Social theory Yu. habermas

The concept of a communicative action demonstrates the interaction of at least two interacting subjects, which start with speech and enter into an interpersonal relationship.
It is worth noting that the special significance in the ϶ᴛᴏth model belongs to language. Only with language are actions oriented towards mutual understanding born.

All actions for the orientation of actors are divided into two large classes: success-oriented - formal; oriented to understanding - communicative.

The starting point of the sociological theory of Habermas is the concept "life world" in which our social relations exist: work, family, friends. Opposes the life world "system world" consisting of anonymous and business relationships taking place in the economic market and in government institutions. These two worlds have a qualitative sign of difference, which leads to the concept rationality. Material published on http: // site
The life world ϲᴏᴏᴛʙᴇᴛϲᴛʙ is supported by communicative rationality, the systemic world by instrumental rationality. The change in the types of rationality occurs against the background of social evolution. Habermas defines social evolution through the development of human cognitive abilities, which include both cognitive and productive activities.

Sociology of J. Habermas

(b. 1929) is a modern German sociologist who integrated philosophical and sociological perspectives in his teaching, which often remain isolated or even opposed. Habermas' doctrine serves as a kind of synthesis of the concept of rationality of social action and the concept of interaction.

The systematic development of Habermas's ideas is found in the work “We note that the theory of communicative action”, where an original concept of society is developed on the basis of the concept of social action.

Habermas points out that the concept of social action covers four aspects:

  • the concept of "teleological action" has been at the heart of the philosophical theory of action since the time of Aristotle. The actor achieves the goal by properly applying the appropriate means;
  • the teleological notion of action can be extended to a "model of strategic action". It is worth noting that it does not correlate with a single actor, but with members of a social group who orient ϲʙᴏ and actions depending on common values;
  • the concept of "dramatic action" is not connected either with an individual actor or with a member of any social group. It is worth noting that it is associated with the participants in the interaction, who are spectators for each other. The actor forms a certain image of himself in the audience, purposefully revealing the ϲʙᴏth subjective world.
    It is worth noting that the basic concept of “self-representation” demonstrates the purposeful expression of their experiences, and not spontaneous self-expression;
  • the concept of communicative action is associated with the interaction of at least two speaking, capable of action subjects entering (using verbal or non-verbal means) into an interpersonal relationship. Actors strive to achieve an understanding of the action situation in order to coordinate action plans and actions themselves. Such an understanding is associated primarily with reaching agreement on situations. In the ϶ᴛᴏth model of action, language takes on special significance.

Habermas divides all actions into communicative, or oriented towards mutual understanding, and formal, result-oriented. In addition to these fundamental differences related to orientation, actions differ in the type of knowledge used in them and the forms of argumentation. These points constitute the three main aspects of the rationality of action.

Based on Weber's typology of social action, Habermas developed his own typology containing two large types: success-oriented actions and understanding-oriented actions.

Explaining the specifics of communication, Habermas introduces the concept of “life world” borrowed from phenomenology as the basis for understanding, and by analogy with the concept of “language competence” by N. Chomsky, he introduces the concept of “communicative competence”. This is not a monological concept, but a dialogical one, i.e. implies knowledge not only of the language, but also of social conditions and their interpretation. According to its essence, communicative competence is focused on understanding and therefore will be intersubjective and dialogic; it aims at establishing the meaning and meaning of linguistic expressions through communication.

The central concept of the theory of communicative action will be discourse - argumentation and understanding of people who have a common life world, associated with communicative rationality, freed from instrumental-rational connections.

Habermas admits that the processes of social reproduction cannot be fully explained with the help of communicative rationality, but "the symbolic reproduction of the life world of social groups, seen from an internal perspective" can be explained.

Therefore, society is understood at two levels: on the one hand, as a life world, i.e. symbolic self-reproduction or self-interpretation, and on the other hand, as a "system" of actions, which society seems to an outside observer. Societies must be considered both as a system and as a living world.

The system and the life world are two different ways of understanding the world divided into three parts: the objective world of facts, the social world of norms, and the subjective world of inner experiences.

The life world is ϶ᴛᴏ the cumulative process of interpretations, ᴏᴛʜᴏϲᴙ reaching out to all three worlds. Interpretation occurs in a particular situation. Situation - ϶ᴛᴏ "excerpt" from the life world, which singles out certain themes and goals of actions from it.

The main problem and specifics of modernity, according to Habermas, will be the separation of the system and the life world, which is expressed in the process of reification of modern life worlds and their increasing provincialization. The life world becomes the property of private life and falls out of the social system, which includes money and power.

Social evolution in our time is characterized by changing dependencies between the lifeworld and systems. If the systems were originally determined by the lifeworld, then subsequently they developed a growing independence, lost their initial dependence on the connections of the lifeworld and developed their own dynamics. Such a reification of society is a shift of the center of gravity to mediums independent of language and communication - like money and power, which means the absorption of life-worlds by systems.

At the junction of the system and the life world, new conflicts arise (problems of the environment, supercomplexity, overload of communicative structures, etc.) Therefore, the problems of modern society cannot be understood only with the help of an analysis of systemic processes: they need to be criticized on the basis of a concept that is opposite to the systemic consideration, and ϶ᴛᴏ may be an analysis of communicative action from the standpoint of the lifeworld.

Critical theory should not concern itself with ideologies, since feature modernity, according to Habermas, there will be fragmentation of everyday consciousness and colonization of its systems. The result of the collapse of the common understanding of life-worlds is the end of ideologies; the place of "false consciousness" is occupied by fragmentary consciousness. Similarly, the notion of class consciousness will be obsolete, so a critical theory of society must turn to a critique of cultural impoverishment and an examination of the conditions for reuniting a rationalized culture with everyday communication based on vital transmission from generation to generation. Developed

Habermas, the concept of the life world helps to explain the process of preservation and reproduction of cultural values ​​in the life space during the change of generations.

Jurgen Habermas' Theory of Society

J. Habermas' theory of society consists of three interrelated theoretical complexes: 1) the theory of communicative action and communicative rationality; 2) the dual construction of society, which links the paradigms of the life world and the system; 3) the theory of modernity, which explains today's increasingly obvious social pathologies by pointing out that communicatively structured life-worlds are beginning to obey the imperatives that have become independent, formally organized systems of action.

The theory of society is developed by Habermas in constant

correlation with the historical and sociological tradition. key and

starting point in the development of the theory of society in all three

historical materialism.

In "Toward the Reconstruction of Historical Materialism"

Habermas starts by looking at the most basic concepts and

premises of historical materialism. As these concepts

the concepts of "social labor" and "ancestral history" are chosen.

Socially organized labor is that specific

the way in which humans, unlike animals, reproduce their lives.

From a sociological point of view, this means: 1) a purposeful change in the material of nature according to the rules of instrumental action;

2) social cooperation of individuals in the sphere of production according to the rules of strategic action; 3) the distribution of manufactured products implies a systematic connection of mutual expectations, or interests,

requiring rules of interaction, which on the intersubjective

speech level are recognized as norms, these norms form

communication rules.

The key to the reconstruction of ancestral history is the concept of the mode of production. The mode of production is characterized by a certain level of development of the productive forces and certain forms of production relations. The productive forces are:

a) the labor force of producers; b) technical knowledge embodied in the means of production; c) organizational knowledge serving the mobilization, qualification and organization of the workforce. The principles of the organization of society can be characterized in the first approximation by means of the institutional core that presupposes one or another dominant form of social integration. When trying to distinguish between levels of social integration, it is necessary to distinguish: a) general structures of action; b) the structure of pictures of the world, since it is decisive in relation to morality and law; c) structures of institutionalized law and obligatory moral representations. Habermas proposes the following scheme for the historical development of societies.

Neolithic societies: a) conventionally

structured system of action, b) mythical pictures of the world,

actions that are still directly compatible with the system, c) legal regulation of conflicts from preconventional points of view

(assessment of the consequences of the action, compensation for the damage caused, restoration of the previous status quo).

Early cultures: a) a conventionally structured system of action, b) a mythical picture of the world, separated from the system of action, performs the function of legitimizing domination; c) conflicts are regulated with the help of conventional morality associated with the figure of the ruler, the embodiment of justice.

Developed cultures: a) conventionally structured

system of action, b) break with mythical thinking, education

rationalized pictures of the world (with postconventional

legal immoral ideas), c) conflicts

regulated by conventional morality, not correlated

with the figure of the ruler (depending on tradition, but systematized

right).


Modern societies: a) post-conventionally structured spheres of action: singling out a universalistically controlled sphere of strategic action (capitalist enterprise, bourgeois private law). A system of political will based on formal principles (formal democracy); b) universalistically constructed doctrines of legitimation (rational natural law); c) conflicts

regulated in terms of a clear separation of legality and morality; universal, formal or rationalized law, guided by the principles of private morality.

In his work Toward the Reconstruction of Historical Materialism, Habermas, analyzing and reconstructing Marx's concept of society, develops a critical position according to which society and the process of its development cannot be explained and cannot be determined by the sphere of production, or the economic sphere of instrumental and strategic action. Mankind learns in the field and moves forward not only cognitive, but also value-normative knowledge, and society is determined by the corresponding

realm of the communicative mind. Society is characterized therefore

dominant form of social integration. Systematic

development of this idea of ​​Habermas finds in his two-volume work "Theory

communicative action", where on the basis of the relevant theory

social action he develops his own

original theory of society.

Habermas' concept of society is unprecedented in modern

sociology, despite the fact that with all its components it

linked to the main and fundamental theories of both modern,

and classical sociology. Society, understood simultaneously as a system and as a life world, is a product of historical development, which is a process of isolating the system from the totality of life.

peace. This is one side of the process, while the other, and at the same time its main side, is formed by the process of a differentiated increase in the rationality of the life world and an increase in the complexity of the system. Such a complex process, which forms the essence of social evolution, has a different character at different stages of this evolution. In sociology, a certain convention has developed, according to which the following social evolutionary stages can be distinguished: tribal societies; traditionalist, or

state-organized societies; modern societies

(with a separate economic system). At each stage, new system mechanisms appear with a corresponding level of system complexity. The system and the life world are separated from each other, and this process in the evolutionary perspective looks like this, that the life world, which at an early stage is coextensive with society in general, increasingly becomes a certain subsystem along with others. Systemic mechanisms are increasingly separated from those social structures through which social

integration. Modern societies reach a level of systemic differentiation in which organizations that have become autonomous enter into relationships through "languageless" means of communication. Such systemic mechanisms guide social communication, which is largely isolated from norms and values. We are talking about the management of those subsystems of purposeful economic and administrative action that, according to W. Weber's diagnosis, have become independent in terms of

relation to their moral and practical foundations. At the same time, the life world remains such a subsystem that determines the state of the social system as a whole. Systemic mechanisms need to be rooted in the life world, i.e. need to be institutionalized. In tribal societies, systemic differentiation only leads to an increase in the complexity of the structures of the kinship system. On the higher steps

new social structures appear, namely states and the economic subsystem, controlled by such means as money and power. Systemic ties, which, at a low degree of differentiation, are still closely intertwined with the mechanisms of social integration, in modern societies are condensed into structures free from norms. Formally organized, controlled by means of money and power systems of action are presented to the actors as some kind of natural reality. Habermas's theory of modern society is inseparable from general theory modernity, which is developed by him in strict theoretical correlation with the theoretical concepts of T. Parsons, M. Weber, K. Marx, G. Lukach, T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer. In his theory of modernity, Habermas emphasizes the importance of two theses. First, the dismemberment of the system and

lifeworld is a necessary condition for the transition from the status-stratified societies of European feudalism to the economic class societies of early modernity. At the same time, the system is formally organized spheres of action in the field of economics and politics (economy and state), and the life world is structured communicatively as a private and public sphere. Secondly, the capitalist model of modernization is characterized by the fact that the symbolic structures of the life world under the influence of the imperatives of the subsystems of the economy and the state, which become independent through such symbolic means of exchange as money and power, are distorted or materialized. Capitalist modernization follows the pattern in which formal rationalization through spheres

of the economy and the state also penetrates into other, communicatively structured spheres, acquiring an advantage here due to moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality, and as a result causes violations in the symbolic

reproduction of the life world. The progressively rationalized life-world is both liberated and at the same time dependent on

economy and public administration. Dependence is manifested in the "mediation" of the life world by "systemic imperatives". Addiction can take socio-pathological forms of "internal colonization". But before analytically designating the threshold beyond which the "mediation" of the life world turns into colonization, it is advisable to clarify the relationship between the system and the life world. a) Capitalism and Modernity state structure appear as subsystems that, with the help of such means as money and power, are isolated from the system of institutions, i.e. from the social component of the life world. The life world reacts to this in a peculiar way. In bourgeois society, socially integrated spheres of action are formed, opposing the systemically integrated spheres of the economy and the state. We are talking about mutually complementary spheres of privacy and the public. The institutional core of the private sphere is formed by a small family, freed from economic functions and specializing in the tasks of socialization. The institutional core of the public is the communication networks that are supported by the culture with its institutions, the press, and later the mass media.

If the monetarization and bureaucratization inherent in the economic

and state spheres, penetrate into the symbolic reproduction of the life-world, and not only into its material reproduction, pathological side effects inevitably arise. b) The economic subsystem subordinates to itself the "life form of a private house", imposes its imperatives on consumers. This causes consumerism, possessive individualism, attitudes towards achievement and competition. Everyday communication practice is subject to one-sided

rationalization in favor of the utilitarian lifestyle to which specialists are committed. And such an orientation towards the goal-rational orientations of action causes the emergence of a hedonism free from the pressure of rationality.

Just as the private sphere is subordinate to the economy, so

the public falls under the domination of the administrative system.

Bureaucratic mastery of the processes of formation of social

opinion and expression of will expands the possibilities of purposeful

formation of mass loyalty. c) "The processes of understanding on which the life world is centered determine the need for cultural tradition in its entirety." In everyday communication practice

cognitive interpretations, moral expectations, modes of expression and evaluation must form a rational connection. A communication infrastructure of this kind is under threat from two directions: it is threatened by the tendencies of "systemically induced reification" and "cultural impoverishment". d) The rationalization of the life-world makes it possible

singling out independent subsystems and, at the same time, opening up the "utopian horizon" of bourgeois society, in which the formally organized spheres of action (the economy and the state apparatus) form the basis for the post-traditional life world of a person (the sphere of privacy) and a citizen (the sphere of the public).

Reconstructing in a condensed form the diverse study of modernity by Habermas, we get the following "image" of this era, according to Habermas.

1. Rationalization of the life world through a reorientation towards money and power. 2. Isolation of the economy and the state as systems for which the life world becomes the "surrounding world". 3. Significant dynamics of economic growth, on the one hand, autonomization of management in bureaucratic-socialist societies, on the other. 4. The emergence of imbalances and crises in systems, the emergence as a result of pathologies of the life world: the reification of communicative relations in capitalist societies and the false demonstration of communicative relations in socialist societies.

Public opinion

People have been interested in public opinion since ancient times. At the same time, several main problems were clearly outlined. One of them is the problem of "authorship": who is the subject of the phenomenon, which ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras was named by public opinion. Protagoras believed that it was the opinion of the majority of the population. However, another ancient Greek thinker - Plato - argued that the opinion of the aristocracy is truly public. Protagoras, thus, defended a democratic view of this problem, and Plato - anti-democratic, legitimizing the omnipotence of the aristocracy, having citizens.

The dispute about the subject of public opinion (the term itself was introduced in the 12th century by the English writer and statesman D. Salisbury) has not subsided throughout history up to the present day, linking with another

debatable question - what is the role of public opinion in the life of society. Since this question is directly related to the question of power, it sometimes comes to the fore in all discussions about public opinion. And here there are two points of view. Supporters of one, "tying" public opinion to the people, understand it as a force that governments and parliaments must reckon with, in this sense it acted as an instrument for the participation of the people in the management of state affairs. Representatives of the other, who consider public opinion to be an expression of the ruling elite, believe that it acts as a force that influences the population and contributes to the legalization of the political domination of the elite.

Three of the most influential concepts of public opinion are popular in the West today.

One of which is the concept proposed by the German philosopher

Yu. Habermas, - the so-called moralizing-normative. Habermas in his works indicates that his views are the development of those provisions that were formulated back in the 18th century. They are based on the concept of publicity, openness, with the help of which it is supposed to overcome the isolation of the absolute monarchy, to make its ideology understandable to the masses. Habermas says bluntly that his conception is designed to preserve the dominant private-ownership economic mechanism.

The public, according to Habermas, is not the people, not the mass, not the majority of the population, not "all"; it consists of those who can resonate at meetings, in cafes and pubs, in salons and in the pages of newspapers; it consists of educated sections of the population who own property. They consider themselves the bearers of the truth, which must be recognized by all. The main task of their reasoning is to "legitimately" eliminate contradictions in the interests of the existing state and bourgeois society. Habermas notes that currently not found

political substantiation of the bourgeois public and publicity, which must be left in the structure of public opinion. Therefore, the concept of "public opinion" is so popular - they see it as an opportunity to preserve what cannot be implemented.

by political means.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that the concept of "public opinion", according to Habermas, is directly related to the concepts of "law" and "politics". Indeed, if public opinion is the conscious reasoning of an educated public, then it must first of all strengthen the rule of the bourgeoisie, justify the practice of applying law and the policy of the bourgeoisie. This influence of public opinion is reinforced by the fact that judges and administrative officials are selected from the "educated classes". Relying on existing laws, these officials at the same time "sanctify" the rights and policies of the bourgeoisie by public opinion.

Habermas himself calls public opinion thus understood "liberal-bourgeois". Its subject, we recall, is a group of individuals who have the opportunity to judge openly and unite in the "public" due to the ownership of property and their education. Between the public and public opinion are morality and law. They are approved by the mind. This allows you to appeal to him, making the real subject anonymous. Appeal from above is valued as freedom of the press, and from below as universal accessibility, which is in fact limited by the barriers of private ownership.

The morality proclaimed in this way differs from universal morality. Whoever does not agree with the resonant public is declared by public opinion not just an apostate from the norm, but very bad

person or even an enemy.

The political essence of Habermas' concept is clear. He views public opinion as an instrument in the hands of the ruling classes. Actually, he does not hide this when he defines the “public” of the bourgeoisie, which retains the right to judge and explain what is happening in society. According to Habermas, public opinion is always official; such as is expressed in the press, in other official sources of information.

Introduction

Habermas Jürgen (06/18/1929, Düsseldorf) - German. (Germany) social philosopher. Prof. in Frankfurt am Main (since 1964). Co-director of the Institute for the Study of the Living Conditions of the Scientific and Technical World in Starnberg (since 1970). One of the most prominent representatives of neo-Marxism in the FRG, before the collapse of the Frankfurt School, he represented the "second" ("middle") generation of its theorists. He was influenced by Horkheimer and Adorno, from whom he is distinguished by the tendency to "amalgamate" Marxism with the latest trends in modern bourgeois philosophy and sociology (linguistic philosophy, hermeneutics, phenomenology, etc.).

In the 60s. was one of the ideologists of the West German "new left", from which he began to dissociate himself (following the founders of the Frankfurt school) as cultural-nihilistic and "actionist" (left-extremist) tendencies prevailed in the movement. Although this departure was not accompanied by open philosophical and theoretical self-criticism, in fact it was marked by Habermas's attempts to give his version of neo-Marxism a more liberal form. Leading theme social philosophy Habermas became the problem of an active, "politically functioning" public (Offentlichkeit), which became more acute in the West in the middle of the 20th century. in connection with the final stage of the constitution of capitalism in a state-monopoly form.

Receiving throughout the 60s. an increasingly abstract philosophical formulation, this problem appears to Habermas as a pivotal one, depending on which he makes other socio-cultural problems of our time.

In search of a way that could bring the modern Western European "public" out of a state of deep crisis, providing it with the role of a carrier of structural changes in modern "late capitalist" society, Habermas turns to the problem of interpersonal interaction - "interaction" (communication), focusing on the question about the difference between "true" communication from "false" and the conditions that ensure true communication between people. In this regard, Habermas at the turn of the 60-70s. offers a broad (albeit extremely eclectic) socio-philosophical concept based on the dualistic division of two spheres of human existence: the sphere of labor (the interaction of people with nature) and the sphere of "interaction" (the area of ​​interpersonal interaction). In the work "Knowledge and Interest" (1968), which develops the ideas expressed in his articles of the first half of the 60s. ("On the Logic of the Social Sciences", 1970), this issue is considered mainly in the methodological plane.

In this regard, Habermas distinguishes three types of interest: "technical" cognitive interest, which characterizes natural science and technical sciences ("scientific and technical rationality", which has the goal of mastering "external nature"); "practical" interest, the scope of which is interpersonal "interaction", in the sphere of which ideals and goals are developed, which determines the most general direction in the use and development of science and technology; finally, "liberating" ("emancipatory") interest, reflecting a person's desire for liberation from all and any forms of "alienation" and oppression that arise, according to Habermas, in connection with the transfer of technical means and methods to the area of ​​proper human relationships ("interactions" ).

In the works "Technology and Science as "Ideology" (1968), "Theories of Society or Social Technology?", "Problems of Legitimation in the Conditions of Late Capitalism" (1973) and others, Habermas gives a philosophical-historical, socio-philosophical and socio-cultural interpretation and substantiation of the gap between "labor" and "interaction" postulated by him. In the studies of the late 70s - early 80s, and especially in the two-volume "Theory of Communicative Action", in which Habermas tries to "build" his concept into the process of evolution of Western theoretical sociology from Weber and Durkheim to Parsons, the considered dichotomy is brought to an even more general level of analysis: it dissolves into the antinomy of the unalienated "living world" and the alienating "system" of modern ("late") capitalism, "colonizing", according to Habermas, this vital basis interpersonal communication, asserting the principle of "technical rationality".

Now let's take a closer look at Habermas's theory of society and his moralizing-normative conception of public opinion.

Conclusion

The moralizing-normative conception of Habermas's public opinion can be observed in Russia. Let's compare, for example, news releases on the ORT channel and say the program "Week" on Ren TV. In the first case, the information is only official. Nothing extra. Just what the viewer needs to know. Moreover, the plots are built on the principle of "Catastrophe-politics-other insignificant events." In the second case, the viewer can find out information "unofficial". Something that was not on state channels. Thus, correlate one with the other and get a more objective view of the event. However, the majority watches the central channels. So, they will have the opinion that is imposed on them from the TV screens. And if there is someone among them who will express a different point of view, then at best they will ignore him, at worst they will be considered an enemy (which we can observe in the Soviet period, when society rejected dissidents). Ie public opinion is a tool in the hands of the authorities and the ruling classes. What actually is the main idea of ​​the concept of public opinion Habermas.

List of used literature:

Kimelev Yu.A., Polyakova N.L. The concept of society by Jurgen Habermas. / M., 1995.

Farman, I. P. Socio-cultural projects of Jürgen Habermas. / Ros. acad. Sciences. Institute of Philosophy. - M.: IFRAN, 1999

Noel-Neumann E. / Public opinion: Opening the spiral of silence / M., 1996.

http:// www. slovopedia. com/

NOU VPO "Institute of Television, Business and Design"

Faculty of TV and radio journalism

Department of Journalism

Jurgen Habermas' Theory of Society. Public opinion

abstract


4th year students

Maria Petukhova

) are very different thinkers, between whom there are very few points of contact. Combining the theories of these thinkers in one paragraph allows you to balance their positions. Jurgen Habermas in his writings regrets that in our time the space of the public sphere is shrinking and humanity is losing access to the truth. According to postmodernists, there is no truth and cannot be.

Postmodernism is a direction of scientific thought that denies the possibility of rational knowledge and explanation of reality. On the contrary, global theories explaining the social structure, or “great tales”, as Jean-Francois Lyotard calls them, are attempts to manipulate public opinion, the desire to influence historical development, to direct it in the direction that is detailed in the “great tale”. If all theories are inherently manipulation, then there can be no truth. Even if there is a consolidated opinion in society, which is the truth, this only indicates that discourses have formed in society that perform the function of truth or truth for this society.

Postmodernists have an original view on the role of information in modern society. According to postmodernists, language is the only reality that a person comes into contact with in his life. Economics, politics, cinema, history, sociology, sports are nothing more than forms of the existence of a language, and knowledge of these areas human activity and scientific disciplines occurs through language, that is, the way to talk about these areas and disciplines.

The role of information in modern society has been the subject of most writing by postmodern thinkers such as Lyotard and Baudrillard. Jean-Francois Lyotard notes that the production of information in our time occurs only if it is in demand and useful. Thus, information and knowledge are as much a commodity as a car or a cigar. Lyotard uses the term “performativity” to denote the usefulness and effectiveness of information.

Man's attitude to knowledge and information is changing. If a earlier man aspired to knowledge for the sake of explaining the world, its knowledge, determining one’s place in the universe, then a citizen of postmodernity (as postmodernists call the current stage community development) considers how profitable it is for him to receive certain knowledge and how much time he can spend on replenishing the baggage of knowledge so that it does not harm his business, making money. If the information is not performative, then it is of no interest to the general population and remains the area of ​​interest of scientists who seek not financial gain, but the search for truth.

Baudrillard considers modern culture as a system of signs. The difference between modern society and industrial and pre-industrial society lies in the fact that a person perceives as many signs in one day as a person who lived in previous eras in his entire life. Signs lose the function of representation, now they only simulate reality. The signs do not hide the reality that scientists who do not belong to the postmodern direction are trying to know, that is, the signs cease to be authentic. This is due to the information richness of our lives. For example, a simple dinner with a business partner in a restaurant involves a person's perception of many signs. Clothing, appearance, the figure of the interlocutor, the food he orders, design, status, the cuisine of the restaurant that you have chosen to spend time together, these are all signs. And if you add to this list those signs that you perceive in the process of verbal communication with the interlocutor, then it becomes clear why the signs lose their authenticity.

Television news, according to Baudrillard, does not tell at all about what is happening in the world. They offer the viewer a version of events. What we see on TV in the evening depends more on the mood and political position of journalists, their connections with newsmakers than on what happened in the world during the day. The very idea of ​​selecting news for breaking news is that journalists are only simulating reality. After all, outside the issue there are news, without which the picture of the world remains incomplete. And there is no reason to trust the journalist's instinct, his ability to separate the wheat from the chaff.

According to Baudrillard, people of our time watch the news not at all in order to find out what is happening in the world. They simply enjoy the process of watching and have little interest in the authenticity of news signs. This also applies to the perception of advertising by a person: either the viewer likes it and gives him pleasure, or he does not like it, and he switches the channel by pressing the button on the remote control. The viewer only pretends to be interested in the meaning of the message that the advertisement conveys. In fact, he is well aware that signs are inauthentic, and does not consider that the loss of meaning by signs is any significant problem.

Baudrillard introduces into scientific circulation the concept of "simulacrum" - a copy that does not have an original. The sign loses contact with its referent, begins an independent existence, acquires the status of a single and self-sufficient reality. Baudrillard believes that there are three orders of simulacrum: forgery, production, and simulation. A fake is a copy of a real-life object that has value. An example is the creation by an amateur artist of a copy of Kazimir Malevich's painting "The Black Square". Production involves replicating an image for financial gain. Malevich's painting is produced on a conveyor belt, and a postcard with a "black square" ends up on store shelves. Simulation no longer has a connection with its prototype, it replaces reality.

The idea of ​​a simulacrum is that it hypertrophies everything around: war becomes more bloody, and terrorism is much more cruel than they really are. The "simulacrum" theory became known to a mass audience when Baudrillard stated that the 1991 Gulf War was a simulacrum. According to Baudrillard, there was no real war. Desert Storm is a highly rated new television show that aired on CNN. The possibilities of computer graphics make it possible to realistically simulate military operations. And if in the director's chair there is a talented director who knows how to work with special effects, such as Steven Spielberg, you can create an interesting television show "Gulf War".

The proof that the Gulf War could be a simulacrum is the development of a new direction in film art - "fakumentary", that is, a fake documentary, when footage from the archive is mounted with staged footage. The film "First on the Moon" tells about the landing of Soviet cosmonauts on the moon, about the victory of the USSR in the space confrontation between the two superpowers. Moreover, the film is made so high quality that a schoolboy who has not read a history textbook will definitely believe what is happening on the screen.

Jürgen Habermas is a classical thinker. He believes that knowledge of reality is possible. However, in modern society, the activities of public opinion specialists, who use various communication technologies and turn political life into a colorful television show, reduce the space of the public sphere.

The public sphere is a space for open public discussion, the participants of which strive to find a rational solution to the problem, and do not defend their own or others' interests. The public sphere arose in Western society at a time when the bourgeoisie began to gain strength and tried to become independent of the state. The free press and political debates were used by the bourgeoisie to publicly announce their position and by the power of their own argument to defeat their opponent in the debate. The space of the public sphere was periodically reduced or, conversely, expanded. However, right now the public sphere, according to Habermas, is on the verge of extinction. Media corporations and public relations agencies that shape messages that are distributed through media channels perceive the public sphere as an anachronism, a relic of the past. The main goal of media corporations is to make a profit by broadcasting advertising messages to a large audience.

Jürgen Habermas agrees with the thesis put forward by postmodern thinkers: modern world is a sign system. But he denies the unconditional inauthenticity of the sign. According to Habermas, in the information society, signs should serve people, contribute to the improvement of a democratic society, and the task of scientists is to expose the distorted picture of the world created by the media, explain to humanity the need to rationally discuss problems that arise in society, publicly discuss important topics, restore the public sphere to its former limits. Everyone should have access to primary information, and not receive information in a distorted form after it has been processed by journalists and public relations specialists.

One of the main shortcomings of Jurgen Habermas' theory of the public sphere is that the researcher finds it difficult to prove that the public sphere existed before the advent of the information society. Rather, Habermas' work describes an ideal model of the public sphere, which essentially never existed and which, according to Habermas, may form in the future.

See Lyotard J-F. postmodern state. M.; SPb., 1998; Lyotard J-F. Phenomenology. SPb., 2001.

abstract

"Communication process according to J. Habermas"

1. Introduction

2. Biography of Habermas

3. Social communication

4. Practice, ethics and morality in the theory of communication action

5. Types of communication action

6. Speech acts

7. The concept of speech action. Language is the basis of communication

8. Argumentation theory

9. The concept of discourse

10. Ideal speech situation. The concept of genuine consensus


Introduction

The social theories of the 20th century are characterized by a transition from one paradigm of the development of society to another. The change of social paradigms that began around the middle of our century - a paradigm based on monism, opposition and a strict system of views and principles, to another one based on pluralism, agreement, a combination of different points of view, recognition of marginality, on the interpretation of a diverse theoretical and practical heritage - is by no means always accompanied by their name. This transition is becoming increasingly important not only in politics, but also in science. In particular, the idea of ​​consensus, which is in its infancy in hermeneutic theories, has resonated with representatives of other orientations.

Complex processes in world politics and economics raise new questions for social researchers. Among them, the well-known German social philosopher J. Habermas occupies a prominent place. Habermas pays the main attention to the analysis of transition processes and ways to overcome the conflicts that accompany them. His concept can serve as a methodological prerequisite for a productive discussion of the current situation in post-socialist countries, where there are conflict situations associated with the transitional period of their development, with a clash of various interests and forces.

Habermas is one of the few modern thinkers who is convinced that it is possible to achieve a rational social consensus on the basis of a rap-monious combination of freedom and the public good. Already in The Theory of Communicative Action, he reflected and interpreted almost all the main directions and ideas of social thought since the end of the 19th century, related to the problem of social consent. The purpose of this reflection is to present and substantiate a new paradigm that is promising for the development of modern social knowledge. In this regard, he highlights the problem of reaching consensus on the basis of understanding. Its solution begins with Habermas in the theory of communicative action, in which he develops the concept of understanding accepted in hermeneutics as a prerequisite for social consent (contract, consensus) and develops a new categorical apparatus.

From Habermas' point of view, linguistic communication arises through the mutual recognition of claims to the significance of various kinds put forward by the participants, which, if necessary, can be the subject of discursive argumentation. According to Habermas, discursive forms acquire special significance in conditions of fundamental differences in the beliefs and values ​​of subjects, the analysis of which is one of the main tasks of the theory of communicative action. Considering verbal communication as a medium of sociocultural life, Habermas is convinced that it is in a communicative action oriented towards understanding and mutual recognition of claims to significance that language finds the application for which it is fundamentally intended. Habermas always emphasized the practical social orientation of his theory of communicative action. He saw its purpose in the elimination of communication barriers and the destruction of pseudo-communications, which should serve as a means of spiritual improvement of mankind and at the same time change the social life world.

The ideas put forward by Habermas, one of the most prominent representatives of the communicative-pragmatic orientation in modern philosophy, are of particular relevance at the present time, when one of the global problems generated by the development of civilization in the 20th century is the problem of mutual understanding between people, overcoming alienation in the field of interpersonal communication. , establishing a dialogue between different cultures, philosophical schools and directions. Therefore, it seems that reflection on the conditions for the possibility of linguistic understanding in the communicative community will continue to be one of the priority areas in the philosophy of language.


Biography of Habermas

Habermas, Jürgen (Habermas, Jürgen), German philosopher, the largest representative of the Frankfurt School. Born in Düsseldorf on June 18, 1929. Studied philosophy, history and psychology at the Universities of Göttingen, Zurich and Bonn. In 1954 he defended his doctoral dissertation on the philosophy of Schelling under the guidance of E. Rothhacker. From 1956 to 1959 - assistant at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt am Main, and in 1980-1983 - director of this institute. From 1964 to 1971 (and since 1983) - professor of philosophy and sociology at the University of Frankfurt. From 1971 to 1980 he was director of the Max Planck Institute (in Starnberg).

At the center of Habermas' philosophical reflections is the concept of communicative reason. The first step in the development of this concept was the book Knowledge and interest (Erkenntnis und Intereste, 1968). In this work, Habermas is looking for a model of critical dialogue, with the help of which he hopes to rethink the claims of transcendental philosophy, linking the latter with the tools of the social sciences. “Consciousness”, which acted as the supreme judge in the traditional European ontology, is now deprived of its prerogatives, and a universal communicative community takes its place. At the same time, communication itself does not act as the highest and last instance, since its results depend on social conditions and they can be affected by the influence of relations of domination and subordination. Criticism therefore needs to re-analyze society in order to distinguish between free communication and communication under the influence of domination-submission relations. In this context, the models for Habermas are Marx and Freud, who took a fundamentally important step towards a critical renewal of the concept of reason. The new concept of reason is critical (but connected with the criticism of society, and not only with the “critique of reason”, as in Kant) and has a universal character (being the norm of procedures performed by a potentially universal communicative community, and not the actual evidence of the universal act “I think”, like Descartes or Kant).

Since 1971 (namely, with the release of a small work " Preliminary Reflections on the Theory of Communicative Competence”) Habermas seeks to connect the communicative concept of mind with the "linguistic turn" made by Anglo-American analytic philosophy. Referring to the relevant studies of K.-O. Apel (and in close collaboration with him), Habermas comes to the development of the concept of reason, based on the theory of language acts. This theory is expounded in detail in the two-volume work " Theory of communicative action"(1981).

The originality of the philosophical theory of Habermas lies in the fact that he connected the concept of mind with the empirical theory of social evolution developed by Marx, Weber and Parsons. He focuses his efforts on the development of a post-metaphysical "philosophical project". This means that the philosophical concept of mind is not independent of empirical observations and must constantly reaffirm itself in dialogue with specific scientific disciplines that reflect the fact of the functional differentiation of society. The dialogue of philosophy with the private sciences Habermas illustrates this with the example of psychoanalysis (“ Knowledge and interest, then on the example of the theory of social evolution (“ Toward the Reconstruction of Historical Materialism", 1976), then on the example of the theory of society (“ Theory of communicative action"), then on the example of the theory of law (“ Factuality and Significance", 1992). A theory of knowledge is possible only as a theory of society - a thought that runs through all of Habermas' work. In contrast to Marx, Habermas clearly distinguishes between the philosophy of history and the theory of social evolution (coming closer at this point to J. Piaget, T. Parsons and N. Luhmann).

Also, Habermas from the very beginning sought to supplement the theory of democracy. Thanks to this addition, the Frankfurt School was led out of the impasse of negativism and received a powerful impetus for further development. Reflecting on the structural transformation experienced by society, Habermas, as early as the early 1960s, put forward a concept that at the end of the same decade became the key for a whole generation of revolutionary student youth. This concept is publicity, the public (Öffentlichkeit). Another important theme of Habermas' research is the relationship between law and democracy. This topic is discussed by Habermas in his book " Factuality and significance”, where the communicative concept of reason developed in previous works is applied to the classical theory of sovereignty.

The formulations and concepts of Habermas have had a marked influence on modern thought. The concepts of emancipation, epistemological interest, communication, discourse put forward by him in the 1960s were developed in the 1970s in the concept of the “crisis of the legitimacy of late capitalism”, and in the 1980s supplemented by terms and aphorisms that became widespread in the language of not only scientists, but also the general public (“colonization of the lifeworld”, “new opacity”, etc.).

social communication

J. Habermas[i] devoted special works to the problems of social communication: "Communication and the Evolution of Society", "The Theory of Communicative Actions" and "Knowledge and Interests".

J. Habermas developed his concept on the basis of a number of provisions of his predecessor in German philosophy - K. Jaspers, who argued that truth is communication, and, therefore, true communication is communication about the search for truth. J. Habermas considers communication to be a true, personally mastered sociality. But it does not become such immediately, but only as it begins to provide people with the opportunity for a completely free and impartial discussion of higher values. The latter change historically, and therefore require a constant dispute about themselves. Proceeding from this, according to J. Habermas, the theory of knowledge itself appears as a communicative process, as communication.1

Communicative actions are called such social actions, the purpose of which is the free agreement of participants to achieve joint results in a certain situation.

It was in the orientation towards finding mutual understanding between different social subjects, and not in the focus on success, that Habermas saw the fundamental difference between communicative action and all other types of social action. Genuine communicative action differs from all others in that it acts as a mechanism for maintaining or renewing consensus as the main factor in the solidarity and stability of society.

J. Habermas, including the provisions of the theory of speech acts in sociological theory, speaks of the theory of communicative action as a theory of society, seeking to reveal its critical dimensions. This means that social processes (processes of integration, socialization, institutionalization) necessarily take place in an interpreted cultural and communicative sphere. Each action of an individual in society is accompanied by a comparison of emerging meanings and meanings already fixed in culture. Communication is a semantic reconstruction of society. The semantic structuring of the social system provides the necessary coherence, and through it the integrity of society.

The essence of communication is mutual understanding, which, in addition to establishing the consent of the speakers and the mutual rejection of subjectivism, also includes the commonality of the life world.

life world(Lebenswelt) is a store of knowledge organized and transmitted from generation to generation through cultural traditions, concentrated in culture and, above all, in language. . This stock of knowledge forms the basis of the individual's life experience.

Habermas characterizes the life-world in the following way: first, the life-world is undoubtedly present in the speaker; secondly, the life world is common. It is immediate and exists as a permanent background. The commonality of the life-world precedes any disagreement. Unlike knowledge, it cannot be rejected by experience, in extreme cases, it can be destroyed in a shock way. Thirdly, the life world forms an environment, a context, beyond which it is impossible to go.

The life world as a whole is reduced to culture, and cultural patterns themselves act as resources for the practice of mutual understanding.

In the process of communication (communicative action), culture (knowledge) is produced and reproduced, communication contributes to social integration (legitimate order) and the formation of personal identity.

An important place in the theory of Habermas is occupied by the analysis of modern society, a distinctive feature of which, according to the scientist himself, is the rationalization of people's communicative behavior. The rationalization of the "life world" has, in addition to positive consequences, also negative ones: excessive rationalization can lead to distorted communications, systems of economic and political action arise and develop, which, standing out from the "life world", begin to control it from the outside.

Analyzing the life of modern society, Habermas introduces the concepts of "labor" and "interaction", (the process of mutual influence of individuals on each other, their interaction) reveals their interaction and shows the importance in the self-reproduction of human society.
The spheres of work and interaction are distinguished in Habermas's ideal model as the sphere of good and the sphere of negative freedom (freedom from something). Pursuing his goals in work, a person is concerned with achieving good. While striving to achieve understanding in communication interaction, he is free from this concern. The model of pure communicative action is the "ideal language situation".

Language, according to Habermas, occupies a central place, since as a means of communication it allows you to check the correctness of statements in the course of argumentation, the search for truth and achieve understanding on this basis. Only the reflection of communication, i.e., finding its philosophical foundations, reveals the truth, regarding the content of which understanding can be achieved. Language is always a tool for understanding between subjects, but the actual interaction of people in society often proceeds differently than it is described in an ideal language situation. The reality of society is inextricably linked with the factor of power and with the political situation in which the process of interaction is carried out in the form of "non-violent violence". Habermas calls this "disrupted communication," which is essentially the failure to reach a communication agreement.

The philosopher recognizes science as one of the most important factors that rationalize communication. Within the framework of scientific theory, a search is carried out for the main patterns and definitions that make it possible to identify cause-and-effect relationships in society and make predictions. Habermas' theory of consensus has a rational and, moreover, scientistic character: in the act of communication, the truth is revealed, which underlies understanding. Thus, communication theory also acts as a social model of society. Consent in society is achievable not only because the truth can be found, but also because, according to Habermas, this implies the implementation of a certain model of Western-type society, providing a certain normal course and standard of living for those who agree with its establishment.

Habermas proceeds from the premise that the main task of the sciences is to reveal the fundamental (constituting) interest. This interest is associated either with the characteristics and goals of specific individuals, or with tradition. The very existence of such an interest testifies to the stability of society, the absence of painful processes of transition from one state to another and the accompanying conflicts. Therefore, the understanding of regularities is, accordingly, the legitimate goal of the empirical-analytical sciences in the name of maintaining social stability. In contrast, the historical-hermeneutic sciences are engaged in the search for meaning. Such a task arises when the constitutive interest is unclear, the goals of the activity are in question, the situation is not stable, the conflict is possible or already exists.

Both types of cognition of constitutive interest - empirical-analytical and historical-hermeneutic - are determined by a vital necessity and are not an arbitrary goal. scientific activity. The human race maintains its existence in the process of social labor and self-affirmation (not rarely with the help of violence). These aspects of his life activity are investigated by the instrumental knowledge of empirical and analytical sciences. But the human race also survives through verbal communication. For this, communicative knowledge is used, which is the result of the development historical and hermeneutic cal sciences. Habermas builds a consensus theory showing how to master a communicative ethic, an ethic of the pursuit of truth, whose categorical imperatives are formed in language.

Another aspect of consensus: its goal is not to comprehend the truth, but to achieve mutual understanding. Social activity is primarily the activity of subjects who understand each other, and therefore the main role in social problems is played by language as a special tool and a speech act based on it. The rational philosophy paradigm of M. Weber and T. Parsons in the works of Habermas was replaced by a new paradigm of the philosophy of language, intersubjective understanding or communication4. The individual must first be able to take the point of view of another, accept it.

Together with language, according to Habermas, actions oriented towards mutual understanding are born, and language itself always implies the possibility of mutually agreed actions. In his research, he emphasizes that such actions can be realized if the principle of coordination is functioning, which, in turn, depends on the adequate use of speech. Consequently, the use of language, oriented towards mutual understanding, is one of the most important manifestations of social coexistence, its dynamics.

Habermas's views differ significantly from the concepts of other researchers who are trying to find the foundations of consensus, for example, from E. Durkheim, for whom ritual practice, and not actions focused on agreement, are decisive in achieving social solidarity.

Joint life requires even the simplest systems of interaction, constant mutual adaptation and improvement of cooperation. The latter can be achieved either through a strict organization, which is guaranteed only by the usurpation of power by individuals, or through the establishment of a social contract to regulate relations between people. This agreement can only be achieved by reconciling the principles of individual freedom and the public good.

A number of issues that arise within the framework of Habermas' communication ethics are clarified in his recent works, in particular in lectures he gave in Moscow in April 1989. Communicative theory is refined here, in particular by distinguishing between three areas: practice, ethics, and morality.

Practice, ethics and morality in the theory of communication action

In the theory of communicative action, freedom and the good are intertwined at every stage. The initial division of labor as a sphere of interests (goods) and interaction as a sphere of freedom then gives way to their dialectical interweaving. Pragmatically oriented action needs the freedom to choose the proper (good) means to achieve the goal. Communicative action presupposes the presence of an idea of ​​the good in order to achieve understanding. The concept of “good” is not given to a person devoid of rationality. It can be formed and substantiated on the way both by rationalizing one's own expectations, and with the help of a rationalized interpretation of society.

The idea of ​​rationalization in the area of ​​actions oriented toward reconciliation was taken by Habermas from Weber's analysis of the Protestant ethic and its connection with the rise of capitalism. However, unlike Weber, he interprets the process of rationalization as the result of a communicative rather than a purposeful rational action. Legitimation through action can be accomplished not from tradition, but from the principle of free agreement, rational consensus, and also from the basic principle of communicative action - understanding. The sphere of practice affects the situation when a person pursues his interests without raising the question of the grounds for his own activity.

Completion of a communicative action - scope ethical standards that affirm the horizon of a person's value preferences. What is essential here is not so much what goals he should achieve, but who he would like to become. A similar question arises when the goals are not clear, ideas about one's own good are lost, and freedom not only does not provide guidelines for activity, but, on the contrary, makes it difficult to find them.

By introducing and substantiating the distinction between practical, ethical and moral spheres, Habermas, in essence, opens up theoretical ways to find consensus and compromise. Based on his concept, we can draw the following conclusion: consensus - complete agreement in the exact sense of the word - is impossible. It is possible only as an activity on the basis of universally recognized general rules. Agreement on these rules may be complete. Consensus can be realized in practice and lead to a compromise. By compromise we mean the ability to sacrifice part of one's own interests for the sake of maximizing the common good. This ability is inherent both in the sphere of practical action and in the sphere of communications. However, it is realized not in the field of ethics and law, but in the field of morality - in establishing a common horizon of life not only for me, but also for others.

In the practical sphere, the pursuit of one's own interests and goals by each of the people is based on consensus - the recognition of the rule according to which everyone has the right to do likewise. However, this rule by itself is not enough to eliminate the possibility of conflict, as people's interests clash. To avoid this clash, some interests have to be sacrificed. For example, a manufacturer that pollutes the environment in the process of production, realizing that other producers can make their “contribution” to environmental degradation, is forced to reckon with the general interest to keep the environment clean, since in the end he himself also needs it. Even if his production were the only source of pollution, he could not afford to pollute it so much that it became impossible to live in it. Therefore, he is obliged to sacrifice part of his profit interests for the sake of environmental interests. This is already a compromise.

If in the sphere of ethics a person strives to be uncompromising, i.e., to build an image of what is due on the basis of an ideal, his ideas about himself, then in the sphere of morality (where the norms are common) he is inclined to consensus and compromise, just as in the practical sphere. The ability of the will to spontaneous action (freedom) is limited by the desire of the individual to realize himself without closing the possibility of such realization for others, and in the event of a clash of interests and goals (conflict situations) to prevent them from developing into destructive and ultimately destructive conflicts for society.

Thus, the Habermas consensus theory introduces new interpretations of the concepts of consensus, compromise, etc., and creates a field for their further theoretical development. Although it is not universal and acceptable in Russia in its pure form, many of its provisions and principles are useful for explaining the problems of today's transitional stage of development, for substantiating specific ways and mechanisms to mitigate the conflict nature of Russian society.

Types of communicative action

The center of Habermas's efforts was the opposition of instrumental and communicative action. Purely instrumental action corresponds to such an approach to human action, when objective, instrumental, pragmatic criteria are brought to the fore, and the social context and coordinates are, as it were, put out of the brackets. Habermas considers the sphere of work to be the embodiment of instrumental action. This action is ordered according to the rules, which are based on empirical knowledge. When performing an instrumental action, certain goals are realized - in accordance with the criteria of effectiveness, control over reality - certain goals are made, predictions are made regarding the consequences of this action. Already in the works of the 60s, as well as in the mentioned two-volume work, Habermas understands the communicative action as such an interaction of at least two individuals, which is ordered according to the norms taken for obligatory. In the communicative action, as before, the emphasis was placed on the focus of "actors", actors, primarily and precisely on mutual understanding, the search for consensus, and overcoming disagreements.

If the instrumental action is focused on success, then the communicative action is aimed at mutual understanding of acting individuals, their consensus. This agreement about the situation and the expected consequences is based on persuasion rather than coercion. It involves the coordination of those efforts of people that are aimed precisely at mutual understanding. Accordingly, Habermas distinguishes instrumental and communicative rationality. The concept of instrumental rationality is borrowed from Max Weber. The teaching of Max Weber is generally one of the main theoretical sources of the teaching of Habermas. It should be noted that in this case (based on an updated interpretation of Weber) Habermas' typology of action underwent a noticeable transformation. So, in the works of the 60s, the main pair of concepts for Habermas were the named instrumental and communicative types of action. Subsequently, using slightly different criteria for distinguishing, he singled out the following types:

Normative-regulated, dramatic actions associated with self-presentation (actions are correlated with two worlds, respectively with the social and objective world or with the social and subjective world)

In modern society, an action focused on understanding (communicative action) occupies a dominant position, prevailing over actions focused on achieving a goal, following norms, and deliberate expression. People (individuals) live in three intersecting worlds:

First, in the objective world where business relationships take place;

Secondly, in the social world - the world of normative and evaluative relations;

Thirdly, in the subjective world, which is formed by human feelings, experiences, hopes, reflections, etc.

Accordingly, Habermas characterizes the attitude of individuals to the objective world as businesslike, to the social world as normative, to the subjective world as expressive. Individuals express their attitude to all three worlds through language (although the communicative action is not necessarily reduced to speech acts). The linguistic design of an individual relationship in the first case is focused on the truth, in the second case - on the norm, and in the third case - on the truth. Accordingly, Habermas considers three "value spheres": the sphere of science, where human claims to truth take place; the sphere of morality and law, where human claims to loyalty to moral and legal norms are observed; and the sphere of art, where there are claims to truth (truthfulness, according to Habermas, is an authentic expression of subjective experiences).

The essential difference of the concept of Habermas is that it organically includes and synthesizes: - the attitude of the actor to the world - his attitude to other people, in particular, such an important factor as the processes of "speaking", speech, utterance of certain language sentences and listening action counterparties. And from this Habermas concludes: the concept of communicative action requires that the actors be considered as speaking and listening subjects who are connected by some kind of relationship with the "objective, social or subjective world", and at the same time put forward certain claims to the significance of what they say, think what they are convinced of.

In speech utterances in relation to each of the above worlds there are modalities. true or false. correct or wrong plausible or implausible. 1

Thus, on the basis of the constructed logic of statements and the analysis of the effectiveness of this logic, a form of capture of all worlds by communicative actions is shown. Introducing yet another distinction and relating situations and actions, social and non-social, to action orientations, i.e. respectively, with a focus on success and on understanding, Habermas consistently distinguishes simple instrumental action as a success-oriented action, which is built in accordance with the technical rules and built on the definition of a measure of influence based on intervention in the relationship of circumstances and results, and a strategic action, which Habermas defines as the degree of influence that determines the estimated influence on the counter-player or counter-player who makes the decision.

If a mere instrumental action can only be additionally connected with social interactions, then strategic action itself initially represents a social action, because it initially presupposes a reflexive account of the actions of the counterplayer. O communicative action we are talking about the case when the action plan of the participants in the situation turns out to be connected not with an egocentric calculation of success, but with acts coordinating understanding.

speech acts

Initially, Habermas constructs logically the very feature of the communicative action. Habermas does this using a distinction between locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts. The difference between them is that:

Locutionary acts- these are speech utterances in which something is simply reported - the locutionary act expresses the state of affairs, it is built in relation to the linguistic means used in the course of its implementation. The locutionary act is studied by semantics.

Perlocutionary acts are speech acts by which the speaker aims to produce an effect on the listener. If he says something in a given situation, then something follows from it. Through perlocutionary actions, the integration of speech actions into the structure of strategic actions arises, i.e. there is intervention and intervention in the world, the effect is achieved by the fact that something is done through what is said. The effect is already on the face, it is described as having taken place from the outside. From this point of view, perlocutionary acts are described and characterized in relation to their results, and they are studied by rhetoric.

A special question arises in relation to the so-called illocutionary acts. illocutionary act- this is an action that is carried out when a certain state of affairs is expressed, while the mode of the statement is posited as a recognition, order, positing, promise, warning, i.e. it is, as it were, a double act, where in one place the very nature of this positing is determined, and in the second part, due to the propositional structure, something is communicated. The illocutionary act can be characterized as follows - the action consists in saying something. The illocutionary act is considered in relation to the manifested goal and a number of conditions for its implementation.

Illocutionary acts are accepted from the point of view of understanding the content of the utterance, confirmations internal to speech acts and subsequent interactions, opportunities to establish a connection. The condition for this is the acceptance or grasping of the claim to significance inherent in the speech act. This is also a very important distinction of Habermas, because in addition to meanings, he highlights the significance that must be grasped by the opponent. We understand a speech act if we know what makes it acceptable. This is due to the intersubjective recognition of speech intentions. Thus, we are dealing with a somewhat peculiar meta-understanding or reflexive understanding.

Where, then, are communicative actions carried out, which, from the point of view of Jurgen Habermas, are institutionally connected and institutionally unrelated? They are realized, first of all, in the structure of the life world, where two interacting, and possibly more, are mediated in the implementation of communicative actions by culture and language. They build their interaction on the assignment of statements to three worlds: the external world, consisting of an objective fact, the social world of the first communicator, the social world of the second communicator, and finally the internal subjective worlds of each of the participants in communication.

The concept of speech action. Language is the basis of communication

The system-forming element of the theory of communicative action is the concept of speech action, which Habermas defines as "an act by which the speaker wants to agree with another about something." Speech, studied from the standpoint of the theory of speech acts and from the standpoint of phenomenological hermeneutics, opens, according to Habermas, access to three key problems of philosophy: to the “metateoretical” the problem of rationality in general; to "methodological" the problem of understanding the meaning, affecting the internal relationship between the meaning and significance of a linguistic expression, the consideration of which allows us to reveal the internal connection between the concept of "understanding" sociology and hermeneutics; to the “empirical” problem of describing the processes of modernization of society from the point of view of the rationalization of cultural and social life. Thus, relations are established between language and reality, language, cognition, understanding and interest, language, communication and social interaction.

Feature of the theory of communicative action from the point of view of the philosophy of language lies in the fact that language is built into the structure of action as such and thereby acquires its place in the system of social actions. Language interests Habermas primarily from the point of view of pragmatics as a speech act, i.e. as an action that turns the sentences of the language into a situation proportionate to the context of speech. Thus, in his concept, the idea that the center of language is conversation is actualized. The universal (formal) pragmatics is called upon to explore language in action, the main task of which is to “identify and recreate the universal conditions for possible mutual understanding”. Accordingly, the work is aimed at reconstructing the philosophical hermeneutics of Habermas, concentrating on the processes of understanding and mutual understanding, in connection with which such concepts as speech action, communicative rationality, consensus, as well as issues complementarity of the concept of communicative action and concepts lifeworld. The system-forming element of the theory of communicative action is the concept of speech action, which Habermas defines as “an act by which the speaker wants to agree with another about something.

Habermas's views on language are close to the idea of ​​it as a system of objective spirit, i.e. as an intersubjective force that influences the speaking subject and forms him, which does not oppose him as something exclusively external. The language system makes speech actions possible, and the latter, in turn, reproduce the language and, at the same time, imperceptibly and constantly change it. Thus, the structure of the language is preserved and updated through the practice of mutual understanding in society. Language can be understood as a code or structure that has a normative status in relation to speech acts. The structure is not created in the speech act, but gives it the opportunity to take place, but it itself exists only because it is constantly updated in the practice of speech. It is argued that the meaning of what is said is rooted in the conversation and is created in the process of communication aimed at understanding. Since communication proceeds simultaneously at the objective and at the intersubjective levels, an adequate understanding of its meaning requires that the subject of speech is also defined at both levels.

The communication participant is focused in his speech actions on mutual understanding (and, therefore, the conclusion of an agreement on the subject of speech) provided that he, using understandable (grammatically correct) sentences, puts forward (and, in turn, accepts) three significant claims in an acceptable way for others : on the truth - for the content of the proposition; for correctness - for norms that in the given context justify the interpersonal relations established in the performative part of the statement; on veracity - for the expressed intentions. Despite the fact that, depending on the situation, certain claims may turn out to be priority, each speech expression contains (implicitly or explicitly) their entire spectrum. As Habermas emphasizes, the significant claims in question are universal and must be made simultaneously.

Habermas associates the universality of meaningful claims woven into the structure of speech with the role of language in constituting the concept of reality. He defines language as "the medium by which the speaker and listener realize their actions of differentiation". Through language, a person distinguishes between “external nature”, “society”, “internal nature” and “language”. Those functions of the language that Habermas calls "delimiting actions" easily find correspondence to the concept formulated by W. von Humboldt of its "world-opening function", inextricably linked with its systematizing role. The world that opens up in language is real, and it owes its reality to the constitutive function of language.

Argumentation theory

The theory of argumentation, which thematizes the validity of significant claims contained in speech acts, from the point of view of the possibility of their recognition, complements the theory of speech acts. Thus, in the theory of communicative action, an internal connection is established between the meaning of the statement that constitutes the speech act, the significance of the claims put forward in it and their justification. The arguments that the speaker can give to substantiate the possible truth of some sentence turn out to be constitutive of its validity. Due to this, the meaning of the sentence and its truth are related to each other through potential justification i.e. argumentation.

Argumentation as a way to identify the reasonable potential of speech is closely related to the concept of communicative reason. Interpreting the communicative mind as a procedure for developing consensus on understanding the processes (events) taking place in the world, Habermas considers argumentation as the only legitimate (from the point of view of the theory he is developing) mechanism for achieving it. Already everyday practice of communication testifies to the experience of argumentation as a means of coordinating communicative actions in cases where traditional institutions can no longer ensure public consent, but at the same time the use of force to restore violated consent is still avoided. Argumentation thus underlies the concept of communicative rationality as a way of human behavior, which, within the framework of the life world, is aimed at establishing, maintaining and updating a consensus based on the recognition of fundamentally criticized significant claims made in speech actions. The possibility of recognizing these significant claims is due to the fact that they, being problematized, can be substantiated. Thus, the speech act itself indicates the pragmatic possibility of argumentation. By its nature, argumentation is a “different” way of continuing a communicative action. Habermas believes that "communicative action in various forms of argumentation meets reflective forms of itself."

One form of reasoning is theoretical discourse. The topic of discourse is usually the universal claims put forward in speech and the norms substantiating them. They correspond to specific forms of argumentation and types of arguments. In the cognitive use of language, the speaker takes on the responsibility of substantiating constative speech acts. If necessary, he, as a rule, refers to the sources of experience from which he draws confidence in the truth of his statements. If the given justification turns out to be doubtful, then the problematized claim to truth becomes the subject of theoretical discourse. In the interactive use of language, the speech act has an immanent obligation to justify it. To confirm the correctness it is necessary to point to a normative context that gives the speaker the conviction that he is right. If direct justification does not remove doubt in the correctness of the action, one can move on to practical discourse, the subject of which, however, will not be the claim of a speech act for correctness, but the claim for the significance of the norm that justifies it. Explicative discourse problematizes the claim to intelligibility, here the means of mutual understanding themselves become the subject of analysis. This type of discourse is associated with reflection on expressive means language and serves to clarify and clarify the meaning of the expressions used and the correctness (for example, grammatical) of their construction.

As a special “modus of communication”, Habermas singles out the expressive use of language, which he associates with the readiness of the speaker by his actions to confirm the sincerity of what was said. In contrast to the three previous cases, a discursive justification for the truthfulness claim is impossible, it can only be demonstrated. If the speaker's direct assurance of his sincerity is questioned, then it can be double-checked by the sequence of his actions.

The concept of discourse

Jurgen Habermas based on the analysis of works on analytical philosophy, highlights an area that differs from traditional action structures, i.e. the so-called communicative actions, within the framework of which an understanding is achieved between the participants in the situation. It is important for Habermas to show that the understanding that should develop in a situation is not predetermined and not programmed, it is not carried out automatically, so he needs to somehow delay the very process of its structure and formation.

Habermas closely connects the concept of discourse, which is widespread in modern philosophy, with communicative action and explains it as follows. Discourse is, as it were, a “suspension” of purely external compulsion to act, a new reflection and argumentation by the subjects of actions of their motives, intentions, expectations, i.e. actually claims, their "problematization". Of particular importance to Habermas is that discourse, by its very nature, contradicts the model of domination - coercion, except for "coercion" to a perfect persuasive argument. Opponents of Habermas's theory of communicative action have repeatedly reproached him for constructing some kind of ideal situation of consensus-oriented, "persuasive", non-violent action and an ideal "soft", argumentative counteraction. Appealing both to cruel human history and to the modern era, which does not incline to complacency, critics insistently repeat that Habermas's theory is infinitely far from "irrational" reality. Habermas, however, does not deny that he (in the spirit of Weber) studies "pure", i.e. ideal types of action, and above all the type of communicative action. At the same time, he proceeds from the fact that the communicative action and communicative rationality identified and studied by him correspond to quite real features, dimensions, aspects of actions and interactions of individuals in actual history. After all, mutual understanding, recognition, argumentation, consensus are not only concepts of theory. These are integral elements of human interaction. Habermas distinguishes a number of types of discourses:

theoretical discourse, which is organized on the basis of cognitive and instrumental mechanisms,

practical discourse, which is associated with moral and practical assumptions and is based on the definition of correctness and the norm of action,

discourse in the form of aesthetic criticism, which is evaluative-evolutionary in nature and is built on the basis of correlation with value standards,

discourse in the form of therapeutic criticism, the main characteristic of which is expressiveness, plausibility of expressions,

· the discourse of self-expression and self-explanation, which is determined by the achievement of clarity of what is being expressed and is based on the correctness of the formation of symbolic structures.

The distinctions of the three worlds (objective, social, subjective) are important for Habermas to consistently decompose and group different types of actions:

strategic action (includes instrumental and “actually strategic” action. Orientation towards success (or the need to reckon with failure), towards the use of means that meet the goals set, remained its common identification marks)

teleological actions, i.e. related to goals (only with the objective world)

Normative-regulated, dramatic actions associated with self-presentation (actions are correlated with two worlds, respectively, with the social and objective world or with the social and subjective world,)

activities related to communication (actions in establishing understanding are associated with establishing relationships between all three worlds.)

In speech utterances in relation to each of these three worlds there are modalities. In relation to the objective world, it is concluded that this judgment true or false. In relation to the social world and the system of social norms - what is it correct or wrong, and in relation to the subjective world associated with the therapeutic presentation - that it plausible or implausible.

Thus, on the basis of the constructed logic of statements and the analysis of the effectiveness of this logic, a form of capture of all worlds by communicative actions is shown.

Purpose of discourse, as well as the goal of communicative action and argumentation, is to reach agreement on the subject of communication. The agreement reached can be characterized in terms of common understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and agreement with each other about the rules in force. The basis for agreement thus provides for the recognition of four interrelated universally valid claims: understanding, truth, truthfulness, and correctness. This means that different forms of argumentation, by virtue of their need to complement each other, form a system and internally point to each other. This circumstance is fundamental for the theory of truth as a consensus proposed by Habermas. Its main conclusion is that the truth of statements cannot be judged without taking into account the question of the competence of the participants in the discourse; and the issue of competence cannot be resolved without taking into account questions of the truthfulness of expressions and the correctness of actions. Only by taking into account the totality of factors, one can distinguish between genuine and imaginary consensus.

Idea genuine consensus requires participants to distinguish between being and seeming, essence and appearance, existing and due. Competence in use makes it possible to distinguish the world of accepted beliefs (the objective world) from the subjective world of mere opinion. The distinction is facilitated by the transition of the language game to the meta level, which introduces the dimension of the speaker's responsibility for his words and their consequences. This allows you to notice the difference between being and what should be, between observed behavior and rules that are followed or violated. These three types of distinctions, taken together, make it possible, in the end, to distinguish genuine consensus from an imaginary one as a result of argumentative discourse.

The essence of Habermas' interpretation of truth as consensus is thus that truth is understood not as a predicate that can be attributed to a certain statement, but as a claim contained in it. Doubting the legitimacy of a claim to truth calls into question not the semantics of the statement, but the pragmatic meaning of the speech act that puts it forward. Truth is thus placed in dependence on the argumentation of the statement claiming it.

Ideal speech situation. The concept of genuine consensus

The main problem in interpreting truth as a consensus reached by reasoning is that a reliable criterion is needed to distinguish between real and imaginary consensus. As such a criterion (as well as a criterion for distinguishing different types of discourse and the corresponding types of speech acts), Habermas proposes to introduce “ ideal speech situation.

The ideal speech situation is characterized by the following. First, it does not allow any violence - neither external, nor violence that follows from the structure of the communication itself. This means that pure communicative action is prototypical for it. The only kind of coercion it allows is the “non-violent” violence of the best argument, which stimulates the search for convincing and reliable ways to substantiate the claims made. Truth, therefore, is connected not so much with the logicality / illogicality of arguments, but with the pragmatic modality of their persuasiveness. Here it is also important to pay attention to the connection established by Habermas between the idea of ​​truth and the idea of ​​freedom. According to this idea, a consensus is considered "rationally motivated" or "rationally justified" only if it is reached in the course of a "persuasive" argument.

Of particular importance in the search for convincing arguments is discourse logic. It should provide for the possibility of an increasing tightening of the conditions of argumentation, which means that not only the legitimacy of the conclusion or the choice of data substantiating it can be called into question, but also the entire initial system of assumptions within which the data are described, hypotheses and laws are formulated. In other words, since any statement is made within the framework of a certain language system, if it is possible to prove its inefficiency, it must be subjected to a critical check and, if necessary, modified.

Secondly, the structures of the ideal situation of speech provide symmetry of conditions for the participants of the discourse, which is achieved, on the one hand, by the partners' recognition of each other as fully sane, responsible and truthful subjects of action, as well as their readiness for criticism, self-criticism and substantiation of their opinions; on the other hand, an equal distribution of chances in the choice and implementation of speech actions, which provides the fundamental possibility of exchanging roles in the dialogue, as well as the symmetry of rights and obligations. An equal distribution of chances to put forward explanations, assertions, explanations, justifications and substantiate or refute their claims to significance lays the foundation that no opinions will escape criticism and thematization over time. The symmetry of roles, which means the right to order, allow, forbid, etc., concerns not the discourse itself, but the conditions of its organization and includes the ideas of freedom and justice reformulated in terms of universal pragmatics, i.e. requirements of an ideal form of life.

Thirdly, the ideal situation excludes a systematic break in communication. The subjective condition for this is that the communicative action continues as long as everyone agrees that they are rightfully making mutual claims. One can talk about discourse when one admits the fundamental possibility of reaching a rationally justified agreement on the subject, which implies that the argument is carried out quite openly and can continue it for a long time. The consensus reached in an ideal speech situation is considered genuine consensus.

The concept of an ideal situation of speech is important for explaining the very possibility of speech. The prototypical character of mutual understanding in the case of spoken language is that in any speech act one should assume the existence of an ideal situation, even “contrary to the facts”. According to Habermas, some initial agreement refers to the very structure of speech, without which it would not be possible. Since the meaning of speech obviously lies in the fact that at least two participants - the speaker and the listener - agree on something, they behave as if the desired mutual understanding is already valid at every moment.

Returning to the problems of the theory of argumentation, one can notice, together with Habermas, that only in theoretical, practical and explicative discourses, the participants in the argumentation should proceed from the fact that the conditions of an ideal speech situation are fulfilled with a high degree of approximation. Therefore, the concept of genuine discourse cannot be interpreted in the Hegelian sense as capable of historical realization. However, since the outcome of any discourse depends on its focus on a genuine consensus, then in every discourse one should start “against the facts” from the assumption of an ideal discourse. The fact that this assumption operates in the case of “operational” argumentation allows us to consider the ideal speech situation as one of the conditions for the possibility of discourse and cognition in general. The ideal situation of speech is thus not an empirical phenomenon, but neither is it a bare construct; its mutual acceptance is inevitable in any discourse.

An argument approaches the conditions of genuine discourse if, from the point of view of process, it can convince a universal audience, from the point of view of procedure, it can end in a rationally justified agreement; in terms of products, can substantiate or refute meaningful claims with persuasive arguments. Under these conditions, argumentation can be considered as a cooperative search for truth aimed at reaching an intersubjective agreement, the strategy of which is determined by the mechanism of production of the “best argument”, and can be considered a continuation of the communicative action oriented towards mutual understanding by “other means”.

The process of mutual understanding consists, according to Habermas, in essence, from the proposal of a speech act and the Yes / No position that the opponent takes in relation to this act. Objective - i.e. an agreement about something in the world that can be challenged depends on establishing a relationship between the speaker and at least one listener.

To establish mutual understanding, the constitutive dialogue is of particular importance. universals. Without referring to these universals, it is impossible to define the invariant components of the speech situation: namely, the expressions themselves, the interpersonal relationships that are generated between the speaker and the listener, and the objects in question. However, one universal or formal pragmatics cannot reveal all the necessary conditions for mutual understanding. For these processes, the material ones that determine them are also essential, among which Habermas singles out the concepts of the objective world and the life world as the most important.


List of used literature:

1.Modern Western theoretical sociology. Issue. 1. J. Habermas.

2. Habermas Y. "Democracy, reason, morality." M., 1992

3. Article: Ritums Rozenbergs "The problem of social consensus in the works of J. Habermas" 1995 (Rozenbergs R. - Jr. Researcher Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, own correspondent of the newspaper "Labrit" (Riga) in Moscow.)

4. Article: Ritums Rozenbergs "The problem of social consensus in the works of J. Habermas" 1995

5. Article: "Basic concepts and ideas of Habermas's theory of communicative action." 6.Yu.V. Gromyko “G.P. Shchedrovitsky and the theory of communicative action by Jürgen Habermas. Points of correlation and incompatibility.

7.M. Sobolev "On the concept of the philosophy of language by Jurgen Habermas"

8.Electronic encyclopedia "Circumnavigation". Biography of Habermas

Electronic encyclopedia "Circumnavigation". Biography of Habermas

Modern Western theoretical sociology. Issue. 1. J. Habermas. M. - 1992

Habermas Y. "Democracy, Reason, Morality." M., 1992.

Article: Ritums Rozenbergs "The problem of social consensus in the works of J. Habermas" 1995 (Ozenbergs R. - junior researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, correspondent of the newspaper "Labrit" (Riga) in Moscow.)

Article: Ritums Rozenbergs "The problem of social consensus in the works of J. Habermas" 1995

Article: "Basic concepts and ideas of Habermas' theory of communicative action."

Yu.V. Gromyko “G.P. Shchedrovitsky and the theory of communicative action by Jurgen Habermas. Points of correlation and incompatibility

Yu.V. Gromyko “G.P. Shchedrovitsky and the theory of communicative action by Jurgen Habermas. Points of correlation and incompatibility

M. Soboleva "On the concept of the philosophy of language by Jurgen Habermas"

Jurgen Habermas is a contemporary philosopher and social theorist. His works became widely known at the turn of the 60s and 70s, and in the early 80s, with the publication of the fundamental work The Theory of Communicative Action, interest in his ideas among sociologists in Western countries increased even more. At the same time, Habermas's social theory has only recently become the subject of systematic consideration in Russian literature.

As a rule, Habermas is considered the representative of the 2nd generation of the Frankfurt School. He was indeed influenced by the works of neo-Marxist theorists: Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno. But H. never sought to simply develop and continue their ideas. He tried to develop his own concept based on the reconstruction of classical philosophical and sociological theories. He relied only on the Marxist tradition, but also on the ideas of Weber, Freud, Mead, Durkheim, Parsons, and also on phenomenological sociology. Also, among the sources of his theory, a significant place is occupied by concepts borrowed from various areas of philosophy, psychology, and linguistics.

For Habermas, the reconstruction of Marx's social theory is essential. On the one hand, H. largely remains in line with the Marxist tradition, but his view of the theoretical heritage of Marx is free from any dogmatism. H. does not accept the position of classical Marxism that the laws, religion, morality of society do not have their own history, since they are elements of an ideological superstructure derived from the basis. In contrast, X. adheres to the view that the sphere of culture is not entirely subordinate to the economic sphere, but has its own logic of development. From his point of view, social progress is determined not only by the development of material production, but also by the growth of human knowledge. If Marx paid exclusive attention to the concept of labor, then H. insists that communicative interaction between individuals, aimed at achieving mutual understanding and agreement on the goals of their activities, is no less important for social development.

Following Weber H. considers the process of rationalization of various spheres of life in Western society. H. draws on ideas from Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. He argues that in Weber's theory there is a certain gap between the analysis of rationalization in the field of ethics and culture, on the one hand, and in the field of politics and economics, on the other. According to H., considering the society of the era of early capitalism, Weber focuses on the rationalization of the ethical sphere, but does not pay enough attention to economic and political structures. At the same time, from the point of view of H., when Weber turns to the analysis of contemporary society, he describes, first of all, a rational capitalist economy and rational bureaucratic management, but not a further rationalization of culture and moral consciousness. H. considers it necessary to show that in and in the era of early capitalism and in the XX century, there is a kind of dialectical interaction between culture and political and economic structures.

One of the central concepts of the theory developed by H. is the concept of " lifeworld" (a concept close to the meaning used by Schutz). The life world is a sphere of direct existence of people and their primary contacts and interactions, including the totality of the experience of everyday life shared by people.

From H.'s point of view, the evolution of society is accompanied by a process of rationalization of the life world. Yes, in traditional societies mythological thinking prevailed, and the dominant cultural tradition imposed certain norms and values ​​on individuals. In contrast, in modern society, the cultural tradition itself becomes the subject of reflection, critical reflection, as a result of which the worldview modern man characterized by much greater logical consistency and rationality.

How can a truly rational interaction be achieved? First of all, H. refers to a situation where people's behavior is not entirely rational, and communication between them is systematically distorted. The possibility of a way out of this situation H. connects with the use of some of Freud's ideas and in particular the methods of psychoanalysis developed by him. According to Freud, in the course of a psychoanalytic procedure, the patient acquires the ability to analyze his memories or the content of his dreams in such a way that he becomes aware of impulses previously repressed into the sphere of the unconscious. If this procedure is successful, the patient is freed from distorted perceptions and achieves a greater degree of rational control over his actions. This establishes a truly rational communication between therapist and patient. According to H., this example can serve as a model of any communication, that is, in the end, it is possible to overcome the reasons that distort the process of communication between interacting individuals.

H. uses the concept of "ideal speech situation" to refer to a state of affairs when all disagreements and conflicts between people are resolved in the process of communication, completely free from any coercion. Ideal speech situations must satisfy 2 conditions: 1. all potential participants in the discourse must have equal chances to use communicative acts. 2. All participants in the discourse should have an equal chance to put forward interpretations, statements, recommendations, justifications and to problematize, substantiate and refute their claims to validity, so that no preconceived opinion can long avoid thematization and criticism.

Such a situation suggests that equal individuals, in the course of discussing problems of interest to them, are subject only to the power of more convincing arguments, but not to external pressure. Wherein the purpose of communication is to reach consensus agreement between all its members. H. considers such a situation as an ideal type, which should be compared with the real processes of communication, which are to some extent distorted. At the same time, H. obviously adheres to the point of view that the ideal speech situation is, in principle, quite achievable.

This concept H. often criticized. At the same time, first of all, the utopianism of the model of communication proposed by him was emphasized. An ideal speech situation implies that all participants in communication have equal opportunities to defend their point of view. Meanwhile, in real life, the level of education and the degree of competence of individuals in a particular area can vary significantly. Representatives of some social groups have clear advantages in access to education and cultural capital. Also, from the point of view of critics, even if the participants in communication are approximately equal in competence, reaching agreement can be difficult when it comes to interaction between representatives different cultures or supporters of different scientific paradigms.

H. pays great attention to the problem social action. He develops his own concept of types of social action, which is opposed to them by Weber's concept. The concept of communicative action is of primary importance for H., but it acts only as one of the ideal types. In the concept of H. teleological action aimed at the most effective achievement of any goal. Such an action is divided by him into two types: instrumental (aimed at natural objects) and strategic (involves interaction with people around him. But at the same time, the subject of strategic action considers other people as means to achieve his goal). Regulatory action subject to some commonly shared values ​​and norms with which the individual must correlate possible consequences their actions. Dramaturgic action associated with the self-expression of the acting individual, with an attempt to create a certain image in the eyes of others. Communicative action is aimed at achieving joint results based on the voluntary consent of its participants.

If the subject of a strategic action is a separate individual striving to achieve his egoistic goals, and such an action is essentially not social in the full sense of the word, then each of the following types is somehow correlated with the actions of other people. The communicative action is most aimed at achieving mutual understanding between individuals. It always implies the possibility of establishing a truly rational communication between them.

According to H., any distortions of communication generated by the life world itself, which have arisen due to insufficient rationalization of the interaction of individuals, can be overcome. However, the communication process continues to be distorted, now due to the influence of external causes. The life world is subject to expansion from the side of the system, that is, the economic and political organization of society. The concept of the life world, denoting the sphere of direct communication between individuals, reflects only one side of social reality. The second side of this reality is represented by the concept of a system, which includes, first of all, the market mechanism and bureaucratic management structures.

market economy and government invade the sphere of interpersonal interaction and impose their demands on it. This process is designated by H. as the colonization of the life world by the system. As a result of such a process, commodity-money exchange and relations of domination and subordination are implanted at the level of life. However, H. does not consider the colonization of the vital world irreversible. As the main forces counteracting the influence of the system in modern society, he considers new social movements: anti-war, environmental, feminist, etc. The activity of such a range of movements allows at least partially limiting the further expansion of the system.


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