of the state, while by not escaping, he becomes involved in injustice ... In addition, we could argue that his refusal to escape is contrary to his past actions when he refused to take part in the actions of the Thirty Tyrants who executed Leontius of Salamis” (Bergman, p. 573).

To these accusations, Socrates, in turn, could object something like this: there is a significant difference between encouraging injustice and agreeing to be the victim of injustice; after all, I, Socrates, tried to convince the judges of my innocence, but they did not heed my arguments; I am not involved in the unjust verdict, so the evil associated with this verdict stems from the judges, and not from me. And if I agree to become a victim of a formally legal but unfair sentence, then this is a consistent conclusion from my ethical and philosophical attitude, according to which "one cannot respond to injustice with injustice."

But even here, in turn, questions arise: isn't such an ethical-philosophical attitude equivalent to a call to obey every legislative act, as such, on the grounds that it is a legislative act? Couldn't there be cases where civil disobedience is justified and really necessary? M. Bergman writes in this regard: “In our time, the Nuremberg trials recognized this possibility (of civil disobedience. - F.K.): those leaders of the Third Reich were condemned, whose activities did not go beyond the law, but whose crimes against humanity were considered with the point of view of higher justice, and not the code of laws and legal proceedings of the Third Reich ”(Bergman, p. 580).

With a considerable degree of certainty, it can be assumed that Socrates would have answered the questions raised as follows: my refusal to arrest Leonty of Salaminsky is just an example of civil disobedience to the authorities, as well as the consistency of my actions. For I refused to carry out the order of Critias and other tyrants, for the reason that they wanted to inflict injustice on another person by using me as an instrument for the execution of their will. Another thing, if the same Thirty tyrants committed injustice (up to the death sentence) against me. In that case, I would have obeyed their order and not responded to injustice with injustice. (To the possible consideration that Socrates had reason not to carry out the order of the Thirty Tyrants because of its illegality or unconstitutionality, he, Socrates, could answer with a counter-question: what are

orders and laws of the state, if they do not express the will of those who have political power?) So, we see that the ethical-philosophical principle of Socrates does not exclude cases of civil disobedience. Moreover, it presupposes resolute civil disobedience in cases of the threat of committing injustice and arbitrariness against another person. In other words, the Socratic principle of non-resistance to evil by violence must be understood in a very narrow and direct sense of the word, namely: do not respond to injustice and evil with injustice and evil, when injustice and evil are committed against yourself, and not another. From the behavior of Socrates himself, his speech against the illegal (and unfair) condemnation of the Athenian victorious strategists to death, as well as from his disobedience to the Thirty Tyrants, on the contrary, the following follows: resist and disobey those in power in cases where injustice is committed in in relation to others. Following the accepted logic, Crito was, perhaps, right in his own way, considering saving the life of Socrates as his direct duty, dictated by the rule: it is fitting to obey God more than men. But this does not mean that Socrates was wrong in deciding not to respond to injustice with injustice. More precisely, we would not have the right to demand that Socrates escape from prison, because from the point of view of higher justice (let it be allowed to use this phrase), each person has the right to dispose of his life at his own discretion. “... Under certain circumstances, it can be the highest value for a person to sacrifice his life and well-being, if in this way he can save his true “I”, his moral personality” (83 a, 62).

And finally, with the possible exception of bribery or deception of the jailer, from the point of view of the objective state of things, there would be nothing unfair (although formally illegal) if the son of Sophroniscus agreed to escape from Athens. The dialogue "Phaedo", written by Plato much later than the "Apology of Socrates" and "Crito" and dedicated to the proof of the immortality of the soul, characterizes, as was said, the worldview of Plato himself, and not of Socrates. But in this dialogue, the death of the philosopher is described in dramatic tones, the moral character of Socrates in the last minutes of his life is revealed. Socrates remains Socrates to the end. He says goodbye to his children, wife and relatives and devotes the remaining time to talking with friends. The philosopher's friends are overwhelmed by the thought of the impending separation from him and at the same time are struck by the greatness of his spirit, his truly philosophical calmness and extraordinary courage in the face of death.

The exclusivity of the personality of Socrates is also reflected in the details. To save women from washing their bodies after death, Socrates takes one last bath. He refuses to wait for the sunset, as Crito advises him, and asks to bring a bowl of poison, hemlock. This is how Plato describes the scene. When the attendant held out the cup, Socrates took it "with complete calmness ... - he did not tremble, did not turn pale, did not change his face, but ... raised the cup to his lips, drank it to the bottom - calmly and easily" (Plato. Phaedo. 117 b-c).

Socrates is dead. His death sealed his personality in the memory of generations. She largely determined the influence of his personality and teachings for all subsequent times.

Conclusion

THE SPIRITUAL HERITAGE OF SOCRATES

Socrates went to his death not as a fanatic martyr, not as a blind adherent of a professed idea or faith, but as a martyr of philosophy, as a convinced sage who made a free choice between life and death. Confident that truth, incompatible with untruth, will sooner or later prevail, he predicts a severe punishment at the end of the trial by condemning him to death. Leaving the courtroom, he advises the latter “not to shut the mouth of others, but to try to be the best you can” (Plato, Apology, 39 d-e).

The oppressive political atmosphere created in Athens] after the execution of Socrates prompted Plato and some other followers of the philosopher to leave Athens. Many of the Athenians, apparently, believed (or wanted to believe) that by executing the well-known Socrates, they strengthened democracy, faith in Olympic gods and good manners. Returning to Athens a few years later, the students and followers of Socrates launched a wide literary activity around the personality and philosophical work of their teacher. This is how Socratic literature arose, one of the tasks of which was to rehabilitate Socrates in the eyes of his contemporaries and descendants.

The condemnation of Socrates found a kind of refraction in the minds of later generations. There was a tradition about the repentance of the Athenians and about the punishment of the accusers of Socrates after his death. According to one version, the accusers of the philosopher were executed (Diodor. XIV. 37), according to another, they were expelled from Athens (Diogenes Laertius. II. 43). There were also other legends, such as the story of the suicide of the accusers of Socrates, who hanged themselves, unable to bear the contempt of the Athenians, who allegedly deprived them of water and fire. However, legends remain legends. In any case, they are contradicted by the fact that “As early as 387 Anit held the responsible position of a sitophilak, that is, an observer of the grain trade” (Zaitsev, p. 185). And if we mention these legends here, it is only to show the tendency of descendants to think about retribution for those who executed the innocent Socrates. The trial of Socrates excited and continues to excite people. This is explained by the fact that the problems raised on it have not lost their significance to this day. It is not surprising that the day of the trial of Socrates has forever remained in the memory of mankind.

Indeed, what should be done if individual consciousness clashes with the public, if the conscience of one goes against the conviction of many? What to do if the opinion of one of the citizens contradicts the interests of the state, its requirements? What should be done by those whose theoretical and practical activities cause distrust and enmity on the part of the surrounding people? What sentence can be passed on a person accused of undermining the foundations of social and family life, if, moreover, he resolutely refuses any compromise with people who consider his activities destructive and even pernicious? In a word, what if one goes against everyone and considers the truth what, in the opinion of the rest, is a dangerous delusion?

Opinions differed on this issue in the past and differ now. Some researchers stigmatize the execution of Socrates and equate it with a political murder perpetrated by "retrogrades and obscurantists" (28, 27), "enlightenment reactionaries" (Zaitsev. P. 145; Losev. 1969. P. 81) - Anit, Melet and Lycon. Other researchers (History of Philosophy. I. S. 104) consider the sentence fair. Sometimes an opinion is expressed about the verdict on Socrates as a strange misunderstanding and a mysterious action.

Indeed, how to understand the fact that Socrates decided to drink a cup of poison, having full opportunity to avoid death? He might not have come to court. But he not only appeared, but also delivered a speech that can be called as much defensive as it is accusing the judges. This circumstance

puzzles and involuntarily suggests that “in essence, he (Socrates. - F. K.) still remains incomprehensible, how incomprehensible his execution is, producing such an impression that it was not the Athenians who executed him, but he himself forced them execute yourself” (Losev, 1970, p. 51; see also: Jaspers, p. 114). Indeed, at first glance, it may seem that Socrates, with his supposedly defiant position at the trial, forced the judges to sentence him to death. Therefore, if anyone is to blame for the death of Socrates, it is mainly Socrates himself. Such a conclusion also suggests itself from the reasoning of the authors of the first volume of the History of Philosophy (p. 137): “Socrates did not take the opportunity to flee from Athens, appeared in court and was sentenced to death.” In other words, the death of Socrates is an unfortunate misunderstanding and suicide.

Meanwhile, the death of a philosopher is neither suicide nor a miscarriage of justice. The position of Socrates at the trial is inseparable from his philosophical and ethical attitude to follow the dictates of conscience and reason, from his personality, alien to conformism and adaptability to circumstances. Socrates was convinced that what he devoted his life to, philosophizing and instructing citizens on the path of self-knowledge and moral self-improvement, is good, not evil. Evil he considered the intellectual "hibernation", in which, in his opinion, his compatriots were.

Socrates, who taught that the main question of life is the question of good and evil, and that a person in all situations can and must choose good, was given the opportunity, and by personal example, to prove the feasibility of what he teaches. At the trial, he was faced with a choice: to stop philosophizing and save his life, or, on pain of death, continue his activities. For Socrates, the rejection of his mission was tantamount to a rejection of life, its meaning. He chose death. For such whole and honest natures as Socrates, there was no other alternative. Hegel pointed to this. Hegel's point of view was shared by T. Gomperz (p. 83) and other scientists. She finds supporters at the present time.

According to Hegel, the imposition of the death sentence on Socrates was the result of a legitimate conflict between an individual who consciously expressed a “new principle of the spirit”, a new worldview, and a people who defended their “substantial spirit”, that is, what constitutes the basis of its being, the existing frame of mind , generally accepted traditional ideas about the world and life, established customs and mores (Hegel. X. S. 84-85). This conflict, inevitable "in world history", is a tragedy in which the individual hero perishes, but not the principle put forward by him. Hegel writes: “In the truly tragic ... two opposite rights oppose each other, and one breaks against the other; thus, both suffer damage, both are also right against each other, and it is not the case that only one is right and the other is wrong ”(Ibid. 87).

So, the Athenians who executed Socrates were right, because they defended the foundations of their "moral life." However, Socrates was right, as he put forward a new principle, which marked the onset of a new era, new phase in the history of the world and of all mankind.

1 A. V. Kurgatnikov, speaking of the trial of descendants over Socrates, in particular, writes the following: “Let us note the great sophist of modern times, Hegel, who in one of his writings retried Socrates and pronounced a second death sentence on him, separating him from Socrates- man's teaching: they say, the author is guilty, but his teaching is immortal! (Kurgatnikov, p. 251).

Proceeding from the fact that the social institutions and ideological structures that have developed in a given era are historically justified, Hegel was inclined to exaggerate the right of the old to exist. More precisely, correlating the right of the old and the right of the new, he made the existence of the new dependent on the judgment of the old on him, demanded that the new be justified before the old. Hence the equal recognition of two rights, the recognition of dual justice. But the equal recognition of two rights, as well as of two truths, can satisfy few people. Nor could it satisfy Hegel, who glorified world history as a single process. To get out of this situation, he presented the conflict of Socrates with his era as a tragedy phenomenon.

Meanwhile, the condemnation of Socrates is not only a tragedy, but also an event in human history (as well as a fact of a moral order), subject to the judgment of history. Anyone who recognizes that a new stage in the history of philosophical thought is associated with the name of Socrates cannot justify the sentence against him. From this point

view, the half-hearted position taken by Hegel on the question of the justice of the sentence is also unacceptable. Having blunted the acuteness of the issue by referring to the tragic manifestation of justice in history, to the clash of two equal rights in one or another era, Hegel came to the conclusion that Socrates was innocent, so to speak, and offered to come to terms with the verdict.

However, if some kind of reconciliation with the verdict is possible, then only from the position of Socrates himself, according to whom, with a good man“nothing bad happens either during life or after death” (Plato, Apology, 41 d). This conviction stemmed from his idea that virtue, with all its diversity and with all the inconsistency of its manifestation, is one and the same. It was no secret to him that the concepts of good and evil, of just and unjust, are relative. He understood that the same act is good in one respect and evil in another. However, he refused to consider two mutually exclusive actions (for example, the accusation brought against him and his refusal to admit his guilt at trial) equally fair, equally virtuous on the basis of the dual nature of justice and virtue. This was for him tantamount to the simultaneous recognition of many truths about the same thing.

Faced with the relative nature of ethical concepts, Socrates tried to find something permanent, something substantial in morality. Hence his search for general ethical definitions, which is considered to be his great merit in the history of philosophical thought.

Bringing spiritual values ​​to the fore, Socrates considered their creation the main goal of human life. And since, according to Socrates, spiritual benefits are not transferred in a ready-made form from one person to another, but are revealed and acquired in search, in the study of oneself and others, in “care for the soul”, insofar as the refusal of such a search is tantamount to a refusal of life . According to Socrates, the dialogue and the dialectical (question-answer) method of defining concepts are necessary conditions joint search for truth.

The Socratic dialogue-dialectical method assumes the freedom of man and is based on the democratic idea that man is a responsible being, capable of knowing the truth and making decisions at his own peril and risk.

Through the “test” of irony, Socrates exposed the unfounded claims to omniscience and infallibility, overthrowing all imaginary, pseudo-serious and all kinds of false authorities. Socratic irony is a search for the true and the positive, a call to truly serious and significant, to their constant "test". The irony of Socrates stems from the love of wisdom and is aimed at arousing this love as the highest value.

The area of ​​the ideal, discovered by Socrates, did not appear in his teaching as an independent sphere of reality. However, in his search for the universal in morality, Socrates emphasized the unity, identity, and generic community of the diversity of ethical phenomena under consideration and left their specific differences in the shade. Naturally, there is only one step from the Socratic search for "truth as such" to the transformation of concepts into independent entities. This step was taken by Plato.

Although Socrates' attempts to define concepts tended to end in indeterminacy, for him general concepts(“courage in general”, “justice in general”, etc.), in each of which the “essence of a thing” is expressed, were not empty sounds, that is, conventional, nominal designations for equally conventional phenomena. On the contrary, general ethical concepts were for him an expression of the universal in morality, and his search for this “universal” was based on the conviction that each person unconsciously owns the “universal”, has that general and objective principle that should be revealed in the concept, definition. In defending this thesis, Socrates saw a way out of the subjectivism and relativism of the sophists, according to whose teaching there are as many truths and virtues as there are people, and each is right in his own way.

Socrates declared: virtue is knowledge. But not all knowledge in general, but only good and evil, is knowledge that leads to correct, virtuous deeds. On this basis, he came to the conclusion that no one is evil on their own, but only out of ignorance. The ethical paradoxes of Socrates laid the foundation for a controversy that continues to this day about the relationship between knowledge and virtue, science and morality.

The ethical intellectualism of Socrates is connected with his individualistic solution of the question of moral perfection. According to Socrates, virtue is acquired as a result of self-knowledge, "care for the soul", self-improvement. Socrates was the first of the thinkers who made self-knowledge (“Know thyself”) the main part of his teaching and the guiding principle of his activity. Socrates' idea of ​​self-knowledge, popular in antiquity, often became the leading idea at turning points in history and significantly changed people's way of thinking (Trubetskoy, p. 437).

Socrates, who spoke of the impossibility of final knowledge about anything (“I know that I know nothing”), was equally aware of the fact that a person is able to acquire knowledge and multiply it, and that knowledge and “art” ("techne") in themselves is a great power. However, he was sure that this power could be used for both good and harm to a person. According to his teaching, if a person has not made the question of self-knowledge the main issue of his being, the alternative of good and evil with a conscious preference for good, any other knowledge - for all their usefulness - will not make a person happy. Moreover, they can make him unhappy. It is not surprising, therefore, that Socrates' doctrine of self-knowledge is closely related to the discussions that are Lately not only in philosophical and scientific circles, but also among the broad circles of the intelligentsia both in our country and around the world around the problems of "man - science - technology", "science - ethics - humanism".

The topics of these discussions resonate with the Socratic understanding of the task of philosophy and the value of knowledge in general. These discussions and discussions are often accompanied by direct and indirect references to the teachings and personality of Socrates. And this is no coincidence: the questions over which he struggled ancient philosopher, have not lost their relevance; that is why Socrates was and remains one of the eternal "companions" of mankind.

Application

WORD ABOUT TEACHER*

In practice, the “word” is “logos”, this is consonance with being, this is being itself, but in its pure, generalized form. This is such a generalization in which individual elements, particulars do not lose their general meaning, but rather highlight its meaning and convey its meaning. In this sense, I would like to preface a few words to the book of F. H. Cassidy "Socrates", to the book of the Teacher, who has long become a friend. For the works of Theochary Cassidy (Feochary - "beloved by the gods") the concept of logos is the key, without this concept it is impossible to talk about him. One of his main works is called “From Myth to Logos” (Moscow, 1972). In many ways, communication with Cassidy the Teacher was perceived by us, then students and graduate students, as a transition from myth to logos.

But such a transition is possible only against the background of a powerful myth, as it remained in culture. Ancient Greece and which is difficult to remove from modern human life; we involuntarily return to it when we read F. X. Cassidy's brilliant philosophical work on the life and ideas of Socrates, whose name has long become a legend. And the events themselves acquire a mythopoetic reality: the book that Cassidy sent to Russia (Rostov-on-Don, and then, corrected and supplemented, to St. state university that took place before his departure for Greece. It must be said that Feokhariy Kessidi all these years has not lost contact with his many friends and students, who still love him and meet him during his annual visits to Moscow or communicate with him in letters and by phone.

The name of Cassidy entered Russian philosophy as a wonderful and joyful event against the backdrop of ideologically consistent and boring formulas and provisions. His book The Philosophical and Aesthetic Views of Heraclitus of Ephesus, published in Moscow in 1963, immediately drew attention to itself with interest, professionalism, and love for wisdom, which, by definition, philosophy should be and which, alas, is not so often It happens. Already in this book, another feature of Cassidy's creative style is manifested, which in those years was sharply evident: the use of a wide range of world literature, at least in three foreign languages.

languages ​​- German, English, French. At the same time, he often used the works of Greek authors, introduced them to the Russian-speaking reader, and each of his new works received Russian, Greek and world sound. After this book, for any, both mature and novice philosopher, and I also belonged to the latter at that time, any article, any work of the author became an event.

And Cassidy's articles appeared with enviable regularity in the most interesting journal, which still remains the same today - "Problems of Philosophy". I will dwell only on some of the old impressions that remained in the memory of those times: the relationship of myth, religion and philosophy, the understanding of dialectics and metaphysics in the ancient world, and much more. How not to keep the impression of myth as a true reality - the reality of desire (according to Cassidy), which defeats all the gray prose of life, the so-called real reality. Cassidy, who deeply experienced all the tragedy of the Stalinist myth, truly understood the origins, danger and power of myth-making. Maybe that's why he was so careful about the rational heritage of the Greek genius. And here he did not sever the rational and the artistic, he paid attention to the images and antique plasticity, and in particular warned against templates like: materialism - idealism, dialectics - metaphysics, preferring to talk about hylozoism and pantheism of the ancients, their powerful elemental dialectics.

In his articles, Heraclitus and Parmenides appeared not as antipodes of two opposite worldview positions - dialectics and metaphysics, but as successors of the same thing - the search for the essence of things. At the same time, they viewed the world from different perspectives. In one case - from the standpoint of statics, in the other case - from the standpoint of dynamics. But at the same time, it turned out that this is one and the same world, that it cannot be considered otherwise, that variability, dynamics are inevitable characteristics of the world, which is based on invariably existing. It is no coincidence that Cassidy's interest in the work of the great Greek philosopher Plato manifested itself in this context: in 1979, in Moscow, the Nauka publishing house, edited by F. X. Cassidy, published the book Plato and His Epoch. It should be noted that Heraclitus and Socrates remained his favorite philosophers, several books were devoted to them. And here we have a book about Socrates, which in this expanded version appears for the second time before the Russian-speaking reader.

Far from summing up the author's creative thinking, this book tells us what level of thinker we are dealing with. Cassidy's book on Socrates, in its expanded, current form, not yet known to the Russian-speaking reader, has already been published in France (1982), Greece (1984), Czech Republic (1980), Estonia (1987). Feokhariy Kharlampievich Kessidi, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Corresponding Member of the Athens Academy (founded by Plato), Academician of the Academy of Humanitarian Research and the Academy of Humanitarian Sciences, member of a number of scientific councils, worthily represented the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (then he worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy

Academy of Sciences of the USSR) at international forums, in particular, at international congresses dedicated to Aristotle and Democritus (Greece, 1978 and 1983). He wrote and published much more: more than two hundred works in various fields philosophical knowledge, mainly on issues ancient Greek philosophy. The author's works were published in fifteen languages ​​of the world.

But here, in order not to lose the lyrical-aesthetic component of the logos about Theocharia (and, as Karl Yule noted, for example, lyricism and philosophy are equally a manifestation of subjective feeling), let us turn to personal memories. This was over 20 years ago. Having received the consent of F. X. Cassidy to act as an official opponent for my Ph.D. thesis “Change in ideas about space in connection with social development policy”, I was looking forward to his arrival in Rostov. I must say that Cassidy was supposed to fly from Tbilisi, but he was not among the arrivals. When I got through to Moscow, his wife - Olga Nikolaevna - explained to me that Feokhariy Kharlampievich was coming to Tbilisi from Tsalka, along mountain roads, where there could be snow landslides, and therefore there might be a delay. To my joy, it turned out that there was another flight from Tbilisi to Rostov, which I was looking forward to with the greatest impatience. Imagine my happiness when this time Professor Cassidy was among the crowd of arrivals. He himself was surprised, because due to the delay, he did not expect that they would be able to meet him.

And then there was a defense that was successful, there was a speech by Cassidy, where before the members of the dissertation council at Rostov State University, a respected professor smashed to smithereens the theory of the slave-owning economic basis of ancient culture. However, the RSU has always been dominated by an atmosphere of creativity and free-thinking. Since that time, Cassidy has become a true friend of Rostovites.

His next visit to Rostov soon followed, when he delivered lectures to graduate students and students of the Russian State University. There was informal communication with academician Yu. A. Zhdanov, professors V. E. Davidovich, E. Ya. Rezhabek, V. P. Yakovlev, to whom he still does not forget to send greetings. But constantly next to the venerable scientist were young teachers: Gennady Drach - your obedient servant, and Alexander Erygin. And among the listeners there were those who later became widely known for their scientific works, public and political activities- Among them are Lyudmila Kosareva (who died untimely), Emilia Volkova, Tamara Matyash, Vladimir Basin, Petr Mostovoy.

I am holding the yellowed pages of Professor Cassidy's lecture book. The main topic of the lectures is antiquity and modernity, ancient culture and philosophy, the importance of ancient philosophy for modern man. Issues raised include characterization Greek myth as an attitude and artistic reflection, the transition from myth to logos and, of course, about slavery in Ancient Greece. Special place took Cassidy in his lectures to his beloved Socrates. It was then that we learned about the ethical

and the human feat of Socrates, about "extravagant" democracy and the attitude of the Sophists and Socrates towards it, about the problem of the unconscious among the Greeks. There is no need to say that this was a whole epoch in the development of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Russian State University, which in 2000 turned 30 years old.

And then there were the famous Aristotelian Readings. They took place in the city of Tsalka in the then Georgian SSR, in an area densely populated by Greeks. The participants of the All-Union Conference were met at the Tbilisi airport, and then they were taken directly to Tsalka by personal transport. Until now, the interest in the conference, which was shown by the inhabitants of a small town, is striking. Each fresh position contained in reports and speeches was discussed not only at scientific discussions, but also on the streets of the city and during feasts of amazing beauty and luxury.

It was at these meetings that young specialists in the field of ancient philosophy could get to know each other. There I met Vladimir Gutorov, Vasily Goran, Anatoly Semushkin, Vitold Zverichev and many of my colleagues from Tbilisi State University and the Georgian Academy of Sciences. Mikhail Makharadze then became my close friend and provided invaluable assistance in preparing the defense of my doctoral dissertation at Tbilisi State University. We were especially impressed by the masters of Georgian antiquity - academician Shalva Khidasheli, corresponding members Guram Tevzadze and Rismag Gordeziani. Extremely wide

and an interesting range of issues, ranging from problems of ontology to problems of anthropology, was discussed at the "Aristotelian Readings". Among them is the famous question: "Was the ancient Greek a person?" The main content of the issues discussed was reflected in the pages of the journal "Problems of Philosophy", including in my publications and the publications of O. N. Cassidy. Of course, a special merit in the implementation of this ancient "feast for the soul" belonged to F. X. Cassidy. He managed to unite Russian antiquities around him.

And then there were our meetings in Moscow, the cozy apartment of F. X. Cassidy in Kropotkinsky Lane, the living room where we invariably celebrated my arrival in Moscow, and the owner’s office, where fresh books were already waiting for me, which the venerable scientist received from abroad, giving them to their young colleagues. Cassidy developed a special route for walking around Moscow, where we, avoiding the city noise, could calmly exchange opinions about what we read.

Since 1993, Feochary Kessidi has been living and working in the Hellenic Republic, but not only does he not cut off his ties with Russia, but they seem to have become even wider and more diverse. He prepared and published the "Encyclopedia of Soviet Greeks", summarized his many years of research on human genetics and, of course, continued deep philosophical reflections on Greek culture, on the national character of the ancient Greeks and on the difference between the anthropogenic civilization of the Greeks and modern technogenic. Some of these materials have been published

and in our "Culturology", which is also imbued with the spirit of ancient agonistics and anthropological research in considering the civilizational development of mankind. And now we have a book by F. X. Cassidy about Socrates - the basis for a new meeting, for a penetrating, thoughtful dialogue with an interesting interlocutor and a deep insightful person. This can be applied both to Socrates, who lived thousands of years ago, and to our contemporary and friend Theochary Cassidy.

G. V. Drach, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, Rostov State University

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